On Taking Liberty:

The Role of Emotion in Creating a Mimetic Illusion

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This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Murdoch University

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree that any territory education institution.

Abstract

Stories need to be told in such a way that they build and sustain a narrative momentum. We tend to think of the story as the art, and the telling of it as the craft of storytelling. The Russian formalists referred to them as the fabula, the stuff of the story, and szujet, the composition of the plot. This thesis is mainly concerned with the szujet, the praxis of telling a story, in the medium of drama.

The dramatic performance of a story elicits from an audience a response that has much in common with the way we normally relate with other people. The principle difference between these two situations is with their motivation. We deal with other people for reasons and with motives of our own whereas we deal with dramatic performances for reasons and motives modulated and framed by someone else. These ulterior motives and reasons are usually masked from the audience by the conflict presented to them at the outset of the performance. The conflict evokes an emotional response from the audience and in this way engages them with the unfolding of the performed narrative. The emotional experience of an audience watching a dramatic performance is designed by the dramatist through a complex variety of dramaturgical techniques and devices employed in the narration. As long as this emotional engagement is sustained the audience responds to it as if the reasons and motives of the engagement are their own, thus giving rise to a mimetic illusion of verisimilitude that defines the medium of dramatic performance. To understand the medium it is important to understand how the emotional response in the audience is established and maintained.

This two-part thesis considers this question by presenting a specific example of how it was done by the play *Taking Liberty.* The first part of the thesis is the script for *Taking Liberty* which serves to demonstrate some of these dramaturgical techniques. The contextual component of the thesis

seeks to illuminate how the complex emotional response in audiences is established and maintained. This contextual component has three chapters.

Chapter 1 describes some of the dramaturgical techniques used in *Taking Liberty*. Chapter 2 deals with the receptive activities triggered in an audience by the sort of dramaturgical devices described in Chapter 1 and the way that normal day to day methods of processing sensory data into information and "understanding" are recruited into narrative reception.

Narrative reception requires psychic effort by an audience. The motivation for this effort is emotional. Chapter 3 examines contemporary approaches to the emotions and their relation to narrative. Each of drama's great variety of dramatic situations is invented to evoke particular emotional responses. The design of emotional experience, its changes of valence and intensity, is a vital aspect of composing dramatic texts and creating a mimetic illusion.

Contents

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Dr Garry Gillard

Taking *Liberty* (draft 7)

Characters and casting for eight actors:

1 - John Bertrand
2 - Ben Lexcen
3 - Alan Bond
4 - Warren Jones
    Major Peter Costello
    Press
5 - Hugh Treharne
    RPYC Commodore 1
    Baron Bich
    Ted Turner
    Press
6 - Newscaster
    Lex Bertrand
    Teacher
    RPYC Commodore 2
    Press
    John Cuneo
    Vic Romagna
    Grant "Maddog" Simmer
7 - Therapist
    James Hardy
    "Ya" Smidmore
    An American judge
8 - The "Commodore"
    Bill Lucas
    Bob McCulloch
    John "Chink" Longley

The play could be performed by six but eight actors is preferred. The set should be multipurpose, dominated in the centre by a 12 metre yacht, however that might be represented, with something corresponding to a helm with a steering wheel, two winches, a mast, a boom and various ropes and pulleys, such that the cast can approximate the activity of the crew during the race. Also a generic office and a couple of telephones.

Act One

A blizzard of audio and visual media from the winning day: a nation celebrates its great victory.
Amidst the sounds of cheering, clapping, crowds singing Waltzing Matilda and "Down Under" by Men at Work on the radio, come the voices of newsreaders and broadcasters:

"Australia has won the America's Cup!" Etc.

Lights come up on John Bertrand centrestage, on a platform from which he will deliver a motivational talk based on his book, Born to Win.

JOHN -- Good evening. I'm John Bertrand.

Applause and cheers.

JOHN -- Thank you. Thanks. As you know, I'm the man who skippered the boat that won the America's Cup.

Applause and cheers.

JOHN -- Thanks. If any of you can still afford it after paying for your tickets, my book's on sale in the foyer. It tells the story in glorious detail. But you're not here to buy a book. You want to know what it takes to win - against impossible odds.
Alan Bond once told me once that trying to win the America's Cup was like climbing a mountain that is never been climbed before. But it was much harder than that.
It was more like catching a rare butterfly. A big white butterfly. And then taming it. And riding it. That is what it felt like at the helm of *Australia II*.
That amazing sailing machine was created by my good mate Ben Lexcen.

Ben enters, looking a little lost.

JOHN -- As you know Ben passed away a while ago. At the funeral I found myself wondering... what would Ben say to… whoever it is that meets us at that last port of call…

Ben looks at the audience.

BEN -- Is this it then, the last drop of the anchor?

JOHN -- ...how would he explain…?

BEN -- I'm done?

JOHN -- ... what he did?

BEN – Oh, I …well, I designed the boat that won the America's Cup.

JOHN -- ... And why he did it?

BEN – Beats me.

JOHN – And you probably heard about another old mate of mine….

We hear the loud slam of a dungeon door resonating away into distant echo and lights come up on Alan Bond.

JOHN -- ... I can well imagine what he'd say.

ALAN – I'm Pissed Off!

BEN – I'm not sure why.

ALAN -- I'm not saying I shouldn't be here. If they see fit to put me in jail for losing shareholders' money so be it.

BEN – I don't think I had a choice.

ALAN -- That is not what I'm pissed off about. I'm talking about my medal!

JOHN -- When something like that happens,…

ALAN -- My Order of Australia. For winning the America's Cup.

JOHN --... You can't help wondering...

BEN – It is what I was born to do.

ALAN -- They took it back!

JOHN --... Was it *worth* it?

BEN – It nearly killed me.

ALAN -- As if it never happened.

JOHN – But it was.
ALAN - But it did.

JOHN -- I know it was worth it.

ALAN -- I won it!

JOHN -- But how to explain …

ALAN -- I had what it takes.

JOHN -- The will...
ALAN -- The will.

BEN -- How do I start?

JOHN -- The drive....
ALAN - The drive.

JOHN --... where it comes from...

ALAN -- You have to believe in yourself.

JOHN -- ... the need…

ALAN -- I always had that.

A cockney teacher shouts.

TEACHER -- Oy! Alan Bond! You come back here, you little brat!

BEN – Well,…

ALAN -- (*a sly child*) You won't catch me!

BEN -- I took my first breath in a bush camp near Boggabri,

JOHN -- For me it begins…

ALAN -- I'm going to Australia!

BEN -- next to the Condamine River.

JOHN -- with a toy boat...

ALAN -- And I'm going to be rich.

JOHN -- in the shallows of Port Phillip Bay...

BEN -- Once, when the river was flooding,...

We hear Frank Miller's voice.

FRANK -- Hold on Bob.

BEN -- ... my dad tried to carry me across... (*remembering*) I'm holding on dad.

FRANK -- Hold on tighter, son. The current's getting stronger.

BEN -- I'm trying dad...

FRANK -- Tighter, Bob, tighter son!

BEN -- I can't!

FRANK -- Bob!!

BEN -- Sorry dad…! And off I went, splish splash! Swept away down the mighty Condamine.

ALAN -- I hated it when I got here.

JOHN -- \
BEN -- / The water felt like a cradle.

ALAN -- The heat, the flies…

BEN -- They found me on /the sand…

ALAN -- …/the sand.

BEN -- …half a mile downstream.

ALAN -- I thought "my godfather…

BEN -- Dad!

ALAN -- …where am I?!"

FRANK -- It is all right son, I've got you.

ALAN -- But I soon learned to recognise opportunity when I saw it.

BEN -- I was seven when I saw it.
(*As young Ben, in wonder*) What's that dad?

FRANK -- What's what, son?

BEN -- That heuuuge dam.

FRANK -- That is not a dam, you stupid little bastard.

DOREEN -- (*also a voice-over, lush and deep and beautiful*) Don't be cross with him Frank, he doesn't know. That is the sea, Bobby.

BEN -- The sea.

JOHN -- When I was 12...

BEN --What's that driving on it?

JOHN -- My dad bought me my first real boat.

DOREEN – It is a boat. And a boat doesn't drive, Bobby. It sails. Isn't it beautiful.

BEN -- That is when I started drawing boats.

JOHN -- My very own VJ,...

BEN -- Dad left us high and dry in Newcastle,

JOHN -- … almost as fast as a Flying Dutchman.

BEN -- and I never saw him again. As for Mum...

A kid calls out.

KID -- Hey, Bobby Miller….

BEN -- well, I didn't see a lot of her either...

KID -- … your mum's a slag!

BEN -- No she's not!

KID -- She roots American sailors! (*Kid runs away laughing*.)

BEN -- Maybe that is why I wanted to beat the Yanks. Get my own back.
/When I was 13…

JOHN -- /When I was 13 I was State Junior Champion.

BEN -- …I left school

ALAN -- I started my own business /when I was 16.

BEN -- /When I was 16 I designed and built my own boat. A bright yellow Comet.

ALAN -- When I was... twenty one
JOHN -- (*simultaneously*) When I was... twenty /two
BEN -- When I was... twenty /three

ALAN -- I'd...
JOHN -- (*simultaneously*) I'd...
BEN -- I designed a Flying Dutchman.

JOHN -- ... won three National Championships...

ALAN -- ... made my first million.

Alan arrives in the office. This time he sits behind the desk.

ALAN -- Business was booming and my acquisitions were increasing exponentially.

Bill Lucas and Warren Jones enter the office.

WARREN -- /Mr Bond...
LUCAS -- \Mr Bond...

ALAN -- (*still to the audience*) I acquired all sorts of things.

LUCAS --... you have a couple of farms I'm interested in buying.

ALAN -- Property…

WARREN --... I have a business I'm interested in selling.

ALAN -- Businesses …

LUCAS -- Unfortunately I don't have the ready cash right at the moment...

ALAN -- All sorts of stuff.

LUCAS -- But I do have a truly beautiful boat.

ALAN -- A boat?

LUCAS -- The Panamuna. She's the Queen of the fleet at the Royal Perth Yacht Club.

WARREN -- That sounds like a good deal.

ALAN -- You reckon?

WARREN -- Yacht clubs are full of business contacts, Mr Bond.

ALAN -- You know a bit about boats?

WARREN -- I know a bit about everything, Mr Bond.

ALAN -- What's your name?

WARREN -- Jones, Mr Bond. Warren Jones.

ALAN -- Listen, Warren, I've got a deal going with the Iranians. They want live sheep. God only knows why. And frankly, I'd rather not. But a lot of the sheep are getting sick on the way over there and the Iranians won't pay for sick sheep so we end up dumping half the cargo into the Arabian Gulf. You sort it out for me and I'll buy your business. (*To Lucas*) And I'll take that boat as well.

WARREN -- And be sure to join the club, Mr Bond.

Two yacht club Commodores pop up at the helm of the yacht.

COMMODORE 1 -- Oh no, no, no, no. Even if he has bought
/the Panamuna.

COMMODORE 2 -- /The Panamuna is a fine boat. But he's still not...

COMMODORE 1 -- ... he's just not...

WARREN -- What you want to be is...

COMMODORE 1 -- \
COMMODORE 2 -- ... a member of the club.
WARREN -- /

Warren leaves. Ben approaches Alan.

COMMODORE 2 -- Not the right sort at all.

BEN -- Mr Bond?

COMMODORE 1 -- Not for the Royal Perth Yacht Club.

ALAN – Yes?

COMMODORE 2 -- The Panamuna might well be the biggest in the fleet...

BEN – I hear you want a fast boat...

ALAN – Not just fast....

COMMODORE 1 -- But Rolly Tasker sails...

ALAN – I want

COMMODORE 1 –)
COMMODORE 2 --) ... the *fastest* boat in the Royal Perth Yacht Club. ALAN --)

The Commodores leave.
James Hardy approaches John.

ALAN – Have you got a boat that fast?

HARDY – Are you John Bertrand?

BEN – Nope.

JOHN – I am.

BEN – I've got a real pretty picture though. (*He shows Alan his design*)

ALAN – Will it beat /Rolly Tasker?

HARDY -- /Rolly Tasker tells me you're a good sailor on a fast boat.

BEN – She'll beat anything with sails.

JOHN – You're Gentleman Jim Hardy.

ALAN – How much will it cost?

HARDY – Frank Packer wants to take another crack at the cup in 1970.

BEN – A hundred grand, give or take.

JOHN – Which cup?

HARDY – There's only one, lad.

ALAN – Better be bloody fast then.

BEN – She will be.

JOHN – Got a boat?

HARDY – Can't sail without a boat. Gretel II. She's a beauty.

JOHN – Will she win?

HARDY – Why don't you come and check her out.

Ben, John and Hardy leave.

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ALAN – (*to audience*) Benny built me the Apollo. And she beat the pants off Rolly Tasker and the snobs at the Royal Perth Yacht Club and I enjoyed it so much I took Ben and his boat to New York for a real boat race. The Newport to Bermuda.

Alan wanders around the hull.

ALAN -- Next to where we docked the Apollo in New York, there was a beautiful looking boat I went over to have a look at. And that is where it all began.

Vic Romagna, wearing a Commodore's hat, pops his head up.

VIC -- Who the hell are you?

ALAN – G'day! I'm Alan Bond from Australia. Who the hell are you?

VIC -- I'm Commodore Victorio Romagna, from the New York Yacht Club, now get your fat arse off this boat. How'd you like me to come and shove my face in *your* living room window?!

ALAN -- I was only having a gander at ...

VIC – You're trespassing, you cheating Aussie bastard, get the fuck off my boat before I call the cops.

ALAN -- (*backing off*) Fuck you too, I'd bet I could buy and sell you 10 times over!

Vic leaves. Alan crosses to Ben.
John steps up to the helm, as if for the first time.

ALAN -- Jesus, Benny, what got up his jumper?

BEN -- He probably thought you were spying for Gretel II.

ALAN -- Gretel who?

JOHN -- I was 22 when I stepped on board Gretel II…my
/first Australian challenger

BEN -- /The Australian challenger for the Cup.

ALAN -- What cup?

BEN -- The America's Cup.

ALAN -- What's that?

BEN -- What's that…?! Bondy, mate, it is like sailing's version of the Ashes.

JOHN -- I felt I was following the call of my seafaring heritage.

BEN -- Every sailor's wet dream is winning the America's Cup. It started in 1851 as some sort of goodwill race between the Poms and the Yanks. Which the Yanks won, so Queen Victoria gave 'em the cup. The whole bloody world's been trying to win it back off them ever since. But nobody ever has.

JOHN -- My great-grandfather helped to build the boats that Sir Thomas Lipton challenged with.

BEN -- The Lipton teabags guy tried for 30 years. Five different times. Each time in a boat called Shamrock. But he never got lucky.

ALAN -- Can anyone challenge?

BEN -- Anyone with a 12 metre boat and a club to back him. But before you can sail against the Yanks, you have to win the challenger's trials, and this year...

JOHN -- In 1970...

BEN --... there's us Aussies...

John takes a position to the back and side of the helm.

JOHN -- …the only other challenger was a French boat,

BEN –... and that French bloke that makes the ballpoint pens.

JOHN -- Financed and skippered by the impeccable Baron Bich.

Baron Bich, proud and resplendent with white gloves and a long cigarette holder appears at the helm of his yacht.

ALAN -- What are our chances?

BEN -- I reckon we'll beat the frogs easily enough.

BB – Alle, alle! Toute suite!

ALAN -- But we won't beat the Yanks?

BEN -- No one's done it yet.

ALAN -- Is it possible?

BEN -- Could be. With the right boat and the right crew and a truckload of money. You interested?

ALAN -- (*looks back at where he had the fight with Vic*) Lets talk about it on the way to Bermuda.

Ben and Alan leave.

JOHN -- In our first three races we beat the French hands down.

Baron Bich reacts to being thrashed with a chain of French expletives.

JOHN -- Then in the fourth race...

Baron Bich tries to peer through the fog, waving it out of his eyes and coughing.

JOHN -- The Baron got lost in the fog...

BB – Sacre Bleu!! Where the merde are we?!!

JOHN -- And had to be towed back to port.

Baron Bich leaves the helm, grumbling in more French expletives.

JOHN -- So we won the trials, which made us feel pretty good…

The crew of Gretel II appear looking smart and efficient, James Hardy at the helm and John as port trimmer (on the left).

JOHN -- … until...

HARDY – There she is gentlemen... on starboard...

The crew turn right to look across at Intrepid.

JOHN -- ... our first real America's Cup race - against *Intrepid*.

HARDY -- ... the boat we're here to beat. By God, she's coming up fast.

JOHN -- I think we'd better tack.

HARDY -- She won't try and cross our bow this close at that speed.

JOHN -- Why not?

HARDY -- It wouldn't be sports... man... like, dear God she is! This is outrageous! Paul, when you get a chance, hoist the protest flag. Gentlemen, we are tacking the boat! Paul, you damn fool, I said when you get a chance, don't do it while we're tacking the...

PAUL -- (*off*) Aaaagh!!

VOICE -- (*off*) Man overboard!

HARDY -- Oh Christ! We'll have to go back! Drop the spinnaker!

JOHN -- I don't think we can.

HARDY -- Why not, for God's sake?

JOHN -- I think it is tangled.

HARDY -- Christ! Untangle the spinnaker! But watch out for...

VOICE -- (*off*) Aaaagh!!

ANOTHER VOICE -- (*off*) Man overboard! Again.

Crew freezes.

JOHN -- We lost the first race under protest and the New York Yacht Club treated our complaint...

HARDY -- (*smarting*)... like a patronising headmaster dealing with a bunch of naughty schoolboys.

JOHN -- So we weren't going to let them get the better of us in the second.

Crew goes to work.

HARDY -- Nicely timed, boys. I make it 2 1/2 minutes to the starting gun and at this rate we'll cross the line in perfect time.

JOHN – *Intrepid*'s trying to squeeze us up to the committee boat.

HARDY -- Steady as she goes.

JOHN -- I think they're going to lee-bow us. We'll have to tack.

HARDY -- (*stubborn*) Steady as she goes.

JOHN -- They're coming up under our bow.

HARDY -- Damn them! I'm not going to let them...

There is a terrible crunching sound and everybody lurches forward.

JOHN -- That was how we collided with the American boat. (*Big splash*) And our bow fell off.

HARDY -- Oh shit.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) This time the Americans protested. And won. In the end...

The America's Cup cannon fires.
The crew slump.

JOHN --... we lost the 1970 America's Cup. Four races to one.

The crew disperses.
Hardy joins John

HARDY -- Let this be a lesson to you, John lad. If they can't beat you on the water, they'll sure as hell beat you in the committee room.

Lights

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Alan and Warren in the office.

WARREN -- Alan, we need to talk.

ALAN -- Warren, how are you? Before you start...

WARREN -- Alan, the cash flow situation is...

ALAN -- Warren, I appreciate your concern but you don't have to...

WARREN -- This latest rate rise is going to raise our debt level…

ALAN – Warren, Warren? Since when did we start worrying about carrying debt?

WARREN -- Are you aware of the debt to equity ratio we're carrying at the moment?

ALAN -- Warren, there's a ratio I like better - it is the debt to terror ratio - the bigger the debt, the more bloody terrified they are of calling it in.

WARREN -- We're not that big yet, Alan.

ALAN -- Don't worry, Warren, we will be. I've just bought out Taylor Woodrow's share of Yanchep.

WARREN -- Yanchep?

ALAN -- The Wydgee property.

WARREN -- We needed Taylor Woodrow to pay for that development…

ALAN -- No way, Warren. It is too sweet a deal to let anyone else get a share.

WARREN -- How much are you paying for it?

ALAN -- 1 1/2 million.

WARREN – Where are we going to get...?

ALAN -- I had the land revalued and Commercial Bank of Sydney gave me a couple of million based on my current equity in the property.

WARREN -- 1 1/2 million? For 10,000 godforsaken acres of semi-arid scrub.

ALAN -- 16 kilometres of glittering beachfront, Warren!

WARREN -- Windblown sandhills...

ALAN -- Warren! That is no way to talk about Yanchep Sun City.

Lights

Ben approaches John.

BEN -- John Bertrand?

JOHN -- Bob Miller? We met at the Olympics back in '68…

BEN -- Actually I've changed my name, mate. I'm Ben Lexcen now.

JOHN -- Really? Doesn't your family mind?

BEN -- I haven't got one, mate. (*beat)* Listen, I'm designing a boat for the 1974 challenge for the America's Cup. Wondered if you'd like to join the crew.

JOHN -- You know I was port trimmer on Gretel II.

BEN -- Don't worry mate, we won't hold that against you. Alan wants you on the team.

JOHN -- Alan who?

BEN -- Alan Bond. He's the bloke with the money.

JOHN – Does he know the odds against winning

BEN -- I think he likes them.

Lights
Alan walks up to a microphone, a pipe band plays God Save the Queen at a distance.

ALAN -- Giday ladies and gentlemen! Welcome to Yanchep Sun City! I'm very proud to welcome the Governor and the Premier here today for the launch of Bond Corporation's America's Cup challenge. And it is a challenge I intend to win. In 1977 the America's Cup will be held right here, at Yanchep Sun City, Australia's own Cote d'Azur. By 1977, there will be a hovercraft ferry service linking Yanchep to Perth, a Grand Prix circuit and a new Disneyland. Thousands of people are already lining up for the next land release, so if you're looking for your place in the sun, you'd better get in quick.

JOURNALIST -- Mr Bond, Mr Bond!

ALAN -- Yes?

JOURNALIST -- Mr Bond... no-one's beaten the Americans to the America's Cup, ever, for over a century. What makes you think you can?

ALAN -- Because we have the best boat and the finest crew that money can buy. Thank you, that is all.

Lights

Ben addresses the audience.

BEN -- The boat I built for our first challenge in '74 was the *Southern Cross*. And Alan made John Cuneo the skipper.

John Cuneo, short and aggressive, prepares to address the crew who assemble (including Ben) on and around a bench in front of him.

BEN -- (*he turns to speak to the audience*) John was a brilliant sailor, and a very smart bloke, but, bless him, he wasn't very good with people.

CUNEO -- Take a seat gentlemen or stand up, I don't mind, so long as you shut up, listen and do as you're told.

BEN -- (*to the audience*) Like a lot of smart blokes...

CUNEO -- Now then, what's the trick to winning the America's Cup... ?

BEN -- ... He thought the rest of us were a bit stupid.

CREW -- (*a well-trained chorus*) Out-think them.

CUNEO -- ... *out-think* them! As well as out-sail them! So let's begin with the pre-start. I want you to imagine you're racing for the cup. Here's the course…

He unfurls a map of the America's Cup course indicating the six legs of the course and the direction of the wind. Each leg is marked; first, second, third etc.
There are two boat icons, represented as being behind the starting line, one indicating sails on a starboard tack, the other on a port tack. Dotted lines indicate that they are on a collision course.

CUNEO -- Here we are at the prestart. We're sailing into the wind on a starboard tack. So you see, there's the boom and the little sails sticking out of our boat (on our starboard side*)*. And here's the enemy on port tack, with their little sails sticking out (on their port side)… a both boats have reached the layline for the start. Lexcen, layline?

BEN -- Sorry...?

CUNEO -- Come on son, even you must know what the layline is.

BEN -- Oh, right, sorry... the final line of approach to the next mark.

During the following Cuneo turns away from his audience to look at the chart and the crew start to sneak away, eventually leaving Ben by himself.

CUNEO -- So we're heading in this direction and the enemy's going in this direction - the smart ones among you will have noticed that the two boats are on a collision course! Now, let's begin with the question -- who has to give way? Us, on starboard tack, or them, on port?

He turns to discover that only Ben is left.

CUNEO -- Wha...Wha... where did they go?

BEN -- I think they all had work to do.

CUNEO -- We'll see about that! (*He heads off, calling.*) Alan!

BEN -- If you're after Bondy, he's not here.

CUNEO -- Well, where the hell is he?

BEN -- Gone to pick up Bertrand from the airport.

Lights

Alan greets John.

ALAN -- Giday, John! I'm Alan Bond, how are you? Before you start, I've got the Rolls parked down the street, I'll show you some of the sites of Perth on the way. (*They walk*) Look, see that building over there? That is Exchange House, I own that. And there's International House, I own that to. And across the river over there, see, is Windsor Towers, I own that too... and... and I own…

Alan becomes preoccupied with trying to remember a complete list of his assets.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) Driving north to Yanchep took us through endless rolling sandhills. I was just beginning to wonder if a burnoosed Arab wasn't going to come trotting into view on a

camel, when Alan parked the car and we climbed up to the top of a sandhill... and from the top, for as far as I could see...the hills were suddenly green!

ALAN -- There she is - Yanchep Sun City! Location of the 1977 America's Cup, and if all goes to plan, the 1988 Olympic games. (But keep that under you're hat for now.)

JOHN -- Is that grass? Have you put in irrigation?

ALAN -- Nah! Green paint, bitumen and grass seeds. Looks fantastic in the brochures! Let's go to the boat shed and meet the crew. They're the best most experienced bunch of sailors in the country. You know Cuneo don't you. He seems to know what he's doing.

John Cuneo and the crew assemble.
Cuneo is holding two sailing ropes.

CUNEO -- Now then boys, watch and listen. This is a complex operation. You probably think you already know how to tie a knot but...

ALAN – 'Scuse me everybody. You all know John Bertrand, don't you. John's our new tactician. Looks like everything's going brilliantly. (*He gives them the thumbs up*) Good work. Keep it up. Gotta go. Things to see to.

Alan leaves. The others greet John.

CUNEO -- Save the greetings until after I am finished, thank you. Since Mr Bertrand is to be our tactician, perhaps we should introduce him to the course. Once a day, Bertrand, we take a sail around the America's Cup course. You might wonder how, since we are 18,000 miles away from Newport, Rhode Island. What's the answer, boys....?

CREW -- (*chorus, not enthusiastic*) One leg at a time.

CUNEO -- One leg at a time!

Lights.

Alan arrives back in the office.

WARREN -- Alan...

ALAN -- Warren, before you start, we need to organise transport to Newport...

WARREN – Our issued capital currently sits at half a million dollars.

ALAN -- I know, I know...

WARREN – While our liabilities are heading towards *50 million*...

ALAN -- I know, we've got a bit of a cash flow problem...

WARREN -- It is no longer a problem, Alan, it is a fucking crisis!

ALAN -- Warren, don't exaggerate, our property holdings are...

WARREN – We're mortgaged up to our eyeballs! We've mortgaged the mortgages on our mortgages.

ALAN -- The blocks at Yanchep...

WARREN -- Are *not selling*, Alan.

ALAN -- No, but when we win the cup...

WARREN -- Alan, how are we going to win the cup if we can't even afford to send the crew to Newport, let alone the boat!

ALAN -- Warren, have faith.

WARREN -- The boys on the floor at the Sydney stock exchange are holding a sweepstake. Did you know that?

ALAN -- The Sydney stock exchange *is* a bloody sweepstake, what are you talking about?

WARREN -- The closest estimate to the date when Bond Corporation collapses, wins the pot. Not *if* it collapses, mind you, but *when*.

ALAN -- Don't you worry about those defeatist bastards, Warren. You wait till they see me on the telly. Drinking champers with the Vanderbilts and the Rockefellers. Representing Australia on the world stage. They can't pull the pin on us now. It'd make the whole country look bad.

WARREN -- Alan, you won't be doing any of that if you can't afford to...

ALAN -- It is not what you can afford, Warren, it is what they think you can afford. It is all about perception, Warren. Sorry mate, got to go. Press conference.

Lights

CUNEO -- (*following the route on the map with a pointer*) Once across the starting line we start the first windward leg, which we call...?

CREW -- (*chorus, embarrassed*) Struggle street.

CUNEO -- Struggle street! The Newport Howler never fails to arrive after the firing of the 10 minute gun and the tacking is always harder than you expect. Especially on starboard. Then down we go into the first power reach, spinnaker up, with the wind on the beam. If the enemy's covered you all the way up the first leg, the second leg is your chance to get out from under. And if you don't manage it down the second leg, there's always the third leg -- power reach number two -- the test of our spinnaker skills. If they've *still* got you covered, the fourth leg becomes...?

CREW -- (*deeply reluctant chorus*) The leg of despond.

CUNEO -- (*turning*) The leg of despond!

Lights.

Alan enters the press conference.

ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press...

BEN -- This was 1974. Not too many ladies in the press corps in those days.

ALAN – ... all I need to tell you is - we have the boat, we have the crew and we have the technology. The America's Cup is in the bag. First we'll annihilate the French, then we'll beat the Americans! Thank you, that is all.

Alan leaves the press conference
The rest of the crew (including Ben) assemble around Cuneo.

CUNEO -- So much for the fifth leg blues. Now for the perils of the final windward leg, where, for the last 123 years, every challenger's hopes of taking the America's cup have finally been dashed. (*Turning*) Remember that feeling Bertrand? I believe you've had the... Blast that Bertrand, where the hell's he gone now?!

Elsewhere, Alan bumps into John.

JOHN -- Bondy, I need to talk.

BEN -- I think he's gone to resign.

ALAN -- John! How are you?! Before you start, I just have to go and...

JOHN -- I'm resigning.

CUNEO -- Good riddance! I never liked his attitude from the moment he got here.

Lights down on Cuneo.
Lights stay up on Ben.

ALAN -- I see.

Alan puts his arm over John's shoulder and they go for a little walk.

BEN -- (*to audience*) But you shouldn't take too much for granted when you're dealing with the greatest salesman in the world.

ALAN -- Why don't you tell me what the trouble is?

JOHN -- I can't work with Cuneo, Alan. I'm sorry, I'm sure he's a decent bloke but...

ALAN -- John! John! I understand... listen...

They continue their walk off.

Lights back up on Cuneo and crew. Alan and John join them. Alan addresses the crew.

ALAN -- Boys, a moment. After an amicable chat John Bertrand has decided to stay on. As our mainsheet hand. Which is just as important a job as tactician, isn't it, Cunesy?

Cuneo nods.

ALAN -- And how is our *Southern Cross* looking against the trial horses, Cunesy?

CUNEO -- We beat them consistently, Alan.

ALAN -- Good stuff.

JOHN -- But that is because you always put the best sails on the *Southern Cross* so she can't lose. What sort of trial is that?

ALAN -- Is that true?

CUNEO -- Rubbish!

ALAN -- Anyone else?

The rest of the crew shrug sheepishly.

ALAN -- Cunesy, mate, a word in your shell-like...

CUNEO -- Look, we've wasted enough time already...

ALAN – I once read that when Napoleon was starting to lose a few battles he took his best General, stood him in front of his troops and shot him. And after that they started winning battles again.

CUNEO -- I don't know what you're talking about...

ALAN -- I was afraid you wouldn't. Let me put it another way; you're fired.

Lights.

Alan walks back to the office where Warren is waiting.

WARREN -- Alan...

ALAN -- Warren, before you start I need to make a couple of calls...

Alan dials the phone.

WARREN -- There are four sets of interest payments due on Friday. We've already had three extensions and the banks won't give us any more. I'm sorry, Alan, I really am, but we have no choice. We have to cancel the challenge.

ALAN -- Warren, mate, I've got two words for you: Robe River.

Pause.

WARREN -- The ore company?

ALAN -- The iron ore company. (*Into the phone*.) Moira? Alan Bond. How are you, before you start, is Gentleman Jim at home?

WARREN -- We can't...

ALAN -- We can Warren. (*Into the phone*.) Thanks love.

WARREN -- What with??!

ALAN -- I paid the deposit out of my own funds. 150 grand.

WARREN -- How does that solve our cash flow crisis?

ALAN -- Now they're going to buy us.

WARREN -- ?

ALAN -- Reverse takeover. They get Bond Corporation, lock stock and barrel, for 25 million, in full, by September.

WARREN -- The Robe River board won't go for that.

ALAN -- Don't have any choice. Mineral Securities has a controlling interest.

WARREN -- Mineral Securities are being liquidated.

ALAN -- By Jim Jameson from Coopers & Lybrand. We had a chat, and he's agreed to a $25 million buyout. So, on the strength of that, Warren, I reckon you should be able to drum up enough credit to get the crew to Newport, don't you? (*Phone*) Ah, Captain Hardy! How are you, before you start, I've got a little proposition for you...

***

The two New York yacht club commadores, Bob McCulloch and Vic Romagna arrive in the boardroom to hold a meeting. They shake hands.

VIC -- Commodore McCulloch.

BOB -- How are you, Victor?

BOB -- Shall I officiate?

VIC – Please.

BOB -- The tactics committee of the strategic subcommittee of the America's Cup defence committee of the New York Yacht Club is

now in session. Commodore Robert McCulloch presiding, Vice-Commodore Victor Romagna also present.

Alan arrives for a press conference.

ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press, I said we would beat the French and we have done so, hands down.

BOB -- What do you make of the Australian?

ALAN -- Now we are closing in for the kill.

VIC -- Arrogant, boorish, ill mannered little toad.

ALAN -- The America's Cup is ours for the taking.

VIC -- Made his money speculating. Wouldn't know a jib from a jibe.

ALAN -- The Americans have accused us of turning the cup into a commercial enterprise.

VIC -- His only reason for being here is to get attention for some grubby real estate deal he's got happening somewhere back of the boon-docks, down-under.

ALAN -- Well, the "old money" people can look down their noses at my challenge if they want to, but the reason I want you all to know about Yanchep Sun City is only so you know where to go for the next America's Cup!

BOB -- The press seem to think he can win.

ALAN -- And just to make sure we win…

VIC -- The press wouldn't know if their nuts were on fire.

ALAN -- I've decided to join the crew myself.

The Australian crew take their positions. Hardy takes the helm. Hugh

Treharne, as tactician stands to his right. John, as mainsheet hand, stands by the mast. Chink takes his position at one of the winch grinders, Alan takes his position at the other.

ALAN -- Take a good look at the opposition boys; you won't be seeing them again, they'll be too far behind us!

HARDY -- (*through binoculars*) Who's that kid at the helm, Hugh?

HUGH -- Dennis Conner.

ALAN -- I have already checked him out. He's an arrogant little smartarse.

HUGH -- He's ruthless and a genius at timing the start.

ALAN -- Don't worry about him! We'll wipe the smug smile off his face soon enough, eh, boys?

HARDY -- We'll do what we can, Alan.

ALAN -- Hope you can keep up with me on the winches Chink, mate.

CHINK -- I'll do my best, Alan.

Chink shares a look with John. Checks his watch.

CHINK -- 10 minute gun.

The 10 minute gun fires.

HARDY -- Sheet on, gentlemen.

The crew go to work raising the mainsheet and then freeze.

ALAN -- (*to audience*) The important thing about the prestart manoeuvers is getting your timing right. Each boat wants to be ready to cross the line as soon as the starting gun fires, and if that means getting in the other boat's way, so much the better. The starting line runs between the America's Cup buoy over... (*looks for the buoy*) over there, and the committee boat, over there.

They always put the line at right angles to the wind. So you always have to sail across it into the wind on a port or starboard tack.

The crew go to work.

HARDY -- Where is he, Hugh?

HUGH -- On our leeward hip, skipper. (*Up stage left*) We've got him covered.

The crew freeze.

ALAN -- When the other boat is leeward, it means they're downwind of you, so if you're sailing into the wind, that means you're in front and you've "got a cover on them", in other words you're blocking their wind. Any wind they do get is all chopped up. Sailors call it "giving them your dirty air". And the only way for the enemy to get out of your "dirty air" is to tack away, sacrificing speed and distance.

The crew go to work.

HUGH -- *Courageous* is tacking, Jim. Do you want to cover him?

The crew freeze.
Alan demonstrates with his hands.

ALAN -- ... and the best way to stay ahead of them is to tack with them and keep them covered, so they're still stuck with your dirty air.

The crew go to work.

HARDY -- How are we on the line?

HUGH -- Pretty good. A couple of seconds to spare.

HARDY -- Let's go for it. Tacking the boat!

The starting gun fires.
The crew move in slow motion.

ALAN -- There goes the starting gun. And we're winning already. It is like I said. All you need is a halfway decent crew, a fast boat and a bit of Aussie know-how. This is going to be a cinch, boys!

HUGH -- There's activity on *Courageous*. I think they're going to tack again.

JOHN -- (*to the audience*) The helmsman has to concentrate on steering his own boat, so he needs a tactician to watch what the enemy's doing.

The crew goes back to work.

HUGH -- They're coming back at us.

JOHN -- Christ.

ALAN -- What? What's happening?

CHINK -- They're going to try to lee-bow us.

ALAN -- (*to audience*) To lee-bow someone is...um... hang on. (*To Chink*) What's that?

Chink explains using his hands, flat and vertical, thumbs representing sails .

CHINK -- We're here (*the right*), they're there (*left, to the rear*), they're going to get in underneath our bow, tack back, slide in front of us and steal our wind.

ALAN -- But if he misjudges his tack he could....

CHINK -- He could collide with us (*illustrates with his hands*) and he'd be disqualified. But once he's crossed our bow he gets right of way, so if we sail into him...

ALAN -- We get disqualified.

CHINK -- Unless we tack or duck his stern and let him pass.

HARDY -- We have to squeeze up higher and pick up enough speed to stop him getting under our bow. John, how's the wind looking to weather.

Alan looks leeward.

CHINK -- (*to Alan*) Weather is that way, Alan, where the wind's coming from.

ALAN -- I have sailed on a boat before, thanks Chink. I was keeping my eye on the other bloody boat.

CHINK -- Sorry Alan.

Alan looks to weather.

ALAN -- So let's pick up some steam then, eh cap'n?!

Hardy ignores him.

JOHN -- I can't see anything over there Jim.

HARDY – Then trim the mainsheet, man! I need another 5°.

JOHN -- Any tighter and she'll stall.

HUGH -- Here they come.

The crew watches horrified as Courageous crosses from the left, goes in front of them and then tacks back across.

HUGH –They have successfully lee-bowed us, Jim.

The sails begin to flap.

CHINK -- There goes our wind.

ALAN –Why did we let that happen?!

HUGH -- The American boat points higher and moves faster in the water.

ALAN -- What do you mean by that?

HUGH -- Their boat's better than our boat, Alan.

ALAN -- Who are you again?

HUGH -- Hugh Treharne, I'm the tactician.

ALAN -- Yes, of course, I remember, I remember. Well, you're not any more. You're fired!

Beat

HUGH -- You want me to leave right away?

ALAN -- Very funny. Captain Hardy?

HARDY -- What?

ALAN -- Did you know that when Napoleon lost a few battles he took out his best general...

HARDY -- ... and shot him. I know, I know. Do you really think that little parable is going to make me want to win this race any more than I already do?

ALAN -- Just doing my best to motivate the team. No offense, Cap'n.

HARDY -- Just let me sail the damn boat.

HUGH -- We're going to have to tack, skipper.

HARDY -- Blast and bugger! Tacking the boat!

The crew go to work in slow motion. Alan and Chink grind away at the winches.
Ben is standing to one side watching through binoculars.

BEN -- *Courageous* slides away downwind and wins the first race by five minutes.

The crew slouch, beaten and exhausted. Alan, gasping for breath, practically collapses. Hardy stays at the helm.

BEN -- She points higher and moves faster. We're fucked.

John and Hugh in a bar, perhaps a couple of pints of beer.

JOHN -- I'll be sorry to see you go Hughie.

HUGH -- I was only doing my job, John.

JOHN -- I know, Hughie.

HUGH -- A tactician has to...

JOHN --... tell it how he sees it. Of course he does. Hughie, if I was ever to skipper a challenge, I'd be lucky to have a tactician half as good as you, mate.

BEN -- *Courageous* takes the second race by one minute, 11 seconds.

Alan heads for the telephone.

HUGH -- You don't have a hope against *Courageous*, John. Not with Conner at the helm.

JOHN -- Alan doesn't understand that yet, Hughie. It is only his first race. He hasn't learnt to read the writing on the water.

ALAN -- (*on the phone*) John Cuneo?... Cunesy, mate! How would you like to come back on board?!

HUGH -- He's in for a big shock when he does.

ALAN -- Don't worry about that Cunesy, mate! I just sacked myself as well!

Alan puts down the phone and joins Ben with a pair of binoculars.

BEN -- *Courageous* wins the third race 5 1/2 minutes to the good.

HUGH – Never mind, John, there's always next time.

JOHN -- Not for me. After a lifetime of dreaming about it, Hughie, I've learned the hard truth about challenging for the cup.

BEN -- And *Southern Cross* just keeps struggling.

JOHN -- Whoever might be standing at the helm, it is the man with the money who sails the boat.

ALAN -- (*wit is end*) Christ almighty, do I have to sack the whole damn a lot of them?!!

HUGH –You just have to learn to outmanoeuvre him.

JOHN -- I just want to win at the Olympics. That is where the real champions race. Anyway, he might not challenge again.

HUGH – I think he'll be back.

JOHN -- I think you might be right.

The America's Cup cannon fires for the end of the final race.
The crew gives up sailing, exhausted and utterly beaten.

BEN – *Courageous* won the last race by four minutes.

ALAN -- They killed me!

BEN -- It is all over. I suppose that is something to be grateful for.

ALAN -- They sliced me into pieces and had me for breakfast!

BEN -- Alan, I...

ALAN -- Sorry mate, can't talk right now. I've got to face a press conference.

BEN -- It was my fault. I'm sorry, Alan. I thought I could design the perfect challenger on my first go.

ALAN -- Don't worry mate. We'll give them a run next time, eh?

BEN -- Not with me Alan. My competition days are over. I've got a dodgy ticker, mate. I can't take another year like that. I'm not up to it.

ALAN -- Don't worry Benny, you'll feel better in a few weeks. We'll catch up back in Sydney and...

BEN -- No we won't, mate. I'm off to Europe. No one'll touch me in Australia anymore. Not after this fiasco.

ALAN -- Course they will! You go and spend some time back with your family...

BEN -- I don't have a bloody family, Alan, I thought you knew that.

ALAN -- Yes, I did. Sorry. Look, you go back to Oz and I'll ring you in a month or two and we'll talk about it then, eh?

BEN -- No we won't Alan.

ALAN -- Okay, well I'll ring you anyway and see how you feel about it.

BEN -- Alan, mate, it is over! Okay?

ALAN -- Sure, sure.

BEN -- I mean it.

ALAN -- See how you feel in a month or two...

BEN -- I SAID I MEAN IT! It is over! I don't even want to think about it ever again. Roger that, Alan?

ALAN -- Sure, sure. No worries Ben. We'll talk later.

BEN – Aaaaaaagh!!

Ben leaves.

ALAN -- (*confused*) Wonder what got up his pyjamas?

Alan turns to face the press, fists raised in triumph.

ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press....

PRESS 1 -- Mr Bond, how do you feel about presiding over Australia's worst ever America's Cup defeat?

ALAN -- Gentlemen...

PRESS 2 -- Mr Bond, do you wish now that you'd spent more time sailing and less time bragging?

ALAN -- I haven't...

PRESS 1 -- Mr Bond, is this the last straw for Bond Corporation?

ALAN -- Don't you believe it. Everybody watching this challenge has learnt all about Yanchep Sun City. And I've learnt a lot about the America's Cup. It isn't just another yacht race. This is a race against the might of America. We'll be back in '77 and we will win. And for your information, Bond Corporation is very healthy. We'll be in receipt of a letter of credit very soon, from a major American bank for $100 million, and we will be refinancing all 28 companies in the Bond Empire, top to bottom.

PRESS -- Mr Bond...

ALAN -- That is all thanks.

Alan crosses to Warren.

WARREN -- What hundred million dollar letter of credit?!

ALAN -- Just playing for time, Warren. What we need to do now is set up another company to organise and manage the challenge in '77.

Warren groans.

WARREN -- Why? Why?!

ALAN -- The *cachet*, Warren! The *cachet*! You know what I've learnt from this, Warren? Men who want to be rich and powerful go to the America's Cup to be with men who are already rich and powerful. To make real money, you have to go where the real money lives. You know what your suntan socialist says about the Americas Cup? "It is just a rich man's hobby". Well, maybe they're right. But listen to the names, Warren: Sir Thomas Lipton, the Earl of Dunraven, Harry Sopwith, the Morgans, the Vanderbilts. Men like that don't just make money, Warren. They make history.

***

The aisle of a supermarket in Cowes. Ben with shopping trolley.

BEN -- After the disaster of the '74 challenge, I moved to Cowes, to try and get some work designing boats for the jet set. But nobody was interested. I was in a supermarket, down to my last few francs, when, just as I was reaching for a packet of cocoa pops, a head popped out from the end of the aisle.

Alan appears.

ALAN – 'Ello Ben!

BEN -- Jesus Christ.

ALAN -- Now then Benny, you know you shouldn't take the Lords name in vain. You've got no money, have you?

BEN -- Yes I have.

ALAN -- No you haven't. You're flat stony broke. Aren't you.

BEN -- No I'm not.

ALAN -- Yes you are. I want you to design another 12 metre.

BEN -- Why?

ALAN -- Because you're a visionary Ben. Like me! When someone says it can't be done, you just have to prove them

wrong. Now you know how *not* to design a 12 metre, you prove to the bastards that you can. What do you say? Come on, Benny, come back to Oz. Come home and give it another shot.

BEN -- I don't have a home, Bondy. Never have had.

ALAN -- There's always a room for you at my place! In fact there's half a bloody dozen.

BEN -- At your place?

ALAN – Yeah, come and live at our place, it'll be great.

BEN -- Look, Alan, I don't think...

ALAN -- Come on Benny, Red thinks of you as part of the family already. And the kids think you're the bee's knees.

BEN -- I don't… I'm a bit messy.

ALAN -- You're a lot messy, who cares, we'll get a cleaner.

BEN -- I don't...

ALAN -- What?

BEN -- I don't understand why...

ALAN -- I need you, Benny. You're a good influence. You keep me honest. And you're the only one I trust to make me a boat that'll beat the pants off 'em in '77...

Alan wheels away the trolley. Ben goes to a telephone and starts dialling.

BEN -- Well, needless to say, they kept their pants on in '77... But it wasn't my fault this time.

Ted Turner climbs onto the podium, very drunk, carrying a bottle of Bourbon.

TT -- (*deep southern accent*) Ladies and gentlemen of the press.

BEN -- *Australia* was a bloody good boat

TT -- My name, in case some of you folks ain't heard it before,...

BEN -- But John didn't come and the outfit was a shemozzle.

TT --... is Ted Turner.

BEN -- We didn't even have sailmaking facilities. They thought they could just bung up the same crappy sails every day, whatever the weather.

TT -- And I've been compet'n against the guys from Downunder.

BEN -- I don't think Alan never expected to win. He knew we didn't have a hope.

TT -- And those Aussies are the best of the best. The best of the best!

BEN -- He knew we didn't have a hope.

TT -- Which is why I take such pride in announcin' that with absolutely no damn help at all from the good burghers of the New York Yacht Club,...

BEN -- The crew tried to stay positive.

TT --... that... I have... scuse me... (*he takes a big swig from the bottle*)

BEN -- But eventually you reach that tricky point when you know in your heart that hope is just another word for self-deception.

TT --.I have just...hic...

Ben puts the phone down. Alan joins him to watch Ted.

TT -- (*after a big breath and with unadulterated pleasure*) I have just won the Amer…hic…a's…hicca's…hic. I do believe… I am…drrrr...

Ted collapses.

ALAN – Never mind Ben, we'll be back next time. With a new boat! And then we'll...

BEN -- Bugger getting a new boat! We could have done it with this one if you'd given it have a bloody chance. All it needs is decent sails and a tactician who knows what he's doing.

ALAN -- Got someone in mind?

BEN – I sure have!

Lights

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Newsreader, perhaps as a voiceover or else an actor into a microphone.

NEWSREADER --... Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer announced yesterday that in light of the Soviet Union's reprehensible actions in Afghanistan, Australia will be joining our allies, the Americans and the British, in a complete boycott of the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow... in the meantime, the Australian challenge for the 1980 America's Cup continues its preparation in Newport, Rhode Island...

Lights.
We hear a doorbell and a front door opens.
Lights up. John has just opened the door to Alan.

JOHN -- Alan? Jesus. I thought you were in Newport.

ALAN -- I had to come to Melbourne for business. Thought I'd look you up. I'm sorry about the boycott...

JOHN –I'm sorry you wasted your money.

ALAN -- Not your fault the Commies invaded Afghanistan. And, I wouldn't have given it to you if I didn't think you'd win. But now you can come and join the crew for the 1980 challenge....

JOHN -- Bondy, mate, don't go any further, I'm sorry but...

ALAN -- We need you, John. We can't win it without you. Look at what happened last time.

JOHN -- Bondy, stop it. It is too late, mate. You're halfway through the trials...

ALAN -- It is never too late, John. It is never too late. Come as tactician. You'll be Jim Hardy's 2 I.C.

JOHN – How's Jim doing?

ALAN -- He's doing fine but he needs you, John. We all do. We are really in with a chance this time. With you as tactician we can win it. I know we can. Come on John! Come and join the team. It'll be great. Listen, I've got to go, but I'll get Warren to ring you with your itinerary. See you over in Newport.

Lights.
Alan crosses to Warren in the office.

ALAN – Warren, listen; Burmah oil's in trouble. They want to sell Santos. I talked to Campbell Anderson at Burmah and he says we can have Santos for 27 million. A complete buyout. What you think?

Warren is too astonished to speak

ALAN -- Warren, that is an operating oil company for 27 million bucks.

WARREN -- … Only 27 million.

ALAN -- And they only want a million for the deposit.

WARREN – Only a million?

ALAN -- And 90 days to get it.

WARREN -- 90 days.

ALAN -- Warren, why do you keep repeating everything I…

WARREN -- We don't have a million!!! We don't have one brass fucking razoo! All we have is debt, Alan. D.E.T. Debt! And, in case you hadn't heard we're right in the middle of a...

ALAN -- Don't say it, Warren, don't say it... please...

WARREN – Credit Squeeze.

Alan groans.

WARREN -- We don't have enough to maintain the Cup challenge. I'm sorry Alan, but this time we really don't. We're going to have to close it down.

Lights
John walks onto the Australian challenge dock, where the crew are busy with preparation and maintenance on the boat. John sees Chink.

JOHN -- Chink! Good to see you on board again.

CHINK -- Hello John. What are you doing here?

JOHN -- I'm your bloody tactician, mate!

CHINK -- ?

Jim Hardy enters.

HARDY -- Hello John. Good to see you. What are you here for?

Ben comes running in with a newspaper. He doesn't see John.

BEN -- Chink! Chink! Have you seen today's *New York Post*? It says John bloody Bertrand's going to be tactician on the Australian challenge.

JOHN -- It is not wrong, Ben.

Ben swings around.

JOHN -- Have you got a problem with that?

BEN – Yeah! I've got a bloody problem. (*Heads off*) Bondy!!

JOHN -- What's got his arse on fire?

HARDY -- He's been our tactician for six months John. And doing a fine job of it. To tell you the truth, I'm surprised you think it is a wise idea to turn up like this…

Alan enters, sees the situation and immediately turns round and heads off.

JOHN -- Bondy!!!

John goes after Alan.

Lights
The office. Alan, Warren, Ben, John and Hardy.

BEN -- So you forgot to mention that you were firing me.

ALAN -- I'm not necessarily firing you.

BEN -- You don't bloody need to now, do you. The signals are pretty bloody clear.

ALAN -- Ben, it is all a misunderstanding.

BEN -- What's he bloody doing here then?!

ALAN -- I want John to be our port-trimmer.

JOHN -- Port trimmer!??

ALAN -- John, mate, before you start, I need to ask all of you a very important question. Do you think we can win?

Pause.

Can we beat Dennis?

Pause.

Question answered.

BEN -- If we got hold of the pom's bendy mast…

JOHN -- Bendy mast?!

BEN -- It is brilliant. Gives you extra sail area without breaking the rules. They made it out of rubber and fibreglass. But I could make a better one.

ALAN -- Have you got enough time?

BEN – There's never enough bloody time but I reckon I can come up with something. As long as I get everything I need.

ALAN -- How much?

BEN -- Twenty... maybe thirty grand. No more than sixty.

WARREN -- $60,000?!

ALAN -- Go to it Benny.

BEN -- Uh... what about...

ALAN – Ben, you're doing a great job. Keep it up mate.

Ben leaves.
Pause.

JOHN -- Port trimmer?

ALAN -- Look, John, what can I say? Without you, the team isn't complete. You'll still be Jim's right hand man. Think about it. Talk to Jim.

Alan shares a look with Hardy.

HARDY -- (*to John*) I'll show you what we've done with the sails.

Hardy leaves. John follows.

WARREN -- Do they know how close we are to...

ALAN -- Warren, listen. I've had a look through the books at Santos. Do you know how much they spend on insurance every year? 4 million bucks. $4 million! So I had a word with Brian Coppin at Western Underwriters. He's only too happy to invest a couple of million bucks for a guarantee of 4 million dollars worth of business later on. That gives us a million for the Santos deposit and another million to cover running costs in Newport. Now do me a favour. Go and organise the cash Benny needs for his bendy mast.

The crew assemble, Hardy at the helm, Ben as tactician, John as port-trimmer.
Alan faces the press.

JOHN -- (*to the audience*) Ben was a better tactician than I expected.

ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press, 1980 is going to be our year.

BEN -- (*as tactician*) She's dead downwind of us, Jim. Tack now, mate.

ALAN – We'll flatten the French all over again.

JOHN -- He was brilliant against the Baron's boat.

HARDY -- (*to the crew*) Tacking the boat.

The boat tacks to port, leaving the French behind.

BEN -- (*to the French boat*) Taste my spray, Monseiurs!

The crew freeze.

ALAN – We'll pummel the poms!

JOHN -- And he did a fine job against the British.

Crew go to work.

BEN -- Sail fat and fast Jim, there's more pressure ahead!

Hardy adjusts the wheel

BEN – Beautiful. Feel that lift. (*informing Hardy*) Passing the poms on starboard.

The crew watch the English boat as they pass close to it.

BEN -- (*calling*) I say chaps, have you tried rowing?

ALAN -- And then...

Lights fade on Alan.

JOHN -- But then...

ALAN -- ... finally...

HARDY -- What's our course Ben?

JOHN -- ... We came bow to bow with Dennis Connor.

ALAN -- ... we'll see to the Yanks.

HARDY -- Ben?

JOHN -- And Ben Lexcen...

HARDY -- Ben?!

JOHN -- ... the great Aussie iconoclast...

HARDY -- Are we going to cross her, or what?!

JOHN --... turned into a puppy.

BEN -- Look at that. Jesus, Dennis Connor knows how to sail a boat.

Lights
Alan arrives in the office where Warren is waiting.

WARREN -- We're losing.

ALAN -- I heard.

WARREN -- And the South Australian Parliament just held a special sitting. Passed an Act, The Santos Act, just for us. Limiting our stakeholding to 15%.

ALAN -- They've given us time to offload.

WARREN -- 20 days. 20 days! To sell 60% of our holding? It is a fire sale. We'll be lucky if we get back a fraction of what we paid. We're stuffed. You're not going to squeeze out of this one.

Beat

ALAN -- It is already taken care of, Warren.

WARREN -- ?

ALAN -- I had a chat to Rupert Murdoch. He's taking half. And Peter Ables is buying the other half.

WARREN -- You've already sold it?

ALAN -- I finalised it this morning.

WARREN -- How much did we lose?

ALAN -- Lose? Warren. You've been so busy in Newport you haven't seen what's been happening to our share price. We made $500 million, give or take. So Bond Corporation can consolidate its finances, and you, Warren can finally get a decent night's sleep.

Lights

The crew on deck.
The America's Cup cannon fires for the end of the last race of 1980.
The crew slump. Alan leaps on board.

ALAN -- Don't be glum boys, you gave it your best.

BEN -- I'm sorry, Alan.

ALAN -- We weren't ready. That is all. But next time... next time... Will we be ready next time John?

JOHN -- I hope so, Alan.

ALAN -- Course we will! Sharpen your pencil Benny, it is back to the drawing board for you. Time to go home, boys. We've got work to do.

Alan and the crew freeze. John steps forward.

JOHN – So we all went home, to prepare to come back three years later, to take on Dennis Connor and the New York Yacht Club Commodores, and try to win the America's Cup all over again.

End of Act One

Act Two:

John and Alan.
John unfolds the designs for the new yacht with the winged keel.

JOHN -- Oh Christ, here we go again.

ALAN -- Before you start...

JOHN – Alan, what did I say? No more gambles.

ALAN -- I know, but...

JOHN -- A trustworthy boat with perfect sails. No more of Ben's tricks. Just a bit of faith in me and the crew.

ALAN -- John, John, a bit of faith in me, mate. We're building two boats. Like I said. A conventional 12 metre, just for you. And this one. Ben's wet dream.

JOHN -- I know what that means. We'll spend the next two years trying to make this one seaworthy and by then it'll be too late for the other one.

ALAN – Oh, ye of little faith.

JOHN -- When will they be ready for testing?

ALAN -- We've been testing this one for six months already. Why do you think we're going to Holland?

JOHN -- Six months? Why didn't you tell me?!!

ALAN -- I can't imagine.

Lights

Alan, John and Benny at the testing tank.

JOHN -- Anything fallen off?

BEN -- Everything mate, everything. The rig collapsed, chain plates pulled out and the mast fell over. For a while I was thinking, "Jesus, these Dutch fellas don't have a clue," but it all came good and we've been feeding the data on the effect of water on the air foil based on maximum volume relative to wetted surface...

ALAN -- Just give us the results, Benny. Are they any good?

BEN -- Good? Bondy! Mate! They're fucking amazing! We're not just going to win the bloody Cup, we're going to win it by miles!

Alan and Ben dance.

ALAN -- That is what I wanted to hear, Benny. I knew you could do it. I knew it!

JOHN -- Have you tested it in the slop?

Beat

BEN -- What?

JOHN -- I'm glad she does well in a water tank, Benny, but out on Rhode Island Sound it can get a bit choppy.

BEN --??!

Lights
Bob McCulloch at the New York Yacht Club reading a big leather bound rule book.

John and Alan back in the car. John looking at the design again.

ALAN -- Look, I know he could be over-stating the advantages. He's an optimist. Like me. But don't forget the psychological advantage of a secret weapon.

JOHN -- Our last secret weapon was a bendy mast. Much good it did us.

ALAN -- Dennis is a control freak. Like Warren. Hates the unpredictable. That is what the keel does. See? Takes Dennis out of his comfort zone. It'll freak him right out. We'll hoist him with his own... thingumybob.

Vic arrives for a meeting with Bob.

VIC -- Commodore.

BOB – Ah, Victor. (*Opens a large leather bound book*) Have a look at this.

JOHN – You're sure it fits the 12 metre formula?

ALAN -- Of course it does.

JOHN -- You know what Jim Hardy says,

BOB -- Rule 27.

JOHN --"If they can't beat you on the water they'll take you to court and beat you there."

VIC -- (*Reading*) "If from any peculiarity... clause, clause, clause...

ALAN -- Warren knows the rule book backwards and as far as he's concerned the keel fits the formula.

VIC --... the measurer shall be of the opinion... clause, clause, clause...

ALAN -- And don't forget the court of public opinion. We'll always get a good hearing there.

JOHN -- What makes you think that?

ALAN -- What makes you think we wouldn't?

JOHN -- When you first went to Newport, Alan, you attracted a lot of attention … and I know why, but …

ALAN -- Meaning?

VIC -- ... if the yacht does not comply with these rules... clause, clause, clause...

JOHN -- It wouldn't hurt to be...a bit more…

VIC --... he shall report these concerns to the National authority...

JOHN -- ... circumspect

ALAN -- I'm leaving Warren to orchestrate the press campaign, does that make you feel better? So I'll need Chink to manage the day-to-day.

JOHN -- He'll probably appreciate the rest. But I'll need another man. I'll see if Hugh Treharne's available.

ALAN -- The guy I fired in 74?

JOHN -- Problem?

ALAN -- He's a pessimist. It is infectious. Before you know it the whole crew picks it up.

JOHN -- You can't blame Hugh for 74, Alan. Christ. *Nobody* believed we could win in 74.

ALAN -- I did.

JOHN -- It was your first challenge. You still thought it was ...

ALAN -- ... just another boat race.

JOHN -- But you must have known, in 77, and last time, that we didn't have a hope. This is the first time we've really been in a race.

ALAN -- You reckon?

JOHN -- Yeah.

ALAN -- I wish you'd told *me*. I could have saved myself about 20 million bucks.

BOB -- We wish to be as accommodating as possible towards technological innovation.

ALAN -- You really think this is our chance? Before you've even been on the boat?

JOHN -- If it is a dud we'll use Challenge 12.

ALAN -- You're not that different from Ben.

BOB -- However,...

ALAN -- For you it is your crew, for him it is his keel,

JOHN -- It isn't a keel yet Alan. It is an idea.

BOB --... we draw the line at controversial.

JOHN -- Let's see if it floats.

Lights down on Alan and John.

BOB -- And the word on Lexcen's new boat is controversial.

VIC – I understand it has a bulb keel, with fins.

BOB -- If there is any question of an unfair technological advantage, then, as the steward of the great sporting tradition that is the America's Cup, the New York Yacht Club is under an obligation to mount an impartial investigation.

VIC -- Officially?

BOB -- Let's keep our powder dry for the time being. But stay abreast, and keep me informed.

Lights.

Ben and John at the helm of Australia II.

JOHN -- Ben, I'll be honest with you. I'm not sure.

BEN -- You said she pirouettes.

JOHN -- She does, mate. She's a bloody ballerina. She whips around faster than any boat I ever sailed.

BEN -- But...?

JOHN -- She's slow in the chop. Already. And Port Phillip Bay's a bloody millpond compared to Newport.

BEN -- You haven't got the feel of her yet. She's delicate.

JOHN -- She's a temperamental bitch. I can never second-guess her.

BEN -- She's like any work of art, John. It takes a while to understand her. You have to learn to ride her in the rough patches. Like a big butterfly. You're used to those heavy bastards that crush the wave for you. This girl dances over them. Like a dolphin.

JOHN -- Make up your mind, Benny. What is she? A work of art, a butterfly or a fucking dolphin?

Lights.

Alan sitting in his office. Warren enters carrying a newspaper. Alan gets up to shake his hand.

ALAN -- Warren, you're early, good to see you, how are you, before you start...

WARREN – You said you'd service the debt.

ALAN -- ... Warren, I want you to know what a great job you're doing...

WARREN -- Don't....You said no more acquisitions.

ALAN -- I know, I know... listen, Chink says we should have an anthem. I was thinking of "Pennies from Heaven". What do you think?

WARREN -- Pennies from Heaven?

ALAN -- "so when you hear it thunder..."

WARREN -- "don't run under a tree", I know. What's it got to do with a boat race?

ALAN -- It is my mum's favourite song.

WARREN -- Oh.

ALAN -- Got a better idea?

WARREN -- Pick what you like. So long as it is not *Six Months in a Leaky Boat.* Alan, the Bond Corporation is a minerals and land development company. Why are we buying a bloody brewery?

ALAN -- Have you seen the share price?

WARREN – I had to read about it in the paper.

ALAN -- You've been busy.

WARREN -- I'm twice as busy since you put Chink back on the boat.

ALAN -- John needed him to run the foredeck. Chink's a tyrant on the foredeck. I know. I've been there.

WARREN – But I managed to get a moment with Peter Beckwith - and found out about all the other acquisitions. Skipper Caravans, Hope Island Casino, South Melbourne football club, Simplicity Patterns...

ALAN -- Warren, it is only the beginning.

WARREN -- You've tripled last year's debt. How long do you think the banks'll wait for their interest this time?

ALAN -- (*the boss*) Warren, why are we having this conversation?

Pause

ALAN -- Your job, Warren, is the America's Cup. I don't want you worrying about this side of the business anymore. I've got Beckwith and Oates to worry about that.

WARREN -- Beckwith and Oates don't worry enough.

ALAN -- You wanted us to have a reliable income stream. When we win the cup...

WARREN -- *If* we win it.

ALAN -- *When* we win, Warren, Bond won't be just the name of a signwriter who got rich flogging sandhills to suckers. When we win the cup, Bond will be a brand. That people trust. And you know how much banks want to be associated with a brand like that. That is when you get *real* cash flow. Pennies from Heaven Warren! "We'll see our fortune falling all over town". And every acquisition we make now, Warren, is just like another umbrella "turned upside down".

WARREN – Oh, bloody hell.

ALAN – This time, Warren,...

WARREN -- Oh Christ.

ALAN – ... this time we *have* to win.

WARREN -- You're gambling the house.

ALAN – Kit and caboodle.

Beat

WARREN -- What if we...

ALAN -- Don't! Warren. Don't.

WARREN -- But what if?

ALAN -- If … if we lose, Warren… we're fucked.

Pause

ALAN -- That is why it is important that we win, Warren.

***

Vic and Bob.

BOB -- 10 wins in 10 starts.

VIC -- Against the French and the Italians.

BOB -- Nevertheless...

VIC -- They lost one against the British.

BOB -- And won four. I think it is time to draft a letter to the Measuring Committee.

VIC -- Might look like poor sportsmanship.

BOB -- Could the Canadians be persuaded to deliver it?

VIC -- Perhaps.

BOB -- Invite them to dinner at the Vanderbilt's.

Lights
Crew and management arrive for breakfast at Founders Hall. Warren clinks his teacup for attention. It is already customary for the crew to take the piss out of Warren every morning.

WARREN -- Gentlemen. Order. Order!

JOHN -- (*to the audience*) Days at Newport began with breakfast at Founders Hall.

WARREN -- It is now 27 minutes to eight and…

CREW -- "No, it is not, it is 23 and a half minutes to eight!" "No it isn't! It is 25 minutes and 34 seconds." Etc

The crew find all this hilarious.

WARREN --... and we have an important race against the Canadians today. . .

CREW -- "Have we really?" "Christ, I'd forgotten all about it!" Etc

WARREN -- Order! *Order*!

CREW -- All right Warren, don't get your knickers in a twist. Etc.

WARREN -- Shut up!!

CREW -- Warren, what time was it again?

Crew laugh hysterically.

WARREN -- It is like a damned sixth form in here! Listen, you may have noticed that the press are getting themselves in a lather over the legality of our keel. But that is *my* department, not yours. Take my word for it, we are perfectly legal and there will be no disqualifications in Newport this summer. So you just take care of the water and I'll take care of the dry end. Now, Sir James Hardy will give us the weather.

Crew cheer.

HARDY -- Gentlemen, it is my profound honour to tell you the weather forecast this morning.

Crew cheer.

HARDY -- We are expecting strong winds from the North, gusting between 20 and 25 knots, with a heavy swell. So, keep a weather eye, and God be with you all.

WARREN – Bondy's flown back from London to talk to you this morning so I hope you'll show your appreciation by giving him your full attention.

Crew cheer.

ALAN -- Boys, I don't want you to feel bad about losing against the poms the other day. You're still doing pretty well. But we've all got to feel as if... as if... the boat was part of us. As if... as if... well, I'm not sure what but let's get out there and sail our arses off and drive the bastards mad and it is all going to be terrific. Just... terrific.

Crew cheer and disperse. Alan catches up with John.

ALAN -- John, John. What the hell is going on? Why did you let the poms win?

JOHN – We're still ahead of them in terms of...

ALAN -- Jesus H. Christ! If the poms can beat you, so can Liberty. When you're up against the Americans it is a completely different calibre of competition. You know that. It is not just an old silver mug we're fighting for, John. This isn't just another bloody yacht race!

JOHN -- I've got a boat to sail.

John leaves. Alan finds Warren.

ALAN -- Why haven't you released that telex yet?

WARREN -- Haven't needed to.

ALAN -- Warren...

WARREN -- While they're busy worrying about our keel, they're not campaigning their boats, are they. Did you read Vic Romagna's memo?

ALAN -- 34 bloody pages on fax paper? No I didn't. But I know what it says. What've you done about it

WARREN -- I issued a press release. Here.

ALAN -- (*Reading*) "We Australians are brought up to abide by the umpire's decision. Members of the New York Yacht Club obviously went to a different school." Warren, you're priceless. "As far as we're concerned the measuring committee has made its decision and that is an end to it." So why are they coming to talk to us? Has McCulloch got something else?

WARREN -- No idea.

ALAN -- If he's coming over in person he must think it is dynamite. Have you got the telex?

Warren pats his pocket.
Lights
There is a blast of the song, Down-under, by Men at Work.
John on deck.

JOHN -- (*to the audience*) On the tow out to the middle of Rhode Island Sound the crew go below and lounge on all the folded sails for a couple of hours, it is down there, that we are finally left to ourselves.

John goes below deck.
Bob and Vic have joined Alan and Warren.
Alan and Warren reading a bundle of papers.

BOB -- Are we trying to influence the outcome of the competition? No - fastest boat wins -- that is our philosophy. But it is in nobody's interest to allow an illegal boat into the contest and, as you see, under rule 27 - that is in the second document, if you'd like to read it for yourselves...

John talking to the Crew below deck.

JOHN -- Gentlemen, I know it is a damned irritating distraction but this so-called keelgate business can only be good for us. If they think we're sailing a super-boat with an unbeatable magic keel, so much the better. It spooks the competition. We know the

truth of the situation, but until we've won our last race I suggest we keep it to ourselves.

Lights.

BOB -- ... since the wing tips of your keel give your boat an increased draft and uplift which wasn't accounted for by the International Measuring Committee's first inspection…

Warren continues to read while Alan begins his furious harangue.

ALAN -- Let me make something perfectly clear to you, Bob. If you expect ...

Alan continues but his voice is drowned out by the roar of a great wind.
Hugh and John. Both in wet weather gear.

JOHN -- (*yelling over the howling wind*) Can we steady the mainsail Hughy?

HUGH – The halyard seems to be jammed.

JOHN -- Christ!

The wind calms for a moment and we hear another snatch of Alan's harangue.

ALAN --... to let a bunch of old straw-hats with a wad of trumped up bullshit...

More wind.

JOHN -- It is only 10 minutes to the start, Hughie. Scotty's going to have to go up.

HUGH – It is bloody rough John, and it is 95 ft. to the top. The mast swings over an arc of more than 60 ft. up there

JOHN -- Scotty knows the risk. And if he doesn't go up we're screwed. We don't have any choice.

Back to Alan at the end of his harangue.

ALAN -- ... we will drag you through so much mud, the names of the Commodores of the New York Yacht Club will go down in history as the biggest pack of cheats ever to claim the title of sportsmen.

BOB -- (*getting up to leave*) If you've quite finished your little tantrum Mr Bond, I don't think we have anything further to discuss, so...

WARREN -- Before you go, Bob, you might like to take these with you.

BOB -- Mmm?

WARREN -- It is a copy of a telex sent by one of your own Cup defence syndicates to the director of our testing tank in Holland. Perhaps you'll recognise it. You haven't seen this yet have you, Alan?

ALAN -- No. Thanks. "Dear Mr van Oossanen, We understand you and your team are responsible for design of the keel for Australia II. We would like to build same design under one of our own boats. We will keep this confidential so as not to jeopardise your agreement with Alan Bond..." Oh dear, oh dear. Talk about red faces.

VIC -- Since you bring up the issue...

ALAN -- Hypocrisy?

VIC -- Responsibility for the design…

Wind. There is a great crash from above. John and Hugh at the helm.

JOHN -- What the hell was that?

HUGH -- I think Scotty's in trouble.

JOHN -- Oh Christ.

Wind calms.

VIC -- According to the cup's Deed of Gift, there is a country-of-origin requirement of the designer of the boat.

ALAN – Ben's as ocker as prawns on a barbie.

VIC -- No doubt. However, it stands to reason that Mr Lexcen, for whom I assure you, we all have the utmost respect, but who, famously, does not have a formal education, let alone a degree in naval architecture, and so, frankly, could not possibly have conceived and designed a keel concept as sophisticated as the device on the base of Australia II without a considerable enough contribution from the Dutch scientists to qualify *them* as the principal designers…

Wind.
Lights down on the meeting.

HUGH -- I think his arm's trapped under the crane.

JOHN -- How the hell are we going to get him down?

HUGH -- He's on the only halyard that goes to the top of the mast. We don't have a contingency plan for this situation, John.

JOHN – Oh Christ.

Wind calms.
Lights up on Ben and Warren

BEN -- They're accusing me of cheating!!? The same guys who raced *Courageous* in 74, which, by the way, was the most incredibly illegal boat in the history of the cup, they are standing up and telling the world that my boat isn't mine!?

WARREN -- Did you design it Ben?

BEN -- I...I... how can you...?

WARREN -- This is a telex from Peter van Oossanen. It says "any suggestion that Ben Lexcen was not solely responsible for the design of Australia II is completely incorrect. I find the New York Yacht Club's position to be deeply disturbing and offensive. I hope they will have the good sense to desist from any further untrue charges." Has he got it right?

BEN -- Blood oath!

WARREN – Good, because, actually, I wrote it myself. The thing is Ben, before I release this to the press, I need to be sure that it doesn't say anything van Oossanen wouldn't say himself. There's no problem, is there?

BEN -- Of course not!!

WARREN – You're absolutely sure?

BEN -- I... it is... it is preposterouuuuuugh...

Ben collapses.

WARREN -- Ben? Ben?!

Lights

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Alan talks to the press

ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press, this is a letter from the Measuring Committee saying that under the guidelines of the 12 metre rule the winged keel concept was and is *legal*. Copies of the letter are being handed round now. I hope that finally puts this matter to rest. Because the New York Yacht Club is hereby put on notice that if they continue to pursue this smear campaign, we will take them back before the International Yacht Racing Union with indisputable evidence that they have contravened rule 42 of the America's Cup rule book, which refers to unacceptable levels of Bad Sportsmanship! Thank you.

Alan and John

JOHN -- I never heard of rule 42 before.

ALAN -- They'll've printed the headlines before anyone bothers to check it. How's Scotty?

JOHN -- His arm's broken but he'll mend. How's Ben?

ALAN -- It is his heart. We're still waiting to hear from the hospital. But it doesn't look good, John, not good at all. Why the hell did you let the poms beat you again?

JOHN -- Alan, we won the trials.

ALAN -- Of course you won. For Christ's sake, you're sailing the fastest 12 metre that is ever been built, how could you not win?

JOHN -- Alan, don't you realise that...

ALAN -- What?

JOHN -- Never mind. We need a new light air mainsail. The old one's had it

ALAN -- Costing?

JOHN -- $18,000.

ALAN -- Christ. Well, I suppose you'd better bloody get it then.

Warren arrives.

WARREN -- They're here.

ALAN -- All right, let's see what they're trying on this time.

JOHN -- I thought they'd capitulated.

ALAN -- So did I.

Bob and Vic arrive.

BOB -- Gentlemen, congratulations. It seems once again that it is finally down to you and us.

ALAN -- No "seems" about it Bob.

BOB -- We are only too happy to race you Alan. All we ask now is that you sign a Certificate of Compliance. I have a few copies if you'd care to peruse them.

Bob hands out papers. Warren reads. The others skim.

ALAN -- Warren?

Warren shrugs. Keeps reading. The phone rings.

ALAN -- (*on phone*) I said no calls.... What?...Oh, right. Yes of course. Send him in. Jesus.

JOHN -- What?

Warren looks up from reading.

WARREN -- What?

Ben enters. He doesn't see Bob or Vic.

BEN -- Bondy! John! Congratulations guys. We finally got to the start. (*Beat*)
What?

JOHN -- Are you all right?

ALAN -- Jesus Christ, Benny.

BEN – (*realising*) Oh. Didn't they tell you? Bloody Newport doctor had the leads from the cardiogram the wrong way round. Turns out it was just a bit of the old high blood pressure, that is all.

Ben sees Bob and Vic.

BEN -- I thought all the legal bullshit was over.

ALAN -- So did we. But Bob and Vic have just brought us this.

BEN -- What is it?

WARREN -- Essentially, Benny, it is an affidavit they want us to sign declaring, under penalty of perjury, that you and only you designed the boat and that in every other detail we have complied with the rules governing the races.

BOB -- It is a formality, but I think, under the circumstances, it is appropriate.

ALAN -- And only three pages this time? A very neat little package. I suggest you go and stick it up your...

WARREN -- I really don't think we're obliged to sign anything, Bob. But if you're going to refuse to race us on those grounds, by all means...

ALAN -- Go ahead! (*He tears up the papers*.) But whether you're there or not, we'll be at the starting line tomorrow and so will CBS and NBC and every other TV station and newspaper in the whole bloody world. All ready and waiting to announce that the Commodores of the New York Yacht Club are the biggest spoilsports in history. So if you don't mind, we've got stuff to deal with. Go on, off you go. See you later.

Bob and Vic leave.

ALAN -- What do you think Warren?

WARREN -- They wouldn't dare.

Beat.

ALAN -- You're right Benny, we finally got to the start.

Lights

***

RACE 1. Score; 0:0

Another blast of "Down under" drowned out by the sound of strong winds and heavy seas as the lights come up on the crew in their wet weather gear.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) Overnight a cold front arrived with blustery winds and heavy seas, so it was a wet ride out. Water crashing over the bow pours down the mast to below deck where all the sails are folded, dozens of them, ready to be dragged out and clipped to the halyard, so the winch grinders can haul them 90 ft. up the mast.

CHINK –Genoa's ready!

JOHN -- Hoist the jib! Where's the red boat Chink?

CHINK -- *(pointing down stage right*) One boat length ahead and to leeward.

JOHN – We'll go up his bum and duck through to leeward.

CHINK -- Starting gun in...5,4,3,2,1...

Gunshot

HUGH -- He's late. Nice start, John. We've got him covered.

JOHN -- Our stern's swinging around like a duchess in high heels. (*To crew*) Too much weather helm. Ease the mainsheet. Too much! Come on, let's settle it down. Better. Better.

MAD DOG -- Speeds off point three of a knot.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) "Mad dog" Simmer, my navigator. He has to try to maximise our speed relative to the angle and speed of the wind. His equipment gives him an ongoing digital readout of boatspeed and windspeed.

HUGH -- He's getting out from under us. We need more speed, John.

JOHN -- We haven't got any! It is too choppy. God damn Benny and his bloody tank tests! I told him! I bloody told him!

HUGH -- Job at hand, John.

MAD DOG -- Wind shifting. 3, 4, 5°. In our favour. We're up five. Up five and looking good.

HUGH -- We're doing fine. Just need her a little bit faster. We need 7.7, that is our target.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) I'm holding her on a knife edge - if I aim her a fraction of an inch closer to the wind, our speed drops. A fraction of an inch the other way and we gain speed but head further away from the mark.

CHINK -- Red boat coming up underneath us.

HUGH -- We only need two points of a knot, John.

JOHN -- We haven't got it Hughie. Jesus, I didn't think he was going to be so fast.

CHINK -- Here he comes.

They watch the other boat pass on their right.

MAD DOG -- There he goes.

JOHN -- This never happened in the trials. We could always hang onto our lead before.

CHINK -- Coming up to the mark.

JOHN -- This is bad, Hughie, this is bad.

HUGH -- Job at hand, John.

JOHN -- Mad dog, are you sure we've got the right spinnaker up?

MAD DOG -- Yep, it is fine.

JOHN -- What d'you think Hughie?

HUGH -- Activity on the red boat. She's jibing to starboard. Heading straight towards us on port. She's got full rights, John.

JOHN -- If we jibe with her we don't have the boat speed to catch her up.

HUGH – We can take her stern now and try for an inside overlap as we come round the mark.

JOHN -- You reckon? (*Beat*) Hughie? Your call, Hughie, but make it soon before she hits us. Hughie?

Beat.

HUGH -- Take her stern.

JOHN -- Here we go...

John slams the wheel hard over.
Crew freezes.

JOHN -- (*to the audience*) On a 20 tonne boat in a 20 knot wind with a 90 ft. sail, turning the rudder that hard puts incredible pressure on the steering system. So I really should have expected what happened next. But I didn't.

Crew goes to work.
There is a loud explosive Bang, like a pistol shot.

JOHN -- Christ!

CHINK -- Shit.

MAD DOG -- Holy fuck! What was that?

John starts turning the wheel with no effect.

JOHN -- The fucking steering's gone!

CHINK -- We've lost the spinnaker.

The crew scramble to maintain control of the boat. Chink disappears down the hatch.

HUGH -- The red boat just gained three boat lengths.

Chink reappears.

CHINK – We've sheared a pulley right out of the side of the hull. You'll have to try to steer with the trim tab while we lash it up.

Crew freezes.

JOHN -- So *Liberty* slips the hook. And crosses the finishing line one minute and 10 seconds to the good.

Lights

Crew are docking the boat. Alan leaps aboard.

ALAN -- Well done boys! Brilliant sailing. There's no contingency for equipment failure. Ben and Kenny reckon they can fix the problem tonight. So don't worry. We'll win the next four. Now I want as many of you as possible to come down to the press conference with me so you can hear me tell them what a brilliant bloody crew you all are.

MAD DOG -- If we're that brilliant maybe you could shout us a beer as well, since you're only paying us 12 bucks a day.

ALAN -- $12.50 smart boy. And tell me if there's anywhere in the world you'd rather be right now than on this boat.

MAD DOG -- Nope.

ALAN -- Nope. So you should be paying me. But you can shout me a beer instead, cheeky bastard. Come on.

Alan and Crew leave Hugh and John aboard.

HUGH -- It was my fault, John. I should have known it'd put too much strain on her.

JOHN -- The buck stops here, Hughie. Faced with Dennis on a faster boat, I lost my nerve and I asked you to call it. Hardly the act of a man in control of himself and his crew, was it.

HUGH -- He was faster today. But we've got the manoeuvrability. It gives us a big starting advantage. If you can win the start, John, the race is yours to lose.

Lights

Score = *Liberty* – 1, *Australia II* – 0

RACE 2.

The crew at work.

HUGH -- Seven minutes to the starting gun, John. We can lock them up whenever we want.

JOHN -- Let's give it another minute or two, Hughie. I don't want to have to hold Dennis under cover for more than five minutes. If we end up in a luffing situation we could drift into them. Let's take our girl for another spin. Tacking the boat!

The crew go into tacking mode. There is another loud bang from above. *The crew look up*.

JOHN -- Oh dear God, what now?

MAD DOG -- It could've been one of those aircraft?

HUGH -- It came from the top of the mast.

CHINK -- The mainsail's falling down.

They watch for a moment.

JOHN -- She's sailed thousands of miles without a hitch. Why does she have to fall apart on us now?!

CHINK -- It is stopped slipping.

MAD DOG -- For now.

There's another loud bang as the boom hits the deck.

MAD DOG -- Boom just hit the deck.

JOHN – Jesus.

HUGH -- If we can crank the mast forward with the hydraulics we could lift the boom and get some tightness back into the sails.

JOHN -- How long to the start?

CHINK -- Four minutes.

JOHN -- Let's do it. We're not giving up. We're going to start this fucking race.

Lights
Gunshot.
Lights
The crew at work.

HUGH -- Red boat just crossed the starting line. (*Down stage left*)

MAD DOG -- And... 3,2,1, the good guys cross the line.

HUGH -- They're only five seconds ahead. But we're falling in on them, John. And they've got rights. Two more boat lengths and we'll have to tack.

JOHN -- Let's go now. Tacking the boat!

The crew tack the boat. (*Putting the red boat down stage left*)

JOHN -- Nicely done, gentlemen.

MAD DOG -- Wind shift.

JOHN -- How strong?

MAD DOG -- Big. It is big; a big right-hander.

The wind picks up.

CHINK -- Jesus, we're catching up. (*They watch the red boat up stage left*)

JOHN -- We're still in this, fellas. We can beat them if we keep this up.

MAD DOG -- Wind shift to starboard.

HUGH -- We should catch it, John. They've still got boat speed on us but we can gain some if we tack back.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat!

Crew tacks the boat.

HUGH -- Dennis has seen it to. They're tacking back over, on our tail. Looks like he wants to push us into a tacking duel.

JOHN -- He knows we're in trouble. He's trying to put as much stress as he can onto our gear.

HUGH – It is the logical thing to do. Here he comes. Tack her now, John, *now*.

JOHN -- Hit the winches again, fellas, tacking the boat!

Crew goes into tacking mode in slow motion.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) Time and again the big red boat comes knifing through the water, looking for all the world as if she might cut us in half. And each and every time we slap a cover back on them. Every man in this crew is driving himself to the limit, dragging every ounce of speed we can from our wounded boat. After nine tries Dennis comes back at us for a 10th, and again the winches scream under the efforts of the grinders, sweat pouring off them, shoulders pumping, lungs heaving, and their poor bloody aching, bandaged hands flying around in endless murderous circles.

Crew shifts into realtime.

MAD DOG -- Shit, here they come again.

HUGH -- And again, John. *Now*.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat!

Crew tacks again.

JOHN -- Don't slow down now, boys! Spit blood! This is the fight we were born for!

They go back into slow motion.

JOHN -- And on she goes, Ben's big butterfly, crippled but still going, still fighting, and by some sort of miracle, still in front.

HUGH -- Jesus, they're going to... they couldn't... Christ, they're tacking back! We've got rights, John, but if we don't tack back we'll collide. Tack now. Tack now!

JOHN – Shit! Tacking the boat!

Crew tacks the boat. (Liberty passes across from up stage left to down stage right.)

CHINK – They just got three boat lengths on us...

HUGH – Break out the protest flag. (*Shouts across to the other boat*) We're protesting.

VO -- (*off*) Acknowledged.

MAD DOG -- Polite bunch of wankers, aren't they.

JOHN -- We've been behind before, boys. Hang in there. We could still find some pressure.

CHINK -- Can't see any.

Lights.
Alan and a judge in the protest room.

ALAN -- Gentlemen, we have television footage which shows, without a shadow of a doubt, that *Liberty*'s dangerous and reckless tactic would have resulted in collision if *Australia II* had not, to her own disadvantage, but for the safety of all concerned, tacked out of the way. Our bowman was also...

Bob McCulloch enters.

BOB -- Before you go any further, Alan, I don't think the court is officially in session yet, is it Lloyd?

JUDGE -- Not quite yet, Bob.

BOB -- Because if you're free tomorrow afternoon, Lloyd, a few of us are planning a little golf at the Vanderbilt's, if you're free...

JUDGE -- I'd be delighted, Bob. Thank you. Now then, let's get this protest deliberated shall we. Jury is in session.

BOB -- Well, first of all, your honour, I should explain that the television footage Mr Bond was referring to was shot on a telephoto lens which, as I'm sure you know, always makes things look a lot closer together than they actually are.

JUDGE -- I have always found that to be the case, Bob.

Lights

Score = *Liberty* – 2, *Australia II* – 0

RACE 3

Third leg, spinnaker is up. The crew's hard at work.

MAD DOG -- Four boat-lengths to the mark, John.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) Today... I'm afraid to say it in case I jinx it but... heading towards the third mark, things finally seem to be going our way.

CHINK -- Two boat-lengths.

HUGH -- Red boat's getting closer, John. But she's still a good 50 yd. behind.

MAD DOG – Bow's at the mark.

JOHN -- Spinnaker down! Jib in! Hit it guys!

(*The mark goes by along the left side of the boat.*)

JOHN -- And heading upwind. Hoist the mainsail!

The crew tacks round into the second windward leg, pulling in the spinnaker and raising the mainsail.

JOHN -- We come round the leeward mark and start the second windward leg 42 seconds in front. We may be two races down but we're not beaten yet.

HUGH -- As soon as they come round the mark slap a hard cover on the bastards. They'll throw tacks at us all the way up the leg but we have to keep him covered, John.

JOHN -- It is nothing we haven't dealt with before. Prepare to lock a hard cover on them.

HUGH -- Here they come.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat!

The crew tacks the boat.

JOHN -- How many is that?

HUGH -- 20. And it won't be the last.

JOHN -- (*to the audience*) Now the grinders are entering the red zone. The pain is so intense that only a trained athlete can tolerate it. But they knew they were bound to reach this point and Chink has a couple of tricks to deal with it.

CHINK -- This one's for Hughie. Make it the best.

The crew tacks the boat.

JOHN -- It is called the dedicated tack. And away they go again with new resolve.

HUGH -- Red boat's tacking again.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat!

CHINK -- One for the skipper! Fast hands!

The crew tacks the boat.
Lights
In the dark we hear the cannon marking the end of the race followed by the roar of a distant victorious crowd singing Waltzing Matilda.
Lights come up on the victorious crew, sagging over their equipment, looking slightly astonished.
Lights.

Score = *Liberty* – 2, *Australia II* – 1

RACE 4

In the dark we hear the clinking of a glass.
Lights up on Warren at breakfast.

WARREN -- Order! Order. It is now 26 minutes to eight, and today we have another America's Cup race to sail.

CREW -- "No, we don't, do we?" "I'm just here for the shopping." Etc
Once again the crew give him heaps.

WARREN --... Order! As we all know, yesterday Benny's keel finally proved its worth. There he is over there. How about a round for Benny.

Applause. Benny gives a big two thumbs up.

Lights

Lights up on John below deck.

JOHN -- Gentlemen, I know it feels like it is taken us forever to win that one race... it certainly feels like it to me... but now I want you to forget it. Forget it happened. Because we're still one down. We can't afford any mistakes. And we can't afford to lose the start. Not in this weather. What was it Cuneo used to say in weather like this?

CREW -- (*together*) "He who wins the start, wins the race".

Lights out.

In the dark we hear:

CHINK -- 10 seconds to the starting gun!

HUGH -- She's going to cross us, John!

JOHN – Oh, Christ, I raised the sheets too late!

MAD DOG – 5,

JOHN – I got us moving too late.

HUGH – 4,

JOHN – Too late.

CHINK – 3,

JOHN – Too late!

MAD DOG – 2...

The starting gun fires.
Lights up
They watch Liberty go past.

MAD DOG -- Thar she goes.

CHINK -- The rusty Dutch barge crosses the starting line. And she tacks.

HUGH -- She's covered us.

MAD DOG -- And there goes all the air in our sails.

JOHN – We'll never get out from under. Oh, Bertrand! You stupid. stupid bastard!

Lights

John and Alan at the press conference.

PRESS -- (*American*) John! John! Now you've confounded everybody's expectations by losing again today, do you think it might be time to change your strategy?

JOHN – Nothing'll change because nothing has changed. Yesterday we had three more races to win and we still have three to win.

PRESS -- But Dennis only has to win one. Alan, how do you feel about the New York Yacht Club already ordering the champagne.

ALAN -- Don't write us off yet. We will win, and win gloriously, just like our boys at Gallipoli.

Lights

Score = *Liberty* – 3, *Australia II* – 1

RACE 5

Breakfast.

WARREN -- (*clinking glass*) Gentleman, the time is 18 minutes and 45 seconds to eight and today...

Alan jumps up from his chair and interrupts him.

ALAN -- … You've lost three times! I've given you a boat that is capable of winning -- and you keep cocking it up. You break down and you stuff up the bloody tactics and... all that other stuff. So it is not the boat anymore, and it is not me anymore. It is you lot, and you alone. For Christ's sake, if you let them win again, it is over! I'm not coming back again. Do you understand? If you lose today... it is all over.

Lights
Crew at work on deck.

CHINK -- Two minutes to the starting gun.

JOHN -- Ease the mainsheet. I don't care if we start luffing. The slower we are the better. Where is she, Hughie?

HUGH -- Quite close, two boat lengths to weather. (*Up stage right*) No, she's bearing away on a port tack. (*Further up stage*) She might be planning to come round us. We could follow her...

JOHN -- Not this time. The leeward end of the line looks good. I'm right where I want to be. We're going to win this start if it kills me.

HUGH -- Watch your time on distance, John. We don't want to cross the line before the gun.

CHINK -- A minute to the gun.

HUGH – The red boat's tacking again. She's setting herself up to the windward end of the line.

JOHN -- That is good, that is good. We'll go for the leeward end.

HUGH -- Head her up a bit more, John, we don't want to get any closer to the line than we already are.

JOHN -- Get ready to tighten that sheet. Timing is crucial.

CHINK -- 30 seconds. I reckon we're early.

JOHN -- Hughie?

HUGH -- Burn some more time, John. Head her up a fraction more. We're only a boat length from the line.

JOHN – Yeah, but it'll take us forever to get her moving again. I'm not going to let that happen again .

CHINK -- 20. We're early.

HUGH -- We've got to burn more time, John.

CHINK -- 15.

JOHN -- Main on, Major. Jib in, Skip!

HUGH – We're only half a boat length from the line.

CHINK -- 10 seconds to the gun. And definitely early.

HUGH -- Head her up, John, head her into the wind.

JOHN -- I'm pushing her up, Hughie. I'm almost head to wind.

CHINK -- five seconds to the gun... We're going to be over…4.

JOHN -- Please God, no.

CHINK -- three... We're over.

HUGH – We've crossed the line, John.

CHINK -- /2....

JOHN -- /Too fucking soon...

CHINK -- One.

JOHN -- Noooooooo!

The starting gun fires.

JOHN -- AAARRGH!!!

HUGH -- Easy, John. Steady.

MAD DOG -- Red boat crosses the line, in perfect time.

HUGH -- It can happen to anyone.

JOHN -- Not to me! Not to me!!

HUGH -- (*calm*) We have to duck back and start again. John, drive the boat. We can still catch her up. Job at hand, John. Job at hand.

JOHN -- Bearing away!

The crew eases the sails away.

CHINK – We're round the mark.

HUGH -- And the red boat looks a bit off the pace.

JOHN -- Tighten up the main!

CHINK -- All clear on the line.

HUGH -- 37 seconds behind the red boat.

MAD DOG -- But we're at the favoured end.

CHINK -- And that is good.

HUGH -- We're still in the race, John.

JOHN -- (*To the crew*) They haven't won yet, guys. You know what Churchill used to say was the secret of winning: Never give in! Never give in! Never give in!

MAD DOG -- Wind shift, 5° to port. And here comes a lift.

HUGH -- Bottom end of the groove, John, we're right back in it!

JOHN -- What are they doing?

HUGH -- Still on port.

CHINK -- They're looking for a starboard shift.

JOHN -- We're back in the race.

MAD DOG -- But not out of the shit yet, Bertrand.

HUGH -- They're tacking back.

MAD DOG -- On a collision course.

HUGH -- Standby to tack, John.

JOHN -- Can we lee-bow them, Hughie?

HUGH – I think we can.

CHINK -- Five boat lengths.

JOHN -- Boat speed?

MAD DOG – 7:4

HUGH -- Too slow.

CHINK -- Four boat lengths.

JOHN -- Boat speed?

MAD DOG –7:5

HUGH -- Still too slow. We need 7:7

MAD DOG – 7:6. Any closer to the wind and we'll stall.

HUGH -- Tack now, John.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat!

Crew tacks the boat.

MAD DOG -- Red boat on our weather hip.

JOHN – How are they looking, Hughie?

HUGH -- We're giving her dirty air, John. And it looks like they have a mast problem.

JOHN -- I smell blood, Hughie.

HUGH -- Not there yet, John.

Lights

The America's Cup cannon fires. We hear the roar of the victorious Australian crowd. Perhaps distant strains of Waltzing Matilda

Lights up on the crew tying up to the dock. Alan and Ben come aboard. Alan calls to the unseen security guards behind him.

ALAN -- I don't want anyone on this dock that isn't crew, family or richer than me. (*To the crew*.) Boys!! Boys!!! What a pack of brilliant bloody bastards! As for that start, Bertrand, you almost gave Ben a bloody heart-attack! Come on, I want you all at the press conference. Even if I have to shout you another drink.

Alan leads the crew off and away leaving Ben and John.

BEN -- Well done, mate. Jesus, I... well done, well bloody done!

JOHN -- Thanks, Benny.

BEN -- Just a couple more and we're home.

JOHN -- I hope so, mate.

There is another roar of celebration from the crowd.

BEN -- They sure can make a big bloody fuss about a silly bloody boat race, can't they.

John smiles, nods.

BEN -- John, I...

JOHN -- What, mate?

BEN -- I.... I missed most of it. After you broke the line I couldn't watch anymore. I had to go below.

JOHN -- I understand, Benny.

BEN -- But I came up for the last leg.

JOHN -- We were a pretty safe bet by then. Even the Newport slop couldn't help *Liberty* with her starboard jumper stuffed.

BEN -- Yeah, but...

JOHN -- What, Benny?

BEN -- The chop's only a problem if you resist it, mate. She'll sail through it if you let her. You... you don't have to try so hard. Give the boat a chance to work for you.

JOHN -- I've been keeping this to myself till now Benny, because it keeps Dennis on the back foot, but sometimes your miraculous fucking keel hangs off the belly of this boat like a 3 tonne bloody pendulum and it takes a crew this good, working like clockwork, to compensate for it.

BEN -- If you get into her rhythm, John, there wouldn't be anything to compensate for.

JOHN -- I know you mean well Benny, but I don't really need this conversation right now.

John leaves Ben alone.

Lights

Score = *Liberty* – 3, *Australia II* – 2

RACE 6

Alan and Warren aboard the Black Swan, watching the race through binoculars.

ALAN -- Benny! Benny! The starting gun's about to go.

Ben comes on deck. *The starting gun fires*.

ALAN -- Oh, Jesus Christ, Bertrand's lost the start *again!*

BEN – That is it then. We've had it. I'm going to lie down.

WARREN – They've split tacks. It is not over yet.

BEN – How's he going to win if he doesn't know how to sail the bloody boat?

WARREN -- He's won two races, Benny. First to do it since Tommy Sopwith. Give the man a break.

BEN -- He could have taken home the cup by now if he trusted the bloody boat.

ALAN -- He's catching up.

BEN -- Is he? I… I can't watch it. Jesus, I don't know if I care any more. I can't even remember why winning it was so important.

ALAN -- Because it'll give us access to unlimited global finance, Benny, unlimited.

WARREN -- What Alan means, Ben, is that if we win, the doors of every major lending institution in the world will open up to us and men with very deep pockets will come running out, begging us...

ALAN -- On their hands and knees…

WARREN -- ...to reach in and take their money.
ALAN – And not just the banks, Warren. Everyone in the whole bloody country'll want to give me their money.

BEN -- You mean lend you their money.

ALAN – Course I do. That is what I mean. Good onya Benny, I told you I need you to keep me honest.

BEN -- So in the end it is really all about what's good for business?

ALAN -- And the honour of winning....

WARREN -- That is good for business.

ALAN -- And the fame and adulation.

WARREN -- Fame and adulation isn't bad for business either.

Alan and Warren share the joke and lift their binoculars again.

ALAN -- Is that what I think it is?

BEN -- What?

WARREN -- Has Dennis seen it?

ALAN -- Doesn't look like it.

BEN -- What!?

WARREN -- Big wind shift on the left.

ALAN -- I don't care what you say Benny, I reckon he's sailing that boat like bloody champion.

WARREN -- It is a header! We've taken the lead.

Ben looks through his binoculars.

BEN -- Jesus! Come on, John, ease her up on the swell. That is it. Ease and retrim. And rebalance. That is it. That is it. And again. And again. Ease, retrim, and squeeze. Come on, mate, and again.

Ease, retrim, and.... Jesus Christ, I think he's finally learnt to sail the bloody boat. Look at that.

WARREN – *Australia II* pulls ahead.

BEN -- She's romping along. I think we're going to win it.

WARREN – It is ours to lose.

ALAN -- I can already smell the money.

Lights

Score: 3:3

Race 7

A busy, but subdued crew at breakfast.
Lights up on Warren dinging his glass.

WARREN -- Order, order.

He's a bit surprised to find that there is almost immediate silence.

WARREN -- Thank you. It is 14 1/2 minutes to eight. (*He waits for the response, but there is one.*) And today we have an America's Cup yacht race to sail.

Pause. Silence.

WARREN -- Okay, well...erm, you'll notice that we have some extra security today. Apparently we're making headlines around the world. They're calling it "the race of the century" and the FBI don't want some idiot trying to make a name for himself by blowing us up before it starts. If you would do me the favour today of winning it, I'd appreciate it. Enough said. Sir James?

James Hardy stands up and addresses them.

HARDY -- Gentlemen, it is my profound honour to tell that we are expecting an eight to 10 knot south-south-westerly. It is one of

those shifty Newport breezes, so keep a sharp weather eye. God be with you all. Here's Alan.

Alan jumps up.

ALAN -- Listen, you've won three races so you're already in the history books. But the last page of the history book is still open. Don't stuff it up this time. Get out there and win the bloody race.

Lights.
Distant cheering and the final strains of "Down under".
Lights up on John below deck talking to the crew.

JOHN -- Apparently, gentlemen, we've been keeping half the population of Australia awake these last few nights. Well, tonight, they'll all be awake. They will be speaking our names in every household in the nation. And for the rest of their lives they will remember the night they watched us win the America's Cup. Today we sail into history, gentlemen, but we also sail together for the very last time. So make this one the best, for yourself and for your shipmates.

Lights
Lights up on the crew sailing the boat.
Alan and Ben raise their binoculars and watch from the tender.
The starting gun fires.

JOHN -- Well, we won the start, Hughie

ALAN -- Bertrand loses the start again!

HUGH -- He's a few seconds in front, John.

JOHN -- Yeah, but to leeward.

BEN -- *Liberty* looks a lot lighter in the water.

ALAN -- They took 1500 lbs. of lead out of her keel last night, cheating bastards.

BEN -- Not against the rules.

ALAN -- They make them to suit themselves.

JOHN -- She's faster in the water today, Hughie.

CHINK -- Wind shift coming.

HUGH -- We need more boat speed, John.

JOHN -- Mad dog?

MAD DOG -- 7.4. That is good. Try for 7.5. Good. Good. 7.6. Looking good.

HUGH -- Red boat is tacking back.

JOHN -- How do we look, Hughie?

HUGH -- I'd say we'll have about two boat lengths on them when they cross.

BEN -- That looks better.

HUGH -- Here they come. They're taking our stern.

ALAN -- That is it Bertrand. Now tack on top of them.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat.

The boat tacks.

ALAN -- Now stay on top of them.

CHINK -- Wind swinging to the right.

HUGH -- Let's take it, John.

JOHN -- Tacking the boat.

The boat tacks.

ALAN -- No! Stay where you are, you bloody fool. Shit.

BEN -- They're hitting the chop from the spectator fleet.

CHINK -- Wind shift to the left.

JOHN -- Shit, Hughie, this is trouble.

HUGH -- Let's get her back over there, John.

JOHN -- Tacking!

The boat tacks.

HUGH -- Red boat's caught up, John.

BEN -- Shit, that was bad luck.

ALAN -- Bloody stupid.

JOHN -- Let's not do anything rash. Just hang in, stay close, keep focused, stay in contact. We'll get our chance.

ALAN -- Dennis is thrashing us already.

BEN -- That is it, I can't stand it. Tell me when it is over.

Ben exits.

ALAN -- Come on Bertrand! Will you pull your bloody finger out, for Christ's sake!

Lights down on Alan.
Lights up on the crew.

JOHN -- (*to the audience)* We're losing. Coming up to the mark on the second windward leg and we're 57 seconds behind. 57 seconds to make up in just two more legs. Over in Oz, it is five o'clock in the morning and millions of people across the country are still awake, watching us on TV. Those who haven't given up in despair and gone to bed.

CHINK -- Coming up to the mark.

MAD DOG -- Which spinnaker John?

JOHN -- Hughie?

HUGH -- John, I think it is time for the man in control of himself and his crew to make the call.

MAD DOG -- John?

HUGH -- John?

JOHN – The 6 : 2.

MAD DOG -- The old 6 : 2 coming up.

CHINK – Bow's at the mark.

The crew prepares the spinnaker.

JOHN -- This is it, guys. We have 57 seconds to find.... What said the man with the big cigars?

CREW -- Never give in. Never give in. Never give in.

Crew raises the spinnaker.

JOHN -- Let's run these bastards down.

The crew is fairly still holding the boat square to the wind.

JOHN -- (*to audience*) As soon as we head downwind I can feel her sliding into the groove. Our sails are delicately balanced with a light wind dead astern and Ben's beautiful boat responds to my hands on the wheel with a mystical grace. Where's the wind?

CHINK -- Left side looks stronger.

MAD DOG -- Up two, John, up two. That is good. It is a lift. Good. Perfect. Hold her there.

HUGH -- We have got definite boat speed on them, John. I think she's going to... She's jibing. Dive below her.

JOHN -- Pole aft! We're back in it, Hughie. We're back in it!

CHINK -- Heads are swivelling on the red boat. They're worried.

MAD DOG -- We're giving them the heebee-jeebees.

HUGH -- Dennis'll try and come across. And he won't care if he rams us. He's got right of way. We have to pass before she blocks us.

CHINK -- The red boat's jibing.

HUGH -- We have to get past her before she reaches us.

MAD DOG -- Up a bit more, John.

CHINK -- The red boat's getting close.

MAD DOG -- Looking good.

CHINK -- If they hit us....

JOHN -- ... we'll be disqualified. I know, I know. Mad dog…?

MAD DOG -- Still looking good.

CHINK -- Jesus, they're getting bloody close.

MAD DOG -- Still looking good....

CHINK -- Here they come.

Crew watches Liberty coming straight towards them then passing behind them.
Lights up on Alan still watching.

ALAN -- (*cringing, as if to protect himself from the collision.*) Jesus Christmas!

MAD DOG -- And there they go!

CHINK -- By a whisker.

Alan looks up again.

ALAN -- Jesus bloody Christmas! Ben! Benny! Get your arse up here! We overtook them. We're winning again!

JOHN -- We're going to jibe and drop the chute at the same time, guys. And it is the last drop, so make it the best. Prepare to jibe.

Ben arrives.

ALAN -- She's heading up the last leg 20 seconds ahead.

BEN -- I knew they could do it. I knew it!

JOHN -- Wait for it... Hoist the genoa!

The major hoists the genoa up the mast with the winch.

JOHN -- Here we go. Jibing the boat!

The boat jibes around the mark. The spinnaker comes down.

JOHN -- This is it. The last leg home.

CHINK -- We've got 20 seconds on them.

JOHN -- By no means a safe lead.

MAD DOG -- Red boat coming round the mark.

HUGH -- Dennis'll try every trick in the book. Whatever happens, John, we have to keep a hard cover on them.

Pause.

JOHN -- What's he doing, Hughie?

HUGH -- He's tacking.

JOHN -- Here we go. Tacking the boat!

The Crew tacks the boat in slow motion. As they continue to tack, backwards and forwards, their actions become dancelike.

JOHN -- And so it begins. Dennis tries again and again to find some clear air to give his boat the power to get past us. And every time he tries we tack across to keep it from him. And with each tack both boats lose a little more speed.

ALAN -- How many is that?

BEN -- 22, or it could be 23.

ALAN -- Bloody hell. (*looking through binoculars*) Dennis's crew don't even look tired yet.

BEN -- They've had more practice at this kind of racing than us.

HUGH -- He's trying to break us, John.

JOHN -- Let him try.

BEN -- While we were having big wins against the frogs and the poms, Dennis and the others were going at each other like this all summer, months on end. They've only just started.

HUGH -- The red boat's tacking again.

JOHN -- So quickly? Are you sure, Hughie?

HUGH -- He's committed. We have to tack, John.

JOHN -- Tack the boat!

The Crew tacks the boat.

HUGH -- And he's going straight back again, John. Tack her again.

JOHN -- Hughie, wait a minute, let's try to relax a bit and make up some boatspeed. We should be at 6 1/2 knots before we tack.

HUGH -- We have to cover them, John.

JOHN -- Mad dog?

MAD DOG -- 5 1/2, skipper.

HUGH – We'll lose them.

JOHN -- Damn it. Okay. Tacking the boat!

Crew tacks the boat in slow motion.

JOHN -- The grinders' pain would be intolerable for any ordinary human being, and each one has to struggle for a reason to disobey every instinct screaming inside his head telling him that his body is too tired and the pain too great ever to do it again.

HUGH – He's coming back, John. We have to go again.

JOHN -- Jesus. And again! Tacking the boat!

The crew tacks the boat. Exhaustion is setting in.

CHINK -- This one's for Hughie.

CREW -- Hughie!

ALAN -- How many have they done now?

BEN – 38 or 39.

ALAN -- Bloody hell. Most I ever did was eight, and that nearly killed me. Come on, boys. Not far now.

HUGH -- Red boat returning. Tack her, John.

JOHN -- Tacking!

YA -- How about one for the skipper?

CHINK -- Make it the best.

CREW -- One for the skipper.

The Crew tacks the boat.

JOHN -- One windshift could make the difference to either of us right now.

HUGH -- We've still got a few boat lengths on them, John. And we're almost at the layline. Here they come again. Tack again, John.

JOHN -- We're almost home, gentlemen. Almost home. Tacking the boat.

CHINK -- How about one for Bondy!

MAD DOG -- We'd better make this one the best or we won't get paid!

CREW -- Bondy!

The Crew tacks the boat.

CHINK – That puts us on the layline.

HUGH – Chink's right, John. Tack now and it is a straight run to the finish.

JOHN -- Forget it, I'm staying right between the red boat and the finishing line. I'm not tacking until Dennis does.

HUGH -- John?

JOHN – If we tack now, Hughie, and the wind shifts, Dennis could still take us.

HUGH -- If we don't go soon he'll run us into the spectator fleet.

CHINK -- We're way over the line.

JOHN – Not going until he does.

HUGH -- John, we almost need a spinnaker to get back down to the line.

Beat.

JOHN – Okay, okay, but if he doesn't come with us, I'm going back. Tacking the boat.

CHINK -- Let's make the last one for Ben. And make it the best!

MAD DOG -- Only the best for Benny!!

CREW -- Benny!!!

The exhausted crew tacks the boat.

JOHN -- Hughie?

HUGH – Something's happening over there... they seem to be... I think... I think he's run out of options, John.

Pause

CHINK -- He's going.

HUGH -- Dennis is tacking, John.

JOHN -- Thank Christ for that.

HUGH -- Red boat's preparing their spinnaker pole.

JOHN -- Is the light air spinnaker ready, Chink?

CHINK – Spinnaker's ready, skipper.

JOHN -- Are we parallel with the layline, Hughie?

HUGH -- Just take her a little bit higher, John.

John steers to starboard.

HUGH -- Okay. Hold this course.

JOHN -- We're taking her home.

ALAN -- Hang on, boys, you can do it. Make an old man happy.

BEN -- You're not so old.

ALAN -- No. But I will be.

Alan is isolated by light. We hear, again, the resounding slam of the dungeon door which introduced Alan at the beginning of the play.

ALAN -- I...I think we're going to make it... Benny?

Lights return. Ben is no longer there. (Perhaps is now on the boat, standing by the mast.)

ALAN -- Benny?

The Crew are still.

HUGH -- Seven boat lengths.

ALAN -- Where are you Benny?

Slowly, in the distance we begin to hear "Down under".

CHINK -- Six boat lengths.

ALAN -- Benny? It is all coming true, we are going to win it.

Now we can just begin to discern the beginning of the victorious cacophony we heard at the opening. Slowly it gets louder.

MAD DOG -- Five boat lengths.

ALAN -- Benny?

HUGH -- Four boat lengths.

ALAN -- Who's going to keep me honest now, Benny?

CHINK -- Three boat lengths.

Beat.

JOHN -- Two boat lengths.

Pause.

The America's Cup canon is fired.
The victorious cacophony rushes to a crescendo
The lights slowly go down on an astonished crew.
The cacophony fades, leaving one last voice in the darkness.

"Any boss who sacks a worker for being late today, is a bum!"

Lights linger on John and Alan as they were at the beginning.

End of play.

Part two:

Composing Taking Liberty

Introduction

1) *Avoiding Tedium*

This second part of my thesis is designed to give context to the first part, the script, which I will call the practice-based research component. As the editors of the first issue of the Canadian Journal of Practice-Based Research in Theatre point out, the term "practice-based research" might equally well refer to research "*for* my practice, *through* my practice or *into* my practice" (2009, p.1), so I should make it clear that, in this instance, I am referring to research I have done, *through* my own practice, into the way drama seduces an audience into creating for themselves a mimetic illusion. By way of demonstration, I will discuss the intentionally seductive aspects I have built into my script for *Taking Liberty*. The script is the blueprint for a performance and it is, of course, through the performance that the seduction is perpetrated. In this contextual component I will examine the nature of the mimetic illusion and the methodology of the seduction I have packaged into my practice-based research component.

At this time there is so much engaging drama available to us that it is easy to take engagement for granted, but anyone who has had to sit through drama

that failed to engage them can attest to its being an excruciating experience in which time seems to slow down as boredom and restlessness intensify. Most audiences seem to think that their engagement depends on familiarity, so are inclined to watch the kind of drama that is aimed at satisfying their narrative expectations, which helps to explain the popularity of genre specific drama. However, too much of the same thing can be boring as well. As Bruner points out, "narrative generally, like culture itself, is organised around the dialectic of expectation-supporting norms and possibility-evoking transgressions" (Bruner, 2002, p.16). For all their fear of tedium, absence of innovation in the form and style of mainstream drama leaves audiences hungry for material that subverts their expectations. Thus form and style evolve as dramatists try to keep their audiences hovering precariously between norms and transgressions. Judgements are made as to the value and quality of these new developments of form and style. With regard to content, Novitz (Hjort and Laver, 1997, p.246-262) points out that transgressive works of art that challenge core values and beliefs will generally be perceived as threatening and will excite hostility towards the artists who create them. He adds that literature can, however, also operate subversively by initially engaging their sympathies through the medium of their own beliefs and values (and expectations) so that they "become susceptible, for the moment at least, to different beliefs, moral standards, religious values, and so on" (p.249). So if a dramatic narrative is able to draw its audience into an engagement with its characters it can then lead them into a conditional acceptance of those characters' (perhaps alien) sets of beliefs and values. Afterwards these attitudes will be judged according to the standards of that audience (which may or may not have changed in lieu of their experience).

I should mention that when I speak of audiences in this thesis I am speaking of those audiences I have personal experience of as a performer, director and writer. I estimate that there would have been somewhere between 2000 to 3000 of them (ranging in size from as few as 10 to as many as 5000 individuals), so I have come to know audiences quite well. As with

individuals, they are multifaceted, complex, contradictory and unpredictable. They vary enormously and have a great deal in common. I have seen and experienced many audiences who appeared to be deeply engaged with a drama even though, later, they judged it to be of dubious quality. Engagement, or reception, is triggered prior to any awareness of quality or merit. My contention is that the triggering of the reception process has the nature of a seduction and, like a seduction , it is only with hindsight that the victim is able to judge whether the experience was worthwhile or not. What I am concerned with here is the mechanics of the seduction rather than the form, style or ideological intentions of the drama. How is an audience seduced into caring about characters and situations they know to be fictional? Is there something in human nature that makes us susceptible to a hypnotic engagement by the narrative? Is there really such an activity as "suspending disbelief"? If so, how does it work? If not, does reception theory offer an alternative explanation? These are some of the questions that have engaged me through the writing of the script for *Taking Liberty*. In my research for this contextual component I have found that contemporary philosophy of the emotions provides some of the most interesting answers.

I should clarify which aspect of the reception process I am referring to as seduction. The word seduce is defined by the OED as "To lead (a person) astray in conduct or belief; to draw away *from* the right or intended course of action *to* or *into* a wrong one; to tempt, entice, or beguile *to do* something wrong, foolish, or unintended" (http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/174721?redirectedFrom=seduce#eid). My own choice of the alternatives offered by this definition, that is, my meaning in the context of this thesis, is "to beguile a person to do something unintended". There are two kinds of intention to be discerned when discussing an audience entering into an engagement with a drama. The first is the initial intention to engage with the performance – which becomes a commitment when they buy a ticket. The second kind are all the intentions we have that are elicited by our emotional involvement with the drama, such

as rescuing the damsel in distress or helping her kill the aliens. We never act on these intentions because they are decoupled from the executive representations that effect physical movement (I examine this process in Chapter 3) but we are, nonetheless, beguiled and seduced.

Drama and emotion are broad concepts that overlap and engage with each other in a number of ways. I will be discussing the nature of emotion at some length, so first of all, let me clarify what I mean by drama. Generally, when I use the term I am referring to the performance of a dramatic discourse common to film and theatre which contains action, events and character-to-character communication (illocutionary action) within a narrative context. By specifying a drama common to both film and theatre I'm trying to isolate dramatic narrative from those modernist theatrical practices that contemporary theatre has inherited (or rediscovered) from non-narrative performance modes such as ritual ceremony, music hall, dance and circus. This is not to suggest that drama doesn't employ any or all of these, but in drama they are employed, as Aristotle recognised, for the sake of the narrative action rather than spectacle. By the same token my use of the term drama excludes those technological aspects of film's narrative devices by which the screen simulates the vast windscreen of a thrillingly swift magical vehicle, and lends the drama a hypnotic elasticity of time and space, more in the mode of a novel or a dream than the representations of human action that drama in the theatre is limited to. Condensing my definition of drama in this way will, I hope, allow me to finesse some peripheral differences between the practices of writing for film and theatre and to focus my field of inquiry on those aspects of the performance of drama that are common to both. This will help me to identify those particular aspects of the dramatic mode in which the representation of human action and interaction is designed for the seduction and engagement of an audience.

2) *The "feeling" method*

Many dramatists make the point (for example, Duerrenmatt and Osborne in Cole; p.132, p.141, and Albee in Plimpton, p.251) that it is not useful to think too hard about the practice of scriptwriting while it is happening. In the heat of composition, the composer is faced with an infinite variety of decisions about what the story is and the way it should be told. Every possibility must be conceived, considered and decided upon against myriads of other possibilities and, until the work is submitted, no decision will ever be final because it must always be subject to re-evaluation in light of the next one and the one after that. It is impossible to measure consciously and rationally the value of every choice against all the other possible choices because if you did it is hard to imagine that any final decisions would ever be made. Therefore, emotional responses have to be trusted. As de Sousa points out in a more general context,

> ... emotions are among the mechanisms that control the crucial factor of salience among what would otherwise be an unmanageable plethora of objects of attention, interpretations, and strategies of inference and conduct.
>
> de Sousa, 1987, p.xv

According to de Sousa we learn and develop emotional responses by means of structured memories which he calls "paradigm scenarios":

> Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic... emotion-type..., and second, a set of characteristic or "normal" *responses* to the situation, when normality is first a biological matter and then quickly becomes a cultural one.
>
> de Sousa, p.182

A baby's smile is a prime example of this cultural appropriation of a biological response. Initially a baby's smile is "a purely biological function" (ibid) with no particular intention to communicate. But by three months the baby has learnt that a smile will evoke a response from its caretaker and so

"begins to use the smile 'instrumentally', that is, 'in order to get a response from someone'" (Stern, 1977, p.45; cited in de Sousa, p.182). Even so, a smile is rarely a conscious decision. Paradigm scenarios operate below the radar of conscious memory, influencing decisions by recalling emotional responses to the perceived value of previous actions:

> ... did the immediate outcome of the chosen action bring punishment or reward? In other words, was it accompanied by emotions and feelings of pain or pleasure, sorrow or joy, shame or pride? No less importantly, was the future outcome of the actions punishing or rewarding...? One of the main traits of civilised human behaviour is thinking in terms of the future.
>
> Damasio, 2003, p.145

We compare past and present in order to "predict" the outcome of the intended action; "anticipating it in simulated form" (ibid, p.146), measuring immediate gratification against potential for a pleasurable and proud future. In this way we grasp the meaning and value of a situation by its associated feeling before we have worked it out cognitively. When juggling, if you think too hard about what your hands are doing you're likely to keep dropping the balls. Similarly, when composing, I have to "feel" my way through the writing, hoping as I go that the best choices are being made. So this investigation into my own practice has to be a retrospective analysis; one I couldn't have made at the time without dropping the balls.

Decisions about composition must be made according to the internal requirements of the work. The composition being dramatic, these decisions will be influenced by emotion, and one of the skills a dramatist needs to master is recognising the difference between the emotions generated by his own paradigm scenarios and those generated by the scenarios he is composing. Often the story the storyteller most wants to tell, the one, that is, which seems to the writer to be of the deepest emotional significance, strikes an audience as dull and irrelevant because they don't have the same relationship with the material that the storyteller has. The narrative images and tropes and scenarios that seemed so touching to the dramatist when he

conceived of them can be misinterpreted or simply fail to trigger other people's emotional responses. Of course, caring deeply about a topic can produce great literature but it could also be said that the more deeply a storyteller feels about his tale, the greater the danger of misjudging its effects when told. Even playwrights whose works are inclined to be figural representations of their own paradigm scenarios, like Tennessee Williams or Edward Albee, recognise this. We are all, as they say, born storytellers. We like people to listen to our stories. The hard part is to *keep* them listening. Care must be taken not to let a personal relationship with the dramatic content influence dramaturgical decisions. The smile must be shared.

Taking Liberty was initially commissioned by the Perth Theatre Company (in partnership with the Royal Perth Yacht Club) to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Australia's winning of the America's Cup. The writing of the play therefore provided an ideal model for an examination of my dramaturgical practice because the application of compositional technique to the story material could be examined according to its intended effect on the audience without any danger of its being influenced by any personal emotional investment.

3) *Resistance to seduction*

Taking Liberty tells of Australia's victory over America in an international yacht race. The race is called the America's Cup because it has taken place every three years since 1840 and America never lost, until 1983, when the American boat, *Liberty,* was beaten by an Australian yacht, *Australia II*. There were three major figures involved in the Australian campaign. The Australian businessman, Alan Bond, who financed the campaign; Ben Lexcen, the designer who revolutionised yacht design with his creation of the Australian yacht's "winged keel", and John Bertrand who skippered the boat. I had intended that Ben Lexcen would be my central character because,

while Bond was better known, he was also deeply unpopular with the West Australian community, who were likely to constitute my main audience. The eventual victory enhanced Bond's international reputation to such an extent that, on the strength of it, he built a global corporate empire from pure credit. When his corporation collapsed most of the money that was lost was lost by West Australians. So I had intended to make Bond a minor character. However, it became clear as I began to write the play that Bond's role in the proceedings was too important and his presence too strong to relegate him to a "supporting role". While this seemed to be a problem at the time, it now makes the composing of *Taking Liberty* a particularly useful demonstration of the way that drama is able to seduce (or fail to seduce) its audience, even in spite of their resistance to the charms of the central character. I never met Alan Bond in person (until, as it happened, on the opening night of the play) and so I was able to create my own version of him based on the evidence of media records, interviews with people who knew him, two biographies and his autobiography. From these I selected the information necessary to present those aspects of his character (a dramatic character, fictional or not, is only ever an impression of a human being) which not only served the action of the play but allowed Bond to sell himself to the audience all over again .

4) *Dramaturgical Methodology*

The first chapter of this contextual component deals with my dramaturgical methodology as I applied it to the writing of *Taking Liberty*. I haven't tried to deal with all aspects of my practice, or to suggest that there is any system to my method. Many drama-writing manuals currently available present a list of dramaturgical rules or "principles" that a dramatist might be expected to encounter and apply (for example; Egri, 1960; Smiley, 1971; McKee, 1998; Russin and Downs, 2004; Snyder, 2005). Each of these manuals differentiates itself by identifying a list of what the writer considers to be the most important dramaturgical aspects to be dealt with. Each list is

different, though plot, character and dialogue appear in most of them. I only deal here with those aspects of the process which presented interesting problems or issues in the composing of this particular play. My own list, consequently, turned out to be exposition, suspense, and development of character. It could certainly be argued, however, that these are the three most important jobs necessary for the crafting of dramatic action.

David Mamet has suggested that all important aspects of the dramaturgical process deal with the relation of each given moment to "the whole" of the work (in Plimpton, 2000, p.382). In the process of the selection and arrangement of the story material into a dramatic structure, commonly called plotting, the choice and positioning of each piece of the story is contingent on the innumerable ways it relates to the rest of the story and the tensions set off by that positioning. I begin Chapter 1 by suggesting why the distinction between the *fabula* and *sjuzet* is analogous to that between story and plot, but more useful than the latter for a clear understanding of what is meant by "mimetic illusion". I suggest that a useful dramaturgical approach to the plotting of the story is to identify, as States does, two orders of causal determination. Within the first order, the causal determinants are the form and design of the work and of the way it will be experienced by an audience. The second order of causal determination is that of the causes and effects within the story-world of the drama. I then suggest an "organising principle" for the design of the work within each of the two orders; “Egri's premise” is the organising principle in the first order, while, in the second, it is "the hero’s pursuit of the desired outcome". These two organising principles become "keys" to the structure of the work.

The next part of the chapter deals with the problem I have already referred to, which puts to the test the seductive power of my play. This is the history of Alan Bond after winning the cup, a history that might disincline the audience to celebrate the success of the whole endeavour and, in particular, prejudice them against my "hero". My method of resolving the problem

demonstrates how the priorities of the first order of causal determination are translated into the causal patterns of the second.

The rest of the chapter deals with certain aspects of the dramaturgical process of writing this play (though by no means all of them). I begin with a discussion of the difficulties of exposition - information which is innately undramatic but necessary to understand the action. *Taking Liberty* was particularly demanding of exposition. Details about sailing and racing were necessary to appreciate much of the action, but were quite the opposite of dramatic. I describe some of the methods I used to make these kinds of essential details palatable to an impatient audience.

The success of any drama depends, to a great extent, on the dramatist's control of the audience's experience of time. This is mainly, though not completely, influenced by their relationship with "what might happen next"; it is a function of suspense. I discuss three methods of raising and maintaining tension and suspense: raising the stakes, manipulating temporal awareness and planting expectations of unpredictable outcomes. I also identify two aspects of the unpredictable in drama: event and character.

Finally in this chapter I discuss two approaches to the development and differentiation of character: dispositions or temperament, and status and self-esteem. The first of these has to do with the private side of the individual character, the second with the public face. Both approaches have a history almost as old as drama itself.

5) *Reception; mimesis and catharsis*

The second chapter is concerned with the process of reception by an audience of the performance of dramatic narrative. Engagement with the dramatic text demands complex cognitive activity that shares much in common with the everyday psychological activity happening all the time as

we process sensory data into information and "understanding". In the context of everyday life, the effort required to maintain these complex cognitive activities is considered to be worth making because they are necessary for our survival and flourishing. A dramatic narrative needs to seduce it is audience into believing that, even in the absence of "real life benefits", the same effort is, nonetheless, necessary. I argue that the illusion of this apparent necessity is sustained by an emotional involvement with the dilemma of the principal character or characters, the condition sometimes referred to as catharsis. While Chapter 3 will deal with the emotions and their part in the "cathartic" engagement of the audience, Chapter 2 is concerned with the cognitive processes of narrative reception.

To begin with though, it is necessary to consider why most theories dealing with the activity of narrative reception are inclined to ignore catharsis. I start by discussing the history of scepticism towards catharsis and question the view that catharsis is a "bad influence" on audiences of drama of both theatre and film.

In spite of its critics the universal popularity of cathartic narrative in all forms and mediums is undeniable and the rest of the chapter explores reasons for its success. I consider two kinds of explanation. First, an evolutionary explanation of the advantages the capacity for storytelling may have offered for the survival of the species. The rest of the chapter grapples with a second kind of explanation of the way dramatic narrative engages with the cognitive processes of the individual members of its audience; that is, the theory and philosophy of narrative reception. Reception theory constitutes a major branch of that vast field of research now usually referred to as narratology. I couldn't possibly do justice to the enormous amount of research that has gone into this field of study. I have tried to select and reference some of the research that has highlighted the complexity of the reception process. I have taken into account the contribution of cognitive "constructivist" psychology, formalist film theory and German reception theory to try to explain the way that everyday methods of processing

sensory data into information and "understanding" in daily life are recruited into narrative reception.

Narrative reception begins with the ordinary processing of sensory data into information. A dramatic narrative depicts a sequence of events designed to persuade an audience that they need to identify what sort of information they are getting and how and why it is relevant to the ongoing dramatic development of the narrative. We "make sense" of narrative by relating the information provided by the *szujet* to what we already know and understand. Thus we fill the gaps left by the *szujet* with story material (*fabula*) which, based on our prior knowledge, we assume "ought" to be there. This activity takes place at two "levels" of thinking; "primary" preconscious emotional responses, and "secondary" thinking that entails cognitive awareness. It is the combination of these processes that leads us to accept the apparent reality of the fictional world according to the conventions it has established.

The second chapter concludes with a discussion of Ricoeur's model of mimesis. It is based on Ricoeur's re-evaluation of Aristotle's dramatic model in the light of our understanding of time as established by Augustine. Following Aristotle, this model takes action as the principal mode of narrative and identifies three aspects of our understanding of human action: a practical understanding of its meaningful structures, its "symbolic resources" and its temporal character. Mimesis is described as an interactive activity between text and audience taking place in three stages which Ricoeur calls "the three moments of mimesis". First is the "pre-understanding of the world of action", then comes the engagement with the text, requiring representation of action and the organising of the events, otherwise referred to as "emplotment". This collaborative mimetic process culminates in the third stage, the "re-configuration" of the action as it is finally understood by the audience.

After a brief discussion of the differences between narrative reception by a reader and that of an audience member, I conclude that in both cases a great deal of psychic effort is required. I argue that the motivation to take such an effort is triggered by an emotional response to the narrative.

6) *The Emotional Audience*

The third chapter begins with a consideration of the paradoxical question (common in discussions of drama and emotion): why do we care about fictional characters? I consider some of the solutions that have been offered before presenting my favoured explanation that the mental activity of audience members when they engage with a dramatic performance is related to the essential everyday activity by which we try to understand other people. This involves a capacity to empathise with other people's dilemmas. Drama exploits these empathetic inclinations to initiate the cathartic engagement of its audience. This leads to a discussion of the role of emotions in the reception process.

I identify two schools of thought about the nature of emotion; those who associate emotion with cognition, and those who don't. The first group conceive of emotions as "propositional attitudes" and try to describe cultural explanations for mature human emotional experience. To the latter the emotions are precognitive physiological responses associated with “readiness to act”. According to this theory it is the feeling of these physiological changes that we identify as emotion; the different kinds of readiness changes determine which emotions we feel. The readiness to act is typically related to a *desire* to act, but there are some mental steps to be taken before desire is translated into physical movement. The first step is the decision which establishes the intention to act. This intention initiates a series of "executive representations" that relate the body to the goal of the action. Damasio refers to these representations as "body maps" (Damasio,

1999). He suggests that the capacity for generating body maps also offers the possibility of generating "as if" simulations that inform us how it might feel when the action we intend to take has been taken *even before we take it*. This notion is offered as a possible resolution to the fiction paradox.

In the next part of the chapter I suggest that the composition of dramatic action, insofar as it is a design for an emotional experience, bears comparison with the composition of music.

The field of human action can be divided into three categories according to the way it is influenced by emotion: (i) impulsive actions operate under the complete control of the emotions that initiate them, finessing cognition so that the necessity of the action is apparently unquestionable. Dramatists often create situations with high-stakes and big risks to provide plausible motives for characters to take this kind of action. (ii) Semi-deliberate and (iii) deliberate actions are those in which, as the name suggests, the emotional influence is mitigated by self-awareness and the need to plan and deliberate.

The “propositional attitude” school of emotional theory takes a more philosophical approach to emotions, identifying the interaction of feeling and cognition, and conceiving of emotional experience as a feedback loop between subjective feelings and cognitive reappraisals. This takes into account the complexity of values embedded in the meaning structures that a given emotion is responding to. Everyday explanations of subjective emotional experience are narrative in form in that they give present emotions a context and value by identifying the relation of the subject's concerns to the present situation and to the past and future. Values are innately attached to one's own selfish needs and desires but they are also taught, and thus culturally mediated; this includes the socially prescribed value or "appropriateness" of the emotional response itself. Narratives can demonstrate how we *ought* to respond emotionally to the kinds of situation we might encounter.

The plausibility of a dramatic action depends on the plausibility of the motive - whether the audience can recognise and respond to the concerns of the hero in the context of her situation. Like the composition of music, dramatic situations are designed to evoke cathartic responses of the broadest possible variety of valence and intensity. I give a rather contrary demonstration of this by showing how two dramatic situations of entirely different scale can produce emotional responses of equal intensity. The potential complexity of dramatic catharsis is demonstrated by instances of emotion inducing denial and self-deception. When, for example, a person feels two strong but incompatible desires at the same time it produces "psychic discomfort". We have a capacity, in such circumstances, to unconsciously alter our view of the world so that it appears more accommodating. We see it in the way, for example, the Fox decides that the grapes he can't reach must be sour, or the way, given the choice, that we choose to believe in myths that rationalise our aggression and place our own tribe at the centre of God's love. These are recognisable patterns of behaviour but unpredictable in any given particular instance.

Drama is often driven by motivations that are, for a variety of reasons, unspoken or even, sometimes, unspeakable. I consider some of these more complex aspects of the operation of the emotions in drama, such as the way that Iago's unspoken shame translates into his hatred for Othello, or the disappointment of the characters in the plays of Chekhov, and I suggest that it is only by means of the emotional comprehension we call catharsis that we can fully appreciate dramatic situations.

In so far as contributing anything new to academic knowledge is concerned, my implicit argument is that narrative theory has underestimated the involvement of the emotions in the process of narrative reception. My conclusion is that a richer understanding of the role of the emotions in the reception of dramatic narrative would be a useful academic pursuit. That

said, my true purpose and greatest hope is that the work I have done here will influence my own dramaturgical methodology for the better.

Chapter 1

A Dramaturgical Methodology

> ... if you write enough of it and let it flow enough, you'll probably come across something that will give you a key as to structure. I think the process of writing a play is working back and forth between the moment and the whole. The moment and the whole, the fluidity of the dialogue and the necessity of a strict construction.
>
> Mamet (in Plimpton, 2000, p.382)

1) *Plotting the material*

Story and plot are usually described as the "what" and the "how" of narrative respectively. But the meanings of the terms "story" and "plot", as both Lodge (1996, p.181), and Brooks (1992, p.13) point out, have become unstable and so less useful as terms for discussing narrative. The Russian formalist distinction between the *fabula* and *sjuzet* is more precise. The *fabula* roughly equates with the story, the *sjuzet* with the plot. The *fabula* has been defined as "the raw material" of the narrative (Lodge, 1996, p.207), and more precisely as "the order of events referred to by the narrative" (Brooks, 1992, p.12). The *sjuzet* is the arrangement of and consequent perspective on the actions and events presented within the narrative. This arrangement of actions and events is contingent on the temporal nature of its telling, that is, the arrangement is designed such that what is revealed sustains an ongoing preoccupation with what has yet to be revealed, the illusion being that what seems to be revealed was already there before. This impression that the narrative creates of the *fabula* as an "invariant core" which "exists prior to any narrative presentation" is

> ... in the nature of a mimetic illusion, in that the fabula - "what really happened" - is in fact a mental construction that the reader derives from the sjuzet, which is all that he ever directly knows.
>
> Brooks, 1992, p.13

Thus the *sjuzet* evokes the *fabula* in the minds of the audience, endowing it with a quality of "prior existence" by drawing the audience into a shared perspective of it. Interpreting the *fabula* from the *sjuzet* requires the imaginative (re)creation of the "original" events as experiences from the perspective of the characters involved in the narrative: "this race must be real because I care about winning it". The mimetic illusion then is the story *within which an audience imagines itself* as they listen to, and/or watch and interpret the narrative; the illusion being that the story exists prior to its telling. And it renders the audience unaware of their own complicity in the creation of the experience.

While the audience only ever experiences the *fabula* by way of the *szujet*, the dramatist must begin the composition of the *szujet* by gathering the material of the *fabula*. This story material is either invented or excavated. Drama based on extant material or history is usually easier to write than when having to invent both the story and the manner of telling:

> The dramatist writing history could finish a play Monday and start another Wednesday, and go right on. Because the *stories* are all prepared for him. Inventing the story is what takes all the time.
>
> Arthur Miller (in Plimpton, 2000. p.165)

In the case of *Taking Liberty* the story material was readily available. If you have read the play you will know that in 1983 Australia won the America's Cup, which many believed, at the time, to be the world's most prestigious international yacht race. Australia certainly believed it. But this alone would hardly have given the event historical significance. What made the victory unique was that the Americans had never been beaten in the 134 year

history of "The Cup". As a result the event made headlines around the world. The final race of the series was broadcast live from Rhode Island Sound, which made it the middle of the night in Australia, but it was nonetheless said to have been watched by the majority of the Australian population. The following morning a mildly intoxicated Australian Prime Minister famously announced that "anybody who sacks a worker for being late today is a bum". The *Sydney Morning Herald* headline called it "The Biggest Thing since Peace in 1945 - Triumph Unites Nation". A*ustralia* II, the yacht that won the race, was built and financed by a team from Perth, the state capital of Western Australia. For my research, I read the many books that have been written about the event and interviewed some of the people who were involved in it. It was the job of "celebrating" the winning of the America's Cup that presented me with a problem: how to convince an audience 25 years later that the event was still worth celebrating? Sporting events slip quickly into the quicksand of cultural history. It might be difficult for an audience to remember why such a big fuss had been made about a boat race. If they were to understand how the race was won and fully appreciate the significance of the achievement, a history of 30 years needed to be condensed into two hours, in a form that would support a sustained engagement with the material. Where to begin? Perhaps with the question: how do I come up with the plot that best tells the story?

According to States, the dramatist makes decisions based on "two different orders of causal determination" (States, 1994, p.69). The first of these is "the realm of design or purpose in nature... that is, the author's super-imposition of form on the seemingly "probable" events of the play" (ibid, p.70). Here the dramatist is thinking like an architect, organising the fate and fortunes of the characters and determining action according to narrative function so that it demonstrates his central idea (there can only be one). States' second "order of causal determination" is concerned with the purposes and pursuits within the world of the drama; the logic of the cause and effect of events and actions understood from a perspective or perspectives within the world of the drama. Here decisions regarding action

are made by or on behalf of and in the interests of the characters themselves. Like the relationship of the *fabula* and *szujet*, the difference between States' two "orders of causal determination" suggests a difference between the material of the story and the way it is experienced. However, while the *fabula* and *szujet* are useful notions for the theoretical analysis of narrative, States' concept of the two "orders of causal determination" has a more practical design aspect to it. The first step in approaching the design of an object is to establish its purpose. In the case of drama, purpose needs to be established in both orders of causal determination.

Identifying the purpose helps to establish an organisational principle. So for example, for the first order, a *premise*, as conceived and defined by Lajos Egri, is the essential basic description of the idea that the drama is designed to demonstrate. Egri argues that a spare, well formulated premise is essential for the conception of an effective drama because it quintessentialises the purpose for which the drama is written. Egri takes issue with Malevinsky who argued, as I have done, that emotion is the essential element of drama. Egri doesn't disagree, but he points out that emotion won't necessarily create good drama "if we do not know *what kind of forces* set emotion going" (Egri, 1960, p.7). Smiley suggests that "as a play dramatises a pattern of action, it simultaneously explores human character" (Smiley, 1971, p.123). Egri's premise pares down this pattern of action and exploration to a simple spare phrase; for example, "shiftlessness leads to ruin" (*Juno and the Paycock*), "the sins of the fathers are visited on the children" (*Ghosts*), "jealousy destroys itself and the object of its love" (*Othello*), "ruthless ambition leads to its own destruction" (*Macbeth*, *Sweet Bird of Youth*). It is not hard to recognise a three-part operation at work in each of these. The first part suggests character (shiftlessness, ruthless ambition etc), the second suggests conflict and direction, the third implies a conclusion. It offers a dynamic operational structure for what Thornton Wilder said was drama's purpose; "the demonstration of an idea" (Cole, 1961, p.111). Egri's premise shouldn't be mistaken for some sort of description of the "meaning" of the work. Its job is simply to force the writer

into ruthless concision. It provides a touchstone for measuring relevance. A premise helps to identify those parts of the drama that are not part of what Aristotle calls the "unified whole":

> ... incidents must be so arranged that if any one of them is differently placed or taken away the effect of wholeness will be seriously disrupted. For if the presence or absence of something makes no apparent difference, it is no real part of the whole.
>
> Aristotle, 1981, p.43

The second order of causal determination refers to the "internal" cause and effect structure of the world of the play. Here the most important determinant of causes is "the hero's pursuit of the goal". The word "hero" here has none of the connotations of courage and moral superiority conventionally associated with it. The hero is simply the principal agent of action and, usually, the subject whose perspective we are inclined to adopt to observe the moment by moment events and situations of the drama. The action is driven by the need or desire of a character who consequently acts (or who in some cases, most famously Hamlet, doesn't) and who we therefore come to think of as the hero: "It begins with the premise: the hero wants something. His desire begins with the *beginning of the film*" (Mamet, 2007, p.59, italics in the original). The desire of the hero for the goal is what establishes the temporal realm for potential mimetic action. “Typically the aim of a desire is to bring about some state of affairs" (Elster, in Solomon, 2004, p.153). The action of the drama will take place in the gap between the initial wanting of/need for the desired outcome and getting it (or not). The hero's desire is the first step in making what Ricoeur calls "the break that opens the space for fiction" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.45). It is the beginning of the process I have described by which the audience, prompted by the performance of the script, fills in for themselves everything necessary to understand what connects the beginning with the end, the heroes with their goals. Limiting the material to anything and everything necessary for the audience to understand the hero's "pursuit of the goal" helps to maintain

another of Aristotle's principal requirements for the drama: the unity of action.

A disciplined unity of action maintains an audience's concern about the outcome. It is a discipline that can lead the dramatist to some interesting dramaturgical solutions to storytelling problems. For example, the requirement to "celebrate" the winning of the America's Cup raised a potentially serious obstacle to the willingness of the audience to enter into the spirit of the drama. Certain events that have occurred since that race meant that a substantial proportion of a Western Australian audience might be disinclined to celebrate. As I explained in my introduction the campaign to win the Cup was led by Alan Bond, the businessman who raised the money. While he received the Order of Australia medal and became a national hero as a result of the win, in the years since his heyday of popular celebrity Alan Bond has suffered a precipitous fall from grace. He was at the centre of one of the country's most titanic corporate collapses, losing millions of dollars for thousands of investors. Many who had invested in Bond's conglomerate of companies were reported to have "lost their life savings" and many of those lived in Western Australia and still do. Although Bond spent time in jail and had his membership of the Order of Australia rescinded, he received early parole for good behaviour and many felt he had been let off too lightly. So since winning the cup Bond has become something of a pariah. An effective "celebration" of the event would need to finesse this complication. To insert into the story any sort of overt apology or justification for Bond's later behaviour was dramaturgically unacceptable. It might incline the audience to suspect the entire work of being a propaganda exercise and, more importantly, it would be irrelevant to the plot, thereby breaking the unity of action. If the audience was to enter into the spirit of the drama and care about the winning of the race their prejudice against Bond would need to be tempered. I came up with two dramaturgical solutions to the problem. The first came about by finding the right premise (in the Egri sense) for the play.

"Relentless determination leads to victory" might appear to be a predictable choice of premise for a drama about a sporting event but apparent predictability, as I will discuss later, can serve a purpose. What is unpredictable in such a massively expensive and collaborative project as the campaign for the America's Cup is the unfolding conflict between the different modes of relentless determination within and between the disparate characters who were all supposed to be working together for the same end. That, in part, is what produced the colour and intensity of the drama.

Relentlessness is a synonym for obsessiveness. They refer to similar behaviour, but the first has a positive and the second a pejorative connotation. The grimly determined Captain Ahab is a character to whom both words are equally applicable and he acquires enigmatic appeal as a consequence of this ambivalence. But determination isn't always necessarily grim. Sometimes it can't afford to be. Raising the funds to finance the campaign required charm as well as determination. It took an incorrigible, charming reprobate of Falstaffian proportions; the same characteristics of behaviour that also led to one of the greatest corporate collapses in the nation's history. If *Taking Liberty* was to be the celebration I had been commissioned to write, I would have to present Bond's pursuit of the cup such that an audience would recognise all the negative traits of character they might have expected to see (relentless determination driven by obsessive greed), but then, in spite of their better judgement, could hardly help but find his good-natured, venal perspicacity appealing even in the face of his flaws. As Bond's character developed into a relentless Falstaffian rogue with the obsessiveness of an Ahab, it wasn't too difficult to highlight the former while still allowing for a suggestion of the latter.

2) *Expositions*

The audience needs to know enough information to understand the situational meaning that motivates the action. Situational meaning relates to a subject's concerns so, as well as information, exposition needs to provide some sort of perspective on the events, which usually means knowing from whose point of view we take the situation to be relevant. But exposition must always be a by-product of action. One of the worst crimes of exposition is the conversation in which two characters tell each other things they either both already know or don't need to know. Shakespeare often employed the simple conceit of opening with two or three characters discussing the "current situation" as, for example, in *Much Ado about Nothing, Othello* and *Hamlet*, but it is always in the context of questions already raised in the minds of the audience about motives driving the action. The opening of Hamlet is justly admired for the elegance of its exposition through suspense and action. Contemporary drama is inclined to leave the audience in ignorance with exposition only provided if and when a lack of information obscures understanding of the action. And sometimes not even then. One of Beckett's innovations was his entire absence of exposition, contributing to the sense of timelessness in his dramatic world but also threatening to make it inaccessible. Pinter adopted this approach to exposition, its absence contributing to the prevailing suspense. By the end of Pinter's *No Man's Land* we still don't really know who the characters are or where they are, which further highlights the absurdity of their meaningless struggle for status and power.

Exposition was unavoidable in *Taking Liberty*. If a non-sailing audience was going to become involved with the struggle of the hero, they needed to know about the history of the event and enough of the rules of yacht racing to understand, at the very least, how and why one boat is able and allowed to overtake another; but to understand that, they first needed to understand the counterintuitive logic of tacking and jibing - the direction of the boat as a

function of the forces of the wind against the sails driving the hull through the water. They also needed to be aware of some particular aspects of the six-leg course of the race on the Rhode Island Sound. Adding to the difficulty was that sailors have their own jargon with which they discuss these subjects. In such circumstances, comedy can help: A remark by Ben Lexcen describing the skipper of the *Southern Cross* as "a smart bloke..., but, bless him, he couldn't handle people" (Stannard, 1984, p.57) presented the opportunity to disguise some essential technical information as an exercise in comic self-importance (p.19-23, script page numbers refer to the published script; Knight, 2008). Alan Bond's attempt to join the crew of the *Southern Cross* provided a similar opportunity (p.31).

Taking Liberty is about the marriage of sport and business, and so it was also important to provide some understanding of the arcane business dealings required to pay for the four campaigns it took to finally win the race. I tried to do this with the schematic expositional "business" scenes between Bond and Warren Jones. Most of us worry about debt so we sympathise as Warren tries to warn Alan of the dangers of his cavalier attitude to escalating debt. For those who are aware of the eventual outcome of Bond's business procedures there is additional irony to these scenes. But as the audience worry along with Warren, they are also picking up enough information to get a rough idea of the way the financial procedures work:

> WARREN – Our issued capital currently sits at half a million dollars.
> ALAN -- I know, I know...
> WARREN – While our liabilities are heading towards *50 million*...
> ALAN -- I know, we've got a bit of a cash flow problem...
> WARREN -- It is no longer a problem, Alan, it is a fucking crisis!
> ALAN -- Warren, don't exaggerate, our property holdings are...
> WARREN – We're mortgaged up to our eyeballs! We've mortgaged the mortgages on our mortgages.
> ALAN -- The blocks at Yanchep...
> WARREN -- Are *not selling*, Alan.
> ALAN -- No, but when we win the cup...

WARREN -- Alan, how are we going to win the cup if we can't even afford to send the crew to Newport, let alone the boat!
ALAN -- Warren, have faith.
WARREN -- The boys on the floor at the Sydney stock exchange are holding a sweepstake. Did you know that?
ALAN -- The Sydney stock exchange *is* a bloody sweepstake, what are you talking about?
WARREN -- The closest estimate to the date when Bond Corporation collapses, wins the pot. Not *if* it collapses, mind you, but *when*.

p.21-22

The drama of this scene is also helped by the contrast between the sanguine Alan and the melancholic Warren. I will discuss this at greater length in the section dealing with character development.

3) *Time, predictability and the expectation horizon.*

> Truly, though our element is time,
> We are not suited to the long perspectives
>
> Philip Larkin, *Reference Back*

Like fish in water, we can't conceive what it might feel like to be "outside" time. Nonetheless we are aware of a permanently present but ever-changing emotional response to past and future. This seems to give a sense of shape to our experience of time. The story of our lives is always going on in the present but our expectations lead us into the unknown future with hope and dread while the memories that accompany us bring with them regret, resentment and grief. The mind is stretched into the future and the past. Augustine called this condition *distentio animi,* the "distension of the soul". It is what Ricoeur means by time becoming human:

> Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.
>
> Ricoeur, 1985, p.52.

Drama depends on this personal relationship with time, particularly with the unknowable future. The job of the dramatist is to maintain what Langer called "the tension between the given present and it is as yet unrealised consequent, 'form in suspense', the essential dramatic illusion" (Langer, 1953, p.311). Dawson tells us that the dramatic

> ... seizes our attention by creating a situation... which arouses expectation of further situations... we become aware of short term and long-term expectations... we do not contemplate the action, we are taken into it, hence our sense of what *is* happening is in fact indistinguishable from our sense of what *will* or *may* happen.
>
> S.W. Dawson, 1970, p.28

But how is this put into practice? Hitchcock famously pointed out that two men having a conversation across a table becomes much more interesting if the audience knows there's a time bomb underneath it. The effect is to bring the future into sharper focus. We now know what events the future might hold and we have an attitude towards them. The secret is that which will be known, and to that extent draws the future into the present. Strindberg's list of requirements for an effective play includes

> ...a secret made known to the audience either at the beginning or towards the end. If the spectator but not the actors know the secret, the spectator enjoys their game of blind man's buff. If the spectator is not in on the secret, his curiosity is aroused and his attention held.
>
> Cole, 1961, p.183

The first of these situations describes dramatic irony, the second, suspense. A contemporary audience has a greater familiarity with dramatic complications than Strindberg's did and they are commonly called on to juggle a multitude of secrets, kept and revealed, about and between many different characters, changing their perspectives of them all the time. But in any drama there is always one secret of primary importance and it is always the same one: what's going to happen next? The much anticipated but unknown future is the dramatist's trump card. With this in mind it might seem fair to assume that my biggest problem with *Taking Liberty* was that a play about a race will depend for its excitement on the question of who will win, so in my case, with the answer only too well known, suspense would be hard to maintain. Surprisingly though, suspense seems to survive foreknowledge; no matter how many times some people watch *Psycho*, they continue to be terrified by the shower scene. It seems that immediate concerns with the present and future displace the long term memory where knowledge of the outcome is stored. So part of the dramaturgical job is to maintain a constant empathetic involvement with an immediate dilemma, directing the focus of attention towards a solution in the future: "how will they deal with the current crisis so that they will eventually reach the

desired goal?" Or, as Mamet says, work "back and forth between the moment and the whole".

It is difficult for most of us to sit still for a long time. Consequently, the longer the drama, the harder it is to hold an audience's attention. The level of excitement and/or involvement needs to increase, (particularly when the audience already knows what's going to happen). There are numerous dramaturgical techniques for increasing excitement and involvement. Each in its own way manipulates the audience's relationship with an unknown future. I will discuss three of the ones I used. The first, which is standard dramatic practice, was to increase the risk. Increasing the value of what's at stake and lowering the odds of winning the goal builds excitement and deepens involvement. At the penultimate moment of almost any Hollywood action film what is at stake is the life of our hero (and those he is protecting) and the odds of his surviving are so small as to be almost nonexistent. However contrived and predictable the circumstances may be, the technique still seems to work. Audiences continue to be thrilled. In the case of my own play historical events themselves provided plausible and interesting ways of increasing the risk. Bond was convinced that winning the race would give him immediate rock solid credibility in the corridors of international finance and that, as a result, the value of any company he bought into before the race would increase significantly if he won. So, going into the final campaign, Bond was gambling most of his own money and an enormous amount of other people's. I was also helped by the unfolding sequence of wins and losses throughout the final seven races. They could not have been better designed to increase the suspense, with our heroes always apparently on the verge of losing all the way to the final leg.

The second technique for increasing tension that I will discuss has to do with the manipulation of the temporal awareness of the audience. In the case of *Taking Liberty* once again the nature of the historical events themselves helped. The timing of the regattas provided an ideal time frame to create an apparent temporal acceleration by manipulating the order and

duration of the action. Here I use the terms order and duration in the sense that Genette used them, neatly summed up in the following passage by Richardson:

> Order is the relation between the chronological events of the story and the sequence in which those events are represented to the audience... duration attempts to measure the relation between the time represented in the narrative and the time it takes to read the representation of those events.
>
> Richardson in Herman, 2007, p.147

So we might say that duration is the difference between the time lived on stage and the "real" time the audience takes to watch it. The central "story arc" or "single action" of *Taking Liberty* is revealed (it was actually there at the beginning) when Bond is "challenged" by Vic Romagna in 1970 (p.12) and finds out about "The Cup". It ends with the final victory in 1983. The 12 years in between could, more or less, be divided into four campaigns of three years each. Each campaign leads to a series of trials culminating in a seven race regatta. The first act of the play deals mainly with the nine years covered by the first three campaigns. The first half of the second act deals with the last campaign, up to the final week of racing. The final half-hour, a quarter of the play's length, deals with the last week of the entire 12 year effort. This expansion of the duration creates for the audience the paradoxical experience of time both speeding up and slowing down. Ricoeur explains how this works by virtue of "a three-tiered scheme":

> ... utterance-statement-world of the text, to which correspond a time of narrating, a narrated time, and a fictive experience of time projected by the conjunction/disjunction between the time it takes to narrate and narrated time.
>
> Ricoeur, 1984, p.77

In *Taking Liberty* the second of these, the narrated time, slows down, getting closer to a correspondence with the time of the narration. And yet suspense increases. This is because the deceleration is occurring as the finishing line gets nearer, and the nearer it gets, the greater becomes the craving to reach

it, that is, to reach it before the opposition, which is the difference between winning and losing. So once again the dramatic effect of this manipulation of time hinges on perspective.

The third of the dramaturgical techniques I want to discuss in this context of how drama strengthens its grip on the attention of the audience by playing with time and the unknown future, is the set up and confounding of expectations. This is a useful example of the way that the first order of causal determination influences the second. Aristotle called it the *peripeteia* or peripety. Kermode defined this as "a falsification of expectation, so that the end comes as expected, but not in the manner expected" (Kermode, 2000, p.53). States describes it as "a change to the opposite of the expected" (States, 1994, p.89) and considers it to be not only a plot device but a constitutive principle of plot development: "we could say that drama *is* peripety and that the objective of drama is to make human experience as peripetous as possible" (States, 1971, p.27). I think he's probably right. Dialogue and action are designed to give a peripetous shape to each scene, and the sequence of scenes is designed to build peripetously to an unpredictable climax of the play. To demonstrate, let us consider the series of business office scenes in my play between Alan Bond and Warren Jones. In each Warren builds up an expectation of financial disaster before Alan finesses the problem with a clever solution. With each successive scene the stakes are increased. So the scenes are building up an expectation which might be expressed as, "Warren always worries about financial catastrophe but Alan's always got a trick up his sleeve". Until we reach the last of the series (quoted below, p.157) when the absence of any immediate clever solution is now novel and thereby increases the significance of the final trial. This was a design I built into the play myself but there were plenty of unexpected events from history to provide further material for *peripeteia*. The most auspicious (from my own point of view; it was the least auspicious from theirs) was the sudden sequence of equipment failures which happened as the Australian yacht began the final series of races:

JOHN -- She's sailed thousands of miles without a hitch. Why does she have to fall apart on us now!?

p.68

Unpredictability, as Bruner points out, is "the impetus to narrative" (Bruner, 2002, p.28), but it has been argued that some of the unlikely, "useful" accidents that constitute *peripeteia* (such as Oedipus meeting his father at the crossroads) can disturb the verisimilitude. According to Hegel, "if we encounter improbable accidents, contrived situations, unduly complicated intrigues... then the impression of fatality is destroyed" (cited in Benjamin, 2003, p.130). But Benjamin points out that this is a flawed argument. The notion of fate is, on the contrary, intensified when drama displays these kinds of "unnatural" complications: "for it is precisely the far-fetched combinations... which …betray, by their paradoxical vehemence, that the action of this play has been inspired by fate" (ibid). The dramaturgical point to be made here is that you can get away with contrivances if you deal with them properly. We don't notice the improbability of Oedipus meeting his father at the crossroads because we don't know yet that it is his father. We only find out later in the context of a sequence of events which seems to make the fact that it was his father strangely and horribly appropriate. Ricoeur refers to this kind of plotting as the "strokes of chance that seem to arrive by design... making... discordance appear concordant" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.43). It wasn't mere coincidence though that Oedipus murdered his father. There is little that is accidental about human behaviour. The meeting at the crossroads was coincidental but the killing was entirely volitional. Similarly, the collapse of the mast on *Australia II* was an accident that could hardly have occurred at a worse time for the crew but the worst events make the best drama because of what they demand of the characters. The true source of fascination in drama is the unpredictability of human behaviour.

If we break down any given instance of emotional behaviour to its constituent moments we will see how unpredictability proliferates. I will deal with emotion's constituent parts and its relation to action at greater

length in Chapter 3; for now I just want to indicate how much potential inconsistency there is in any given emotional experience. To begin with, action is a two-step process; recognition and response. The first of these refers to the recognition of the meaning of a situation to the subject. This has three aspects:

1) relevance to concerns;
2) appraisal of what can be done;
3) urgency, difficulty and seriousness of the situation.

(Pacherie, 2002, p.75).

Each of these assessments is contingent on "the relationship between events and the subject's concerns, and not events as such" (Frijda in Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p. 271). Once "situational meaning" has been decided on, there is a concomitant emotional response, as a result of which, according to Frijda, "action readiness changes are generated... to execute a given kind of action" where "kind of action" is defined by "the end result aimed at or achieved". Frijda proposes that what we understand as emotional experience is awareness of this "state of action readiness" (ibid, p.274). So what we call emotion is the feeling of the physiological changes caused by action tendencies. As William James put it - we don't cry because we feel sad, we feel sad because we cry (James, 1884). Frijda puts it that "different emotions arise in response to different meaning structures..., grief is elicited by personal loss, anger by insults or frustrations, and so forth" (ibid). Each of these emotions has a paradigmatic action tendency. Elster has compiled a list of emotions with some of their paradigmatic action tendencies:

Emotion:	Action Tendency:
Anger	cause object of anger to be extinguished or to suffer (revenge)
Hatred	cause object of hatred to cease to exist
Contempt	ostracism, avoidance
Shame	"sink through the floor"; run away; suicide
Guilt	confess; make repairs; hurt oneself
Envy	destroy the envied object or its possessor
Fear	flight; fight; freeze
Love	approach, touch, help, please the loved one

(Elster in Solomon, 2004, p.152)

The list is hardly comprehensive but it is enough to indicate that most emotions lead to a number of consequent alternative paradigmatic action tendencies. It can be seen from all of this indeterminacy at the level of the elemental choices that constitute any given action, that while we might like to think that we are able to predict what the response will be to given circumstances, the specific choice of action made in response to a given specific event is impossible to predict with any kind of certainty. As an audience, we can never be entirely certain of the action a character will take in a given situation but we know what the action tendency is because we recognise the situational meaning and, consequently, feel it. So we have expectations of the way things might go. Recognisable patterns of behaviour are essential to drama's representation of action if it is to sustain plausibility and empathy. But if the attention of the audience is to be held, these patterns must also be unpredictable. The kinds of psychic mechanisms I have been discussing display recognisable causal patterns of behaviour but are, in any given instance, unpredictable. Elster describes these mechanisms as "*frequently occurring and easily recognisable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences.* They allow us to explain, but not to predict" (1999, p.1, italics in the original). The same can be said for drama. The conditions and the consequences are infinitely variable, but the patterns of behaviour, while unpredictable, have a tantalising familiarity. Drama demands this unpredictable predictability.

"What's going to happen next?" usually equates with "what will he/she do now?" Empathy inclines members of an audience to wonder "what would I do if that was me?" In the moments when significant action or reaction is to be made, the expectation or desire of the audience for a particular outcome will lead them to hypothesise a possibility one way or the other. Such hypotheses are often emotionally motivated and happen on a preconscious level, but were they to be verbalised might be expressed as, for example: "If I

was him I'd teach that guy a lesson!", "Don't trust him, he won't do what he says he'll do" or "Use the force, Luke, use the force!" Hypotheses are then proved right or wrong, expectations supported or thwarted.

Actions and emotions are intimately entwined. As Blacker points out,

> …the well-made screenplay is all plot - suspense, tempo, intrigue, and, above all, action - without emotion it becomes pure mechanical contrivance. The selection and organisation of the scenes in the best possible ascending order toward a climax must evoke emotional reactions in the characters and in the audience.... plot is more than a pattern of events: it is the ordering of emotions
>
> Blacker, 1986, p.20

So in composing the action the dramatist must take into account how temperament, dispositions and experience (among other things) will influence a character's understanding of the meaning of a situation and their subsequent response. If the audience are familiar with the character, his or her behaviour will need to fit their expectations of that character's behaviour according to their previous understanding or else subvert those expectations with a surprise outcome which should be satisfying by virtue of its equally unexpected (and therefore even more surprising) suitability. It might also lead to a "deeper understanding" of the character (or give that impression) increasing their empathy and reinforcing their involvement in the drama. Once action has been taken by a character, an audience is also in a position to experience the pleasure of retrospectively judging the relative value of the action; i.e. its wisdom or courage etc, and its relative success. They also get to judge the character by virtue of his or her actions.

Ideally, every "beat" of a play's rhythm is composed according to some or all aspects of character behaviour I have just described. An example from my own play involves a sequence of actions taken by John Bertrand during the races against the American boat. In the first race John, in spite of being the skipper, avoids making a vital decision about crossing the stern of the other

boat, leaving the decision to his tactician, Hugh Treharne. As a result there is an equipment failure and the race is lost. Afterwards John apologises:

> JOHN --.... The buck stops here, Hughie. Faced with Dennis on a faster boat, I lost my nerve and I asked you to call it. Hardly the act of a man in control of himself and his crew was it. (p.67)

Both the avoidance of the decision and the apology reflect on Bertrand's character, offering the audience of view of a man under enormous pressure struggling with his fear and his sense of correct behaviour. The sequence has its "payoff" later, in the final race:

> JOHN -- (*to the audience)* We're losing....Over in Oz, it is five o'clock in the morning and millions of people are still awake, watching us on TV.
> Those who haven't given up in despair and gone to bed.
> CHINK -- Coming up to the mark.
> YA -- Which spinnaker John?
> JOHN -- Hughie?
> HUGH -- John, I think it is time for the man in control of himself and his crew to make the call.
> YA -- John?
> HUGH -- John?
> JOHN – The 6:2.
> MAJOR -- The old 6:2 coming up.
> *The crew prepares the spinnaker*.
> JOHN -- This is it, guys. We have 57 seconds to find.... What said the man with the big cigars?
> CREW -- Never give in! Never give in! Never give in!

In the unpredictable moment before John names the spinnaker ("the 6:2") we can feel his indecision and fear of making the wrong choice (it is up to the actor to hold the pause for as long as he thinks the audience can bear it). It can be seen how the rhythm of this section, or "beat", builds up to that moment of decision, at which point we are momentarily “held in suspense” until the decision is made and once again the action sweeps forward.

4) *Aspects of character 1: dispositions.*

David Mamet's insistence that "characterisation" is the "screenwriting equivalent of HIV" (Mamet, 2007, p.58) is a deliberately provocative generalisation, but there is some truth to his meaning. Mamet doesn't necessarily object to the notion of "character" *per se*. I think what he is objecting to is the treatment of character as anything other than a function of plot and action. I think he is right to do so for two reasons; firstly, any attempt to present aspects of character that do not contribute to the development of plot distracts from Aristotelian unity of action and loosens the grip of the drama on the attention of the audience (see Mamet, 1986, p.76, for a useful example). Secondly, because human nature is revealed in the behaviour of characters as they pursue their goals. Different dramatists have different agendas but what they usually have in common is the composing of patterns of action that either reveal or raise questions about the agents who carry them out. In this way drama explores the relationship of character to action, which entails the relationship of characters to each other. Characterisation, the "construction of character" by the dramatist, is a subject dealt with by all the drama writing manuals. While all of these writers agree on the importance (to the revelation of character) of the pursuit of goals or objectives, this is still the aspect of dramatic composition that elicits the greatest variation between them. Waters discusses character in terms of functions – plot function, thematic function, and "tonal function". The latter being a way of thinking of characters in the play as equivalent to instruments in an orchestra. In keeping with this approach Waters suggests that playwrights should resist the inclination "to excavate a total biography" of the character. "A spareness of authorial evocation of character in the dramatic personae best serves the necessary open-endedness of characterisation in plays – for different actors will bring very different attributes to any particular role" (Waters, 2010, p.109). In support of this notion he quotes Harold Pinter's famous retort to a question about the past of one of his characters – "None of your damn business" (ibid, p.108). Downs

and Russin, on the other hand, insist on the importance of making lists of as much sociological, psychological and historical information about a character as possible (Downs and Russin, 2004, p.113). Egri emphasises character development, and takes what he calls "the dialectical approach" to the creation of character, insisting that it is the way characters change in response to events that characterises the drama. Edgar looks at the importance of role-play, that is, the idea that characters themselves are often playing roles just as human beings spend much of their lives involved in performative activity. This also seems to have been Brecht's approach to the presentation of character:

> …Physical attitude, tone of voice, and facial expressions are all determined by a social *Gestus*: the characters are cursing, flattering, instructing one another, and so on. The attitudes which people adopt toward one another include even those attitudes which would appear to be quite private, such as the utterances of physical pain in an illness, or of religious faith. These expressions of a *Gestus* are usually highly complicated and self-contradictory, so that they cannot be rendered by any single word, and the actor must take care that in giving his image the necessary emphasis he does not lose anything but emphasises the entire complex.
>
> From article 9 of Brecht's Organum, in Cole, p.76.

In my own teaching practice I try to give a rough outline to my students of as many of the possible approaches that time will allow and suggest that they take the one or more that suits them. I think we each have a unique relationship with the rest of humanity which will reflect, if we are playwrights, the way we approach the creation of character. While a familiarity with all methodologies can only be useful, the writer needs to find his or her own way of doing it.

Here, in keeping with the aim of my thesis, I want to consider two aspects of the way that the emotional attitude of characters emerges from and influences dramatic action. They are both methodologies which have a central role in the history and evolution of drama. I have chosen them, in part, to demonstrate that dramaturgical methodology and emotional psychology share a history that has yet to be eclipsed by the more fashionable and seemingly sophisticated methods of psychological analysis. Firstly, I will consider temperament or disposition as it is expressed in each

of the characters, the way it is revealed, and the way that the mix of different temperaments in the play worked to the advantage of the characters in the second order of causal determination (in pursuing the America's Cup) and to the benefit of the dramatist and audience in the first order, that is, the entertainment value. The second aspect I want to consider of the role of emotions in establishing character is the effect of power and honour on self-esteem, and the way self-esteem operates as a principal motivational driver of the action of the play.

Human temperament is thought to have been schematised by Galen, physician to the court of Marcus Aurelius in the second century AD. Galen's thesis was that human nature is influenced by a quartet of fluids, called the four humours, each bringing its own aspect of human character. Dominance of one or other of the fluids gave dominance to that particular characteristic; a predominance of blood made you sanguine, black choler made you melancholic, yellow choler made you choleric, while phlegm made you phlegmatic. Thus a disposition towards one of the three basic human passions; joy, sadness and anger are mixed together with a "cooling" ingredient. It is not hard to see how the notion might be useful to a dramatist. A mix of strongly contrasting characters creates conflict and variation. The Roman playwright Plautus applied it to the characters of his comedies and it also influenced English comedy of the Renaissance, particularly through Jonson's use of them in plays like *Every Man in His Humour.* It can still be a useful tool.

Dispositions are revealed in the way that characters respond to situations. The character of Alan Bond is predominantly sanguine. The power of his optimism is usually enough to overwhelm any of the qualms of the other characters. This is what makes him such a powerful central character and driver of the action. It also explains the power of his anger when his intentions are frustrated. To suggest the extremity of the forces unleashed when Bond's optimism turns choleric, I had the scene of his verbal abuse of the directors of the New York Yacht Club in the second act played

simultaneously to the scene in which *Australia II* is caught in a storm and one of the crew is lost (p.58). The other two principal characters, Ben Lexcen, the designer, and John Bertrand, the helmsman, provide an ideal contrast with Bond. Ben is, like Bond, usually sanguine about the success of a project, but when things go wrong, quick to change temperament. Unlike Bond though, rather than turning choleric, Ben is inclined towards melancholy. The dramatic potential of this contrast is demonstrated a number of times, but particularly after the catastrophe of the first campaign:

> ALAN -- Don't worry Benny, you'll feel better in a few weeks. We'll catch up back in Sydney and...
> BEN -- No we won't, mate. I'm off to Europe. No one'll touch me in Australia anymore. Not after this fiasco.
> ALAN -- Course they will! You go and spend some time back with your family...
> BEN -- I don't have a bloody family, Alan, I thought you knew that.
> ALAN -- Yes, I did. Sorry. Look, you go back to Oz and I'll ring you in a month or two and we'll talk about it then, eh?
> BEN -- No we won't Alan.
> ALAN -- Okay, well I'll ring you anyway and see how you feel about it.
> BEN -- Alan, mate, it is over! Okay?
> ALAN -- Sure, sure.
> BEN -- I mean it.
> ALAN -- See how you feel in a month or two...
> BEN -- I SAID I MEAN IT! It is over! I don't even want to think about it ever again. Roger that, Alan?
> ALAN -- Sure, sure. No worries Ben. We'll talk later.
> BEN – Aaaaaaagh!!
> *Ben leaves*.
> ALAN -- (*confused*) Wonder what got up his pyjamas?
>
> p.33-34

A revealing aspect of the difference between these two characters is in their relative capacity for self-deception. Sanguine characters are optimistic because they believe in the likelihood of their desired outcomes. Bond, like many successful confidence tricksters, deceives others by deceiving himself as well. There seems little doubt, for example, of his conviction in 1970 that

Yanchep Sun City would indeed one day become the home of a Grand Prix circuit, a new Disneyland and a hovercraft ferry service (p.18). The self-deceptive capacity of his optimism is one of the characteristics that I think redeems him in the eyes of the audience in spite of his apparently inexhaustible acquisitiveness and lack of self-awareness. On the other hand, a realistic view of the likelihood of desired outcomes is characteristic of melancholia. Ben, consequently, is inclined to expect the worst. He is also an astute judge of human nature, his own in particular. After the disaster of the first campaign he is the first to shoulder responsibility; "It was my fault… I thought I could design the perfect challenger on my first go" (p.33).

John Bertrand, on the other hand, is the phlegmatic "steady hand" on the tiller. Bertrand's phlegmatism, as well as establishing a clear contrast with Alan and Ben, offers additional dramaturgical benefits. Free from the potential bias of Bond's optimism or Ben's pessimism, Bertrand's perspective is more likely to be trusted. When, for example, at the beginning of the second act, Bertrand is sceptical about the capabilities of the "winged keel", his scepticism raises doubts in the audience about Ben's judgement of his new keel's abilities. This effectively reduces the perceived odds of winning, thereby increasing the sense of risk associated with the entire enterprise, thus intensifying the suspense. There is another example of the usefulness of Bertrand's reliability later on in the second act. In the heat of the racing, those members of the audience who still don't understand enough of the necessary technical details to recognise how much trouble our heroes are in, need other trustworthy indicators of how serious things have become. Bertrand's phlegmatism creates the impression that his emotional responses are a reliable barometer of how things are going. So his emotional outburst at the end of race four is enough to indicate that the race is as good as lost, thereby dispensing with the need for further information and providing a natural end to the scene.

5) *Aspects of character 2: status and self-esteem*

> Conflict in drama is about power; who's got it, who wants it, who or what helps them to get it, and who or what gets in the way.
>
> Russin and Downs, 2004, p.108

The struggle for power and status within the mobile structures of a social hierarchy has been the lifeblood of drama ever since the Roman comedies of Plautus. It continued through the Middle Ages with the clowns of the commedia dell'arte all distinguished by their social positions. For *Taking Liberty,* differentiating the four central characters was facilitated by a clear delineation within the social hierarchy of multimillion-dollar international yacht racing. While they all paid lip-service to the egalitarian ethos of recreational sailing it was nonetheless easy to identify status differences between "the money man" (Bond), the designer (Lexcen), the crew (Bertrand) and management (Warren Jones). Each has his own function and position established within his own field. Tensions arise when different hierarchies overlap. For example, when Bond joins the crew of the *Southern Cross* (p.27) in the second race of the first campaign, an inevitable power struggle erupts out of the confusion between the offshore hierarchy of the campaign structure where Bond is the unquestionable authority, and the traditional power structure on board the boat. Self-esteem is immediately at risk. When Bond indirectly threatens Hardy by reciting the Napoleon story (in the previous scene it was the prelude to a sacking), Hardy's response is to draw Bond's attention to the immediate peril, thus establishing which power structure is in effect under the present circumstances. Bond has little choice but to concede:

> ALAN --... Captain Hardy?
> HARDY -- What?
> ALAN -- Did you know that when Napoleon lost a few battles he took out his best general...

HARDY -- ... and shot him. I know, I know. Do you really think that little parable is going to make me want to win this race any more than I already do?
ALAN -- Just doing my best to motivate the team. No offense, Cap'n.

(p.31)

Another example of this kind of power struggle occurs in the second act when Warren Jones expresses his resentment at having been sidelined by Bond to the management of the campaign to win "the cup", away from the day-to-day operation of Bond's business corporation. In this instance dominance over the territory is a little less clear but in the end, after some initial give-and-take, Bond leaves no doubt as to their relative positions in this hierarchy:

WARREN -- ... Why are we buying a bloody brewery?
ALAN -- Have you seen the share price?
WARREN – I had to read about it in the paper.
ALAN -- You've been busy.
WARREN -- I'm twice is busy since you put Chink back on the boat.
ALAN -- John needed him to run the foredeck. Chink's a tyrant on the foredeck. I know. I've been there.
WARREN – But I managed to get a moment with Peter Beckwith - And found out about all the other acquisitions. Hope Island Casino, South Melbourne Football Club, Skipper Caravans, Simplicity Patterns...
ALAN -- Warren, it is only the beginning.
WARREN -- You've tripled last year's debt. How long do you think the banks'll wait for their interest this time?
ALAN -- (*the boss*) Warren, why are we having this conversation?
Pause
ALAN -- Your job, Warren, is the America's Cup. I don't want you worrying about this side of the business anymore. I've got Beckwith and Oates to worry about that.
WARREN -- Beckwith and Oates don't worry enough.

(p.52)

In the drama of a heroes' pursuit of a goal, the value of the goal usually speaks for itself; rescue, escape, treasure or marriage all have (or appear to have) intrinsic worth. The principle dramatic question will therefore be,

"Will he, she or they achieve the desired outcome?" Usually, however, at some stage in the plot, the question of the moral value of the goal is raised, which raises the concomitant question about the virtue of the hero. The way a particular drama deals with these questions is usually an indication of its ethical or ideological slant. As I have said, narratives that ignore the question are very rarely innocent of an ideological slant even if, as Bruner suggests, "the teller knows not what ax [sic] he may be grinding" (2002, p.6). All narratives carry a message about the conditions that *ought* to prevail in the world, all things being normal. Some use overt challenges to the prevailing norms as part of their dramaturgical methodology, in which case the dramatic question, "will the hero win?" is joined by a further, usually more interesting, question; "*should* the hero win?"

As I began writing the play I knew that the question most likely to be hovering in the minds of many members of the audience (it would have been in mine if I was watching it) was "why should we care about a 25-year-old yacht race?" The beginning of the play acknowledges this question and, to a certain extent, reassures the audience that it will be answered. Each of the three conversations interwoven through the opening raises the question as to whether winning the race was "worth the effort" (p.4-5). As well as fairly bluntly presenting the question that the play seeks to answer, it also establishes the motivation for the three men to begin to tell their story; each explaining in their own way *why* they believe the 10-year campaign for The Cup was worth it. To do so they must implicitly explain why it was worth it *to them.* Because they are sportsmen, not psychologists, none of them succeed in explaining anything other than what their own contribution was to the success of the enterprise and their own unquestioning faith in the value of their efforts. In doing so they unintentionally reveal something intrinsic about their own character and help to answer the other question the play deals with: how did the Australian campaign succeed against such overwhelming odds? How, that is, did this particular David win against such a Goliath?

In most sporting contests winning is said to be valued "for its own sake" (exemplified by Newbolt's *Vitaï Lampada*: "not for the sake of a ribboned coat, or the selfish hope of a season's fame"). I doubt, though, if many would deny that self-esteem is the true prize:

> In societies or spheres of social life where outcomes are regulated by competition, the emotion experienced by the winners is a variety of pride, triggered by the belief in one's own (socially defined) goodness.... pride is likely to be especially intense... [when] esteem, self-esteem, and feelings of superiority merge into one delicious emotion.
>
> Elster, 1999, p.207

Contestants want to prove themselves better, smarter, braver etc, than the opposition. My research suggested that this was the case for both Bertrand and Lexcen. Both men appeared to have a sense of the "honourable" tradition of the race and of the esteem that winning it would bring. However, as I suggest early in the play, it is clear that Bond's motives are not quite as untainted. Elster points out that "the pursuit of honour may be an investment in material self-interest, if the reputation for courage can serve to advance one's career" (ibid 238). This establishes a tension between motives of self-esteem and self-interest which provide a rich vein of dramatic potential. Bond has an intuitive understanding of global capital's inclination to associate esteem with money. It becomes clear in the following passage that the experience of losing his first campaign has only served to reinforce this intuition:

> ALAN --... Warren. What we need to do now is set up another company to organise and manage the challenge in '77.
> *Warren groans.*
> WARREN -- Why? Why?!
> ALAN -- The *cachet*, Warren! The *cachet*! You know what I've learnt from this, Warren? Men who want to be rich and powerful go to the America's Cup to be with men who are already rich and powerful. To make real money, you have to go where the real money lives. You know what your armchair socialist says about the Americas Cup? "It is just a rich man's hobby". Well, maybe they're right. But listen to the names, Warren: Sir

> Thomas Lipton, the Earl of Dunraven, Harry Sopwith, the Morgans, the Vanderbilts. Men like that don't just make money, Warren. They make history.
>
> p.35

This counterpoint between his motives of self-interest and self-esteem continues to be reiterated and sustained through the rest of the play. It can be heard again during the sixth race, with Lexcen's implied question:

> BEN - I don't know if I care any more. I can't even remember why winning it was so important.
> WARREN - Because it would give us access to global finance at the deepest level.
> ALAN - What he means, Benny is that if we win, the doors of every major financial institution in the world will open and men with bottomless pockets will come running out, begging us...
> WARREN - On their hands and knees…
> ALAN - ...to take their money. (*Beat*) Not to mention the honour of winning....
> WARREN - Also good for business.
> ALAN - And the fame and adulation.
> WARREN -- Fame and adulation isn't bad for business either.

The final iteration of this theme comes with Bond's final lines, spoken as he and Ben watch the last few metres of the last leg of the final race:

> ALAN - Come on Bertrand, make an old man happy.
> BEN - You're not so old.
> ALAN - No, but I will be.

This imagining of oneself in the future looking back at the present is a well established and powerful rhetorical tool. Shakespeare exploited it regularly, most famously in the St Crispin's Day speech in Henry V. Shakespeare's Spanish contemporary Lope De Vega also used it in, for example, the wedding scene in *Fuente Overjuna*. I "adopted" the essential structure of the St Crispin's day speech for Bertrand's speech to the crew before the final race. Hearing Bond's "No, but I will be" (old) at the end of the race, reminds

the audience of the Alan Bond they met at the very beginning of the play and in this way the dramatic irony of beginning the telling with the end of the story pays off. We are presented with a triple perspective; Bond, on the brink of his greatest success, inadvertently draws our attention to where this will all end; with his ruination, in jail. He doesn't know that, but we do. We see Bond's present past, present present and present future all at once, in what Bateson called "a knot of relevance" (Bateson, 1979, p.6) The "true" value of the triumph to Alan Bond is highlighted by this dramatic confluence of temporal perspectives. Later, in jail (as we have seen at the beginning of the play), he will declare, like the lion in *The Wizard Of Oz,* that his most valued possession is his badge of public esteem; the medal he received for winning the America's Cup.

Chapter 2

Cognition and Mimesis

> ... according to Aristotle - and we agree here -
> narrative is the soul of drama.
>
> Brecht (in Cole, 1961, p.77)

1) *Catharsis and its critics*

The first text to attempt a dramaturgical methodology, Aristotle's *Poetics*, doesn't have much to say about the experience of the audience except to mention a couple of aspects of drama that provide an audience with pleasure. Firstly:

> ... inborn in all of us is the instinct to enjoy works of imitation.... the reason for this is that learning is a very great pleasure... they enjoy seeing likenesses because in doing so they acquire information (they reason out what it represents, and discover, for instance, that 'this is a picture of so-and-so!')
>
> Aristotle, 1981, p.35

The other kind of pleasure that Aristotle mentions is "the tragic pleasure that is associated with pity and fear" (ibid. p.49). He associates these emotions with tragedy because this is the kind of drama he was dealing with in the *Poetics*. Ricoeur, however, points out that Aristotle's description serves as an ideal model for the purposes of generalising about all narrative (Ricoeur, 1983, p.32). Theorists of the post-dramatic also take the "Aristotelian model" as the standard description of drama (see, for example,

Hamilton, 2008). I shall adopt this approach and take Aristotle's description of tragedy as a structural model for drama in general.

To continue this inquiry into the nature and practice of "dramatic seduction" I want to consider the difference between the two kinds of pleasure Aristotle refers to in the *Poetics*; the aesthetic pleasure gained from the recognition of imitation, and that pleasure "associated with pity and fear" generally referred to as catharsis. The first kind of pleasure, a phlegmatic, aesthetic response to art and drama has long been considered the appropriate critical response, while pleasure of the second kind, an emotional comprehension and engagement offered by catharsis, has suffered a considerable amount of vilification. Before discussing these different critical attitudes, let me clarify what I mean by catharsis.

There has been much debate over what, precisely, Aristotle meant by the term . A common interpretation is "purgation". The Penguin Encyclopaedia (1965) for example says; "tragedy, according to Aristotle, arouses pity and fear, and thus purges the spectator of an excess of these emotions; he called this discharge of emotion catharsis". The Shorter OED defines it as both purgation and "purification of the emotions by vicarious experience, as through the drama (in ref. to Aristotle's *Poetics*)" (third edition, 1973). In the introduction to his translation of the *Poetics*, T.S. Dorsch says that by the catharsis of such emotions as pity and fear Aristotle means “their restoration to the right proportions, to the desirable 'mean'" (Aristotle, 1981, p.19). So, rather than merely expelling an excess of emotion, catharsis is seen as a kind of emotional rebalancing. Oatley (in Hjorte and Laver, 1997, p.267) and Nussbaum (1986, p.239) understand catharsis to refer to the clarification of an emotional experience leading to a deeper understanding. Ricoeur agrees, calling it "the integrating part of the metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling." It "consists therefore in the transformation of the pain inherent in these emotions [pity and fear] into pleasure" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.50). He goes on to point out that "this subjective alchemy is also constructed *in* the work *by* the

mimetic activity," but more on that later. Whether or not Aristotle actually believed that by vicariously feeling an emotion we can, literally, purge it, there can be no doubt that "feeling emotion" was a necessary part of the experience of dramatic narrative as he conceived it: "the plot should be so ordered that even without seeing it performed anyone merely hearing what is afoot will shudder with fear and pity as a result of what is happening." (Aristotle, 1981, p.49). He was also clear about the best way that the emotional response should be elicited; "Fear and pity may be excited by means of spectacle; but they can also take their rise from the very structure of the action which is the preferable method and the mark of a better dramatic poet" (ibid. p.49). Ricoeur suggests that "structure" here is a mistranslation: "The *Poetics* does not speak of structure but of structuration. Structuration is an oriented activity that is only completed in the spectator or the reader" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.48). Thus it implies events in time rather than an object in space; the reception rather than the text. So, according to Aristotle, "the preferable method and the mark of a better dramatic poet" is to give rise to the emotions of the spectator by "the very structuration of the action". However, as I said, subsequent critical theory has been inclined to disagree.

The main criticism of the notion of catharsis is usually aimed at the soporific effect emotional involvement appears to have on audiences: we are so busy weeping over Willy Loman that we risk missing the social, political and ideological causes and implications of his downfall. In *The Birth of Tragedy,* Nietzsche says that "illusionism" and "naturalism" belong in "the realm of the wax museums" (Nietzsche, 1993, p.38). He thought that a "skilful" audience must be capable of "seeing the work of art as art, in an aesthetic way" (ibid. p.37). The alternative would be, first, a failure to recognise the "horror and absurdity of existence", and consequently, a failure to experience the antidote; the "redeeming, healing enchantress - art" (ibid. p.40). In the case of Nietzsche himself there can be little doubt that he succeeded in recognising the horror and absurdity of existence. However, in the face of it, the "healing enchantress" seems to have failed him. But this

didn't prevent the notion of "aesthetic distance" that he recommended leaving a powerful influence on modernism: for example, the theatrical effects of Expressionism, which, for the first decades of the 20th century, were applied throughout Europe by dramatists like Strindberg, Pirandello, Apollinaire and Cocteau, were designed "to awaken the spectator from his illusionist period'" (see Oscar Budel in Demetz, 1962, p.59-85).

German theorists in the fields of aesthetics, perceptual psychology and art history began to use the concept of *Einfuhlung* - literally, the activity of "feeling into" - to describe the embodied but unemotional aesthetic response of a spectator to an image, object or spatial environment (Koss, 2006, p.139). Koss suggests that this reveals "a fracturing of the disciplines... a rejection of narrative, with the emergence of visual abstraction" (ibid.). However, with the rise of the cinema, mass media and the middle-class, new forms of spectatorship developed and the word *Einfuhlung* lost its meaning as a description of aesthetic experience. With the publication of Worringer's *Abstraktion and Einfuhlung (Abstraction and Empathy)* the concept became "a conceptual foil" in a theory that placed abstraction (and its associated discomforts) at the heart of the aesthetic experience while associating *Einfuhlung* with a quality of comfort which Worringer felt was inappropriate for an aesthetic appreciation of abstract art (ibid. p.146). So *Einfuhlung* and abstraction were now placed "at opposite extremes along an existential continuum of emotional discomfort" (ibid. p.148). Its association with "comfort" meant that *Einfuhlung* became negatively associated with femininity and therefore passivity; on the other hand "abstraction," said the art critic Karl Scheffler, "remains foreign to women" (ibid. p.150). With the rise of film as popular entertainment *Einfuhlung* was used more and more as the label for a psychological and emotional absorption in on-screen narratives and so was now perceived as wholly passive and comfortable; which was precisely what Brecht objected to in what he called *Einfuhlungstheater* (Empathy Theatre). What we can see by this change in the meaning of *Einfuhlung* is that its moral value changes along with it. When it begins the century as an aesthetic response to an image, object or

spatial environment, it is valued positively. But when Brecht uses it in the Thirties to mean psychological and emotional absorption in the narratives of cinema and theatre, its association with passivity (and therefore femininity) has turned it into a pejorative term. I don't think it is coincidental that as this change in meaning and value came about, its reference changed from being a response to timeless abstractions and objects in space, to being the absorption of a temporal narrative. This change of its timeframe, or temporal reference, is an important difference between aesthetic pleasure in the still life of an art object and the complex temporal narrative experience that Aristotle referred to as catharsis.

According to his friend Walter Benjamin, Brecht introduced

> ... the dramaturgy of his theatre as a 'non-Aristotelian' one, just as Riemann introduced a non-Euclidian geometry.... Riemann refused the axiom of parallels; what Brecht refuses is Aristotelian catharsis, the purging of the emotions through identification with the destiny that rules the hero's life.
>
> Benjamin, 1998, p.18

It is hardly surprising that, as he watched the audiences at Nuremberg identifying with the destiny of their hero, Brecht should want to introduce some aesthetic distance into his theatre practice. As Herbert Blau points out "what we saw in Brecht - appraising the disfigurement of history in the avatar of the crowd - was a willingness to forego the placid moment of intimacy for the rigorous moment of perception, in the interests of which it becomes strategically necessary to restore the scrupulous distance" (Blau, 1990, p.6). Benjamin said that the task of Brecht's "epic theatre" was "not so much to develop actions as to represent conditions" (Benjamin, 1998, p.18). He added that "represent" here doesn't mean reproduce but rather "to uncover", that is, to reveal the truth of the situation. The principal method was by various interruptions to the flow of the action, thereby focusing attention onto particular moments, which is the famous effect of alienation or "making strange" (*Verfremdungseffekt*). John Willet believes that Brecht

probably appropriated his concept of enstrangement from the Russian formalist, Victor Shklovsky. In his essay "Art as Technique" written in 1917 (in Lodge, 1988, p.15-30), Shklovsky argues that perception, when it becomes habitual becomes automatic and, therefore, virtually unconscious. Our apprehension of familiar objects is "as shapes with imprecise extensions". Thus, we see them as if they were "enveloped in a sack" and the job of art is to remove them from this "automatism of perception" by "defamiliarisation". Willet points out that Brecht only began to talk about the *Verfremdungseffekt* after a visit to Moscow in 1935 where he would have come into contact with formalist ideas and, in an interesting confluence of events, he also saw a performance by a Chinese theatre company which had a powerful influence on his theatre practice (Brecht, 1964, p.99).

The principal exponents of the pervasive "naturalistic illusionism" that Nietzsche, the Expressionists and Brecht were so determined to resist, were the enormously popular conventional set-piece dramas and farces performed in large proscenium arch theatres throughout Europe in the 19th and early 20th century. The ideological attitudes represented in this kind of drama were perhaps best expressed by Arthur Wing Pinero, one of its most successful British practitioners, who insisted that "wealth and leisure are more productive of dramatic complications than poverty and hard work" (Pinero, 1985, p.xii). One of the constraining conventions to which this kind of theatre conformed was the rule of Aristotle's three unities, according to which dramatic tragedy should consist of "a single action" performed in one place and in real time. It was these pervasive narrow theatrical conventions which served to make Brecht's episodic "epic theatre" seem so strange in its time. If you had to point out the most striking change to the dramatic form that Brecht wrought on modern theatre it must be this. In 1955 Duerrenmatt was able to say that "Aristotle's unities have not been obeyed by anyone for ages" (in Cole, 1961, p.133). It has often been pointed out that, for all his alienation techniques and his disdain for linear narrative (Brecht, 1964, p.44), Brecht's plays owe much of their success to the engaging quality of his stories and characters (for instance, by Gray in

Demetz, p.151-6, and Tynan, 1975, p.196-8). What Brecht proved was not that Aristotelian catharsis has an unnecessary and detrimental influence on an audience's experience, but that you don't need to maintain the unities of place and time in order to wield it. This loosening up of dramatic structure wasn't a new development, just a return to earlier forms. That said, I doubt if modern drama would have the muscular dramaturgical flexibility that it has were it not for Brecht's revolutionary influence. I don't think Brecht would have been unhappy with this idea. In fact Jameson suggests that "Brecht would have been delighted, at an argument, not for his greatness, or his canonicity... as rather for his *usefulness*..." (Jameson, 1998, p.1, italics in the original).

In response to a global entertainment industry (in the predominant mediums of film, television and theatre) in which the dominant form continues to be the dramatic narrative, the failure of non-narrative performance to displace drama as mainstream entertainment is interpreted by "post-dramatic" theorists as a failure of moral fortitude:

> While the large theatres, under the pressures of conventional norms of the entertainment industry, tend not to dare to deviate from the unproblematic consumption of fables, the newer theatre aesthetics practice a consistent renunciation of the one plot and the perfection of drama...
>
> Lehman, 2006, p.27

It seems surprising that more than thirty years after Schechner established Performance Studies as an academic discipline (see Schechner, 1976), some academics and bureaucrats still perceive the non-narrative theatre they champion as some sort of political movement in opposition to an Aristotelian hegemony; "… the authority of the dramatic paradigm", for example, or "… the dominance of text in the theatrical medium" (Hamilton, *Australasian Drama Studies,* April, 2008, p.9: see other articles in this edition for further examples of this attitude). This adversarial positioning of "post-dramatic" performance in opposition to drama and the dramatic tradition seems unnecessary. Non-narrative performance has its own traditions in

the circus and Music Hall and Dance Theatre. The serial transgressions (social and aesthetic) performed by troupes such as Sydney Front and the Wooster Group, and the visual and aural feasts of the likes of Robert Wilson, Eugenio Barba and Tadashi Suzuki hardly need to establish their validity on the basis of having somehow "overcome" the dramatic mode.

Post-structural theorists dealing with film have been no less critical of catharsis. Theory takes an audience's enjoyment of the cathartic effects of the drama to be indicative of its identification with, and therefore submission to the representations of the ideology of the prevailing hegemony of money and power. (Although as Carroll, Smith and Bordwell suggest, the concept of "identification" seems to cover such a wide variety of cases that it has become too vague and equivocal to be particularly useful; Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.17). According to this line of argument, a member of an audience is not the autonomous individual he imagines himself to be but a subject constituted by cultural, institutional and ideological discourses and practices, and always susceptible to further influences. Althusser's explanation of *interpellation* suggests how easily we succumb to the suggestions of power:

> ... ideology "acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all) or "transforms" the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!'
>
> Althusser, 1971, p.174

The subject is susceptible in this way to territorialisation by the subjectivity of a fiction even as the "illusion" of autonomy is maintained:

> ... by controlling the reader's position, a fiction calls on a reader not only to sympathise but to identify with and therefore occupy certain subject positions and social roles, thereby becoming an individual who on the one hand is subject to some greater authority such as the nation state, and on

> the other whose inner life is constituted in part by the illusion that one is a free agent.
>
> Currie, 1998, p.28

Silverman describes the way that Frank Capra's film *It is a Wonderful Life* hijacks the subjectivity of the viewer:

> The opening shot of that film discloses a town-limit sign which reads: 'You are now in Bedford Falls.' ... the pronoun "you" only means something to the degree that the viewer identifies with it, ... locating him or her in the narrative space soon to be inhabited by George Bailey, who will function thereafter as the chief signifier of his or her subjectivity.
>
> Silverman, 1983, p 50

Murray Smith proposes that Althusser's notion of interpellation is an adaptation and extension of Brechtian theory with its implication that subjects "can never really be conscious of the structures that determine their existence" (Bordwell and Carroll, p.134). Smith suggests, however, that this is a contradiction of Brecht's very modus operandi; that it is possible for human society to change. I'm not suggesting that narrative is entirely innocent. As I pointed out earlier, subliminal normative assumptions often lurk in the background of a story: "often so well concealed that even the teller knows not what ax [sic] he may be grinding" (Bruner, 2002, p.6). But an emotional investment in the pursuit of the hero need not blind us to the paucity of his values. I might, occasionally, weep while watching *It is a Wonderful Life*, which would seem to suggest a cathartic identification with its hero. But even as the tears rolled down my cheeks I wouldn't necessarily feel any less disdain for the institutions of capitalism or Christmas than I normally do. As Murray Smith points out:

> A strong emotional response to a character never results in identification or empathy conceived as "self oblivion" and emotional responses do not necessarily cloud the spectator's critical reasoning and thereby "consume his capacity to act."
>
> Smith (in Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.144)

On the other hand, it should also be said that the distrust of the pleasure of the narrative for its own sake is understandable and desirable. The advertising industry understands very well how brief a narrative needs to be to offer enough associative pleasure to convince most of humanity to organise itself, contrary to its own interests, around an economy designed for the acquisition of stuff it doesn't need. This may be responsible, in part, for the disapproval by critics, theorists, academics and the like of the psychological and emotional absorption in the narratives of cinema and theatre. But this disapproval doesn't seem to have prevented an ongoing shameless indulgence in a psychological and emotional absorption in the narratives of cinema and theatre by a vast and growing majority of the entire population of the globe. In spite of sonorous objections from Nietzsche, Brecht, Althusser and their colleagues (all the way back to Plato) to the popular tendency of audiences to become "hypnotically transported" by dramatic narrative, audiences doggedly insist on continuing to be so. It seems that there is something about the human imagination which loves to lose itself in a story. What is it about us that this should be the case?

2) *The Storytelling Animal*

There are two kinds of explanation of our susceptibility to narrative engagement. The first explains our predisposition to engage with story as a function or symptom of our evolutionary success (or lack of it) as a species. The second describes the manner and means by which a story draws the individual into an engagement. It is the second kind of explanation that I am mainly concerned with in this thesis. But to give this a context I will briefly deal with the first kind of explanation, particularly with suggestions regarding possible evolutionary advantages offered by the storytelling habit.

The social sciences and particularly Marxist and behaviourist schools of anthropology and psychology long held that mind begins as a "tabula rasa"

and that storytelling, along with almost everything else related to mind and behaviour, is socially constructed (Searle,1996; Joseph Carroll, 2006). However, the "nature/nurture debate" in psychology seems to have been resolved by research that has concluded that nature *and* nurture influence the development of the human personality; "genes and environment, biological and social factors, direct our life courses and that their effects intertwine" (Myers, 1995, p.113). How then do culture and biology intertwined lead to a human predisposition to tell stories?

Evolution is a stochastic process (from the Greek, *stochazein*, to shoot with a bow at a target; that is, to scatter events in a partially random manner, some of which achieve a preferred outcome). "If a sequence of events combines a random component with a selective process so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endure, that sequence is said to be *stochastic*" (Bateson, 1979, p. 245), hence "natural selection". So, if storytelling is an adapted predisposition of humans, it must offer some sort of selective advantage. What are the advantages to storytellers that they should propagate and proliferate? Sugiyama makes a suggestion, based on research into contemporary foraging communities, that narrative operates as a survival mechanism by enabling people to "acquire information, rehearse strategies, or refine skills that are instrumental in surmounting real-life difficulties and dangers" (Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.187). Stories of the Dreamtime, for example, helped to familiarise aboriginal people with the landmarks that would help them to survive the vast, harsh terrain through which they wandered (ibid. p.195).

Negotiating the terrain of society can be equally as difficult and dangerous as much geographical terrain and the rehearsal of strategies and skills in the act of storytelling might be equally as useful. Research in evolutionary psychology and the relatively new field of Adaptationist Literary Studies or "Literary Darwinism" reveals that stories recognise and recapitulate patterns of behaviour that have evolved over time. Cultural Theory might warn that this kind of literary Darwinism is in danger of becoming

biologically deterministic. Feminist criticism, for example, would argue that fairy tales perpetuate socially constructed gender norms, representing women as subservient and men as heroic. Suggesting that such stories are "naturally selected" reinforces patriarchal social hierarchies. Gottschall has taken samples of traditional folk tales from a range of different cultural areas around the world, calibrated to represent a fair distribution of content across the six geographical regions, and has confirmed that "female protagonist main characters are significantly underrepresented" (Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.210). He points out however that this research is not necessarily an argument in favour of biological determinism; "considerable variability across subsamples testifies to human flexibility and the importance of physical and social environments in influencing the development of individuals and societies" (ibid. p.219). The fact that stories representing princes rescuing princesses are more common than stories of princesses rescuing princes doesn't necessarily reflect the wisdom of the status quo, as much as unavoidable genetic differences between men and women, and stories, as Bruner points out, are not only told to instruct but also to forewarn; "culture is, figuratively, the maker and enforcer of what is expected, but it also, paradoxically, compiles, even slyly treasures, transgressions" (Bruner, 2002, p.15). Bruner suggests that one of narrative's most important purposes is to propose and establish social norms and then to test them by rehearsing transgressions with a view to improving our understanding of the conventions. Collective life, says Bruner, would hardly be possible without

> ... the conventionalisation of narrative that converts individual experience into collective coin which can be circulated, as it were, on a base wider than the merely interpersonal one. Being able to read another's mind need depend no longer on sharing some narrow ecological or interpersonal niche but, rather, on a common fund of myth, folk tale, "common sense". And given that folk narrative, like narrative generally, like culture itself, is organised around the dialectic of expectation-supporting norms and possibility-evoking transgressions, it is no surprise that story is the coin and currency of culture.
>
> Bruner,2002, p.16

Thus Bruner argues that our success as a species can be attributed to the capacity for social interaction, communication and organisation that narrative allows for. Bruner is a member of what Strawson refers to as "the narrativist orthodoxy". Strawson believes that, while the habit of narrative may well be true for some, it is completely false for others:

> There is a deep divide in our species. On the one side, the narrator's: those who are indeed intensely narrative, self-storying, Homeric, in their sense of life and self, whether they look to the past or the future. On the other side the non-narrators: those who live life in a fundamentally non-storytelling fashion, who may have little sense of or interest in, their own history, nor any wish to give their life a certain narrative shape. In between lies the great continuum of mixed cases.
>
> Strawson, 2004, p.10

But this is exactly the point that literary Darwinists make. Like many other genetic traits, the storytelling gene may be dominant in some and not in others. If the species benefits from our capacity for narrative, then presumably a predisposition for the conceiving of stories must offer an individual a reproductive advantage. If, as Ridley (Ridley, 1994, p.318-30) and Miller (Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.156) maintain, a talent for gossip, imagination and storytelling offer the potential for attracting partners for reproduction, then perhaps Strawson should brush up on his Shakespeare.

According to Boyd organisms must "attend to the opportunities and threats that matter to them". Boyd hypothesises that "art is an adaptation whose functions are *shaping and sharing attention*, and, arising from that, fostering *social cohesion* and *creativity*" (ibid. p.151, italics in the original). He refers to research by Bekoff and Allen showing that the colour contrast between the sclera and the pupil is greater in the eyes of humans than it is in chimpanzees and bonobos, and it is greater in those creatures than in other apes and monkeys. From this he surmises that "the ability to monitor the direction of others' attention has mattered more to humans than even to our

nearest relatives" (ibid). Boyd considers focus of attention to be of enormous evolutionary benefit to humans as social animals. It provides us with the capacity for language and the ability to understand "multiple-order intentionality" which is our capacity to understand what someone is thinking about someone else thinking about someone else and so on. Dunbar suggests that a particular skill for multiple-order intentionality was one of the talents that made Shakespeare such a fine dramatist. To understand the subtle interplay of motives and intentions operating in *Othello* for example, we need to understand how Iago is manipulating Othello's understanding of Desdemona's feelings and thoughts about Cassio, while at the same time calibrating Desdemona's true feelings and thoughts about and towards both Othello and Cassio and so on (Dunbar, 2005, p,7-22).

The focus of attention necessary to deal with these levels of complexity also contributes to our capacity to "rehearse strategies" as Sugiyama put it. The "rehearsal of strategy" requires a great deal more thought processing than it might at first seem:

> All intelligent animals can focus on the immediate present, expectations of the immediate future, and perhaps some recollections of their personal past. But we alone, because of our special capacity to share and sharpen attention, can focus our minds together on particular events of the past as experienced or witnessed by ourselves or others, …on possibilities and impossibilities, and events hypothetical, counterfactual, and fictional... and to turn them through the vast space of possibility.
>
> Boyd (in Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.152)

This "vast space of possibility" contains all our representations of everything that we might know about the world and time. As such it is infinite and daunting. Its existential horrors were first identified by the Christian philosopher, Augustine.

Augustine points out that our problems begin as soon as we try to think about the nature of time: "What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled" (Augustine, 1961, p.264). This bafflement arises from the apparent paradox of asserting the very existence of time, because if we assume that time is composed of a past, present and future then we are confronted with a contradiction; the past has gone, the future has yet to be and the present is already passing. So the past, present and future don't exist and, therefore, neither does time. Augustine resolved this contradiction by distinguishing between "eternal time", the sort of time we measure by the sun and the moon and with clocks, and our own personal, internal experience of time, human time:

> ...it is not strictly correct to say that there are three times, past, present and future. It might be correct to say that there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things. Some such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see. The present of past things is the memory; the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of future things is expectation.
>
> Augustine, 1961, p.269

Human experience of time is thus composed of memory, direct perception and expectation and it is important to our conception of it that we recognise the present moment as the very point at which expectation becomes memory:

> Man's attentive mind, which is present, is relegating the future to the past. The past increases in proportion as the future diminishes, until the future is entirely absorbed and the whole becomes past... the mind regulates this process... the future, which it expects, passes through the present, to which it attends, into the past, which it remembers.
>
> Ibid. p.277

Augustine demonstrates this by the analogy of the recitation of a psalm. In this process of reciting what has already been learned, you begin with "an expectation of the whole of it" but as you recite, that which exists in "the province of expectation" is now relegated to the past, so that

> ... the scope of the action which I am performing is divided between the two faculties of memory and expectation. ... But my faculty of attention is present all the while, and through it passes what was the future in the process of becoming the past.
>
> Ibid. p.278

One can have a "long expectation of the future" (the present future) or a "long remembrance of the past" (the present past) but attention is always and only concerned with that singular point of the present present. Augustine refers to this disparity as the *distentio animi* - the distension of the soul. Distension is the result of the difference in the nature of attention compared to that of expectation and remembering. It is also "true of any longer action" including "a man's whole life" and even "the whole history of mankind, of which each man's life is a part" (ibid.). This is the key to understanding man's suffering: compared to heaven where there is no time, just "ever present, never future, never past", the life we live here in this world is havoc:

> ... I am divided between time gone by and time to come, and its cause is a mystery to me. My thoughts, the intimate life of my soul, are torn this way and that in the havoc of change.
>
> Ibid

Augustine's "havoc of change" shares a striking resemblance to Boyd's "vast space of possibility". It is the subjunctive world described by Ricoeur as "the realm of the 'as-if'", in which all the "possibilities and impossibilities" and "events hypothetical, counterfactual, and fictional" come rushing out of Augustine's "present future" of expectations, to be dealt with in the immediacy of the "present present" and are then already disappearing into

the "present past" to become events of memory, only to be reprocessed as models for more hypotheses and expectations. To further contribute to all this "havoc", our gift for multiple-order intentionality invites us to consider all the uncertain confusion and complexity of other people's intentions and expectations as well, four or five orders worth, each with their own worlds of motivation and possibility. Freedom of thought, as the existentialists warned, can be frightening and the "vast space of possibility" is a place none of us would wish to be lost in without a guide. Ricoeur suggests that story offers a straw to clutch at:

> In the capacity of poetic composition to re-figure this temporal experience, which is prey to the aporias of philosophical speculation, resides the referential function of the plot.
>
> Ricoeur, 1983, p.xi

Stories provide relief from "the distension of the soul" because they have a beginning and an end which we can know and understand; and that, as Augustine implies, is what it must be like to be God. This is another of the benefits of storytelling. To tell a story is to offer another individual respite from "the havoc of change" by finding a semblance of order, a reason for the occurrence of strings of dreadful events and the consolation of a satisfactory resolution (or even merely the possibility of a resolution, as Scheherazade managed to do for all those nights). This is what Ricoeur calls "the poetic act par excellence... the triumph of concordance over discordance" (ibid. p.31). He sees it as a solution to the Augustinian paradox (the paradox that sees our "distended souls" churned by "a havoc of change" through "nonexistent" time). The act of understanding a narrative is the act of comprehending as a whole "the miscellany constituted by the circumstances, ends and means, initiatives and interactions, reversals of fortune, and all the unintended consequences issuing from human action" (ibid. p. x). It brings order to the chaos. But narrative is not merely the imposition of an order onto a world of chaotic discord:

> Aristotelian theory does not accentuate concordance alone but, in a highly subtle way, the play of discordance internal to concordance.... this internal dialectic of poetic composition..., makes the tragic *muthos* the inverted figure of the Augustinian paradox.
>
> Ibid. p.38

Muthos here refers to "the arrangement of the events" into a narrative; not so much plot *per se* as the *making* of the plot, which Ricoeur calls "emplotment". The "discord" within the "discordant concordance" of the Aristotelian plot is rung by such incidents as "come unexpectedly and yet occur in a causal sequence in which one thing leads to another". So while the causal sequence is sustained, concord is disturbed by "those strokes of chance that seem to arrive by design" (ibid. p.43). As I pointed out in my first chapter, in tragedy the most important example of this kind of incident, carefully designed to appear as if it arrives by cruel luck, is the "reversal" or *peripeteia* which, in causal sequence with the other "fearful and pitiable" incidents characterised by "surprise and recognition", serve to bring the tragic hero to his or her inevitable demise. All of which, nonetheless, consoles us with its implications of order and meaning in the face of what Zizek calls "the radical contingency of the historical process" (Zizek, 1991, p.157).

Is this why happy endings seem to give us so much pleasure? Is it the experience of momentary relief from Augustinian despair that we enjoy so much? Whatever the explanation, it is undeniable that a narrative transforms the pain inherent in the suffering of its hero(es) into pleasure. This is borne out by the size of an entertainment industry that can only be so large because of the size of the market it provides for. The advertising industry is related to the entertainment industry but the stories are shorter. Seeing beautiful young people briefly experiencing blissfulness in beautiful locations seems to offer enough associative pleasure to convince us to buy syrupy soda drinks by the gallon but not enough for us to want to watch it for its own sake. Commercial television depends on our being prepared to tolerate the short-term narratives of advertising for the sake of the

pleasures of long form drama of any genre or style. But while the pleasures of long form drama tend to be richer and deeper than the short forms, they are not guaranteed. In spite of the enormous investment that the film and television industry puts into script development it is so hard to guarantee success that one of its most successful screenwriters has famously said that in Hollywood "nobody knows anything" (Goldman, 1985). This is because the processes of narrative reception are complex, delicate and subject to great variation. Ricoeur calls it the "subjective alchemy" that transforms suffering into pleasure, and it is "constructed *in* the work *by* the mimetic activity" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.50). To better understand the process, let us also brush up on our Shakespeare…

3) *Schemata, Gaps and Frames.*

> And make imaginary puissance;
> Think, when we talk of horses, that you see them
> Printing their proud hoofs i' the receiving earth;
> For 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings,
>
> Shakespeare (*Henry V*)

The audience, as Shakespeare points out to them in Chorus's speech at the beginning of *Henry V*, is always necessarily complicit in the creation of their experience of the dramatic narrative. Booth has described the appropriate response of an audience to the two characters implicit in one of Browning's dramatic monologues, *Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister*:

> Our job, to put it crudely, is to recreate the qualities of the two men and the drama between them as precisely and vividly as possible. Experienced readers can do the job of recreating the speaker in opposition to his own views without having to make every step consciously.
>
> Booth, 1974, p.144

Although they are only effectively provided with a single perspective, it is expected that each member of a successful audience will adopt the

perspectives of both characters, as well as maintaining their own, without making any conscious decision to do so. My interest here is with the way that a script, as a blueprint for a dramatic performance, elicits this complicity (without having to create a Chorus to beg for it). In my first chapter I described how the reception of a dramatic narrative involves an audience in the creation of a mimetic illusion by drawing the *fabula* from the *szujet*, keeping in mind that "the *fabula* - "what really happened" - is in fact a mental construction that the reader derives from the *sjuzet*, which is all that he ever directly knows" (Brooks, 1992, p.13). This involves organising paradigmatic story material into a syntagmatic diachronic narrative structure. Now I'd like to go into a little more detail about what that process involves.

First of all, our understanding of a narrative is modelled on our quotidian understanding of the world around us, so let me briefly discuss that. According to current theories of cognitive development, children learn surprisingly early (by two to three years old) to build concepts or *schemata*. Schemata are the models or "mental moulds" against which we measure experience, categorising everything we perceive by virtue of what we already know. We also adjust or "accommodate" our schemata to "fit the particulars of new experiences" (Myers, 1995, p.89). Reception and storage of thought material is organised according to innumerable schemata by which the mind contextualises, recognises and classifies incoming information and constructs and makes sense of reality. For a dramatist whose job it is to involve an audience in the world of the dramatic narrative, this immediately raises the question; what constitutes this sense of reality? How many (or few) schemata are necessary to create verisimilitude, the impression of reality? William James raised the question of reality not by asking what it is but by asking "under what circumstances do we think things are real?" He identified different "worlds" that attention and interest make real for us: "in each of which an object of a different kind can have its proper being: the world of the senses, the world of scientific objects, the world of abstract philosophical truths..." (cited in Goffman, 1975, p.2). As

well as measuring new input against established kinds, schemata also "make sense" by providing frames or contexts. Bordwell uses visual perception as an analogy to illustrate this "constructivist" theory:

> .... seeing is a bewildering flutter of impressions. The eye fixates many times per minute... yet we see a stable world... the visual system is organised to make its inferences in an involuntary, virtually instantaneous manner.... this automatic construction is also affected by schemata-driven processes that check hypotheses against incoming visual data.... we assemble our visual world from successive glances which we constantly check against our reigning "cognitive maps....
>
> Bordwell, 1988, p 31

As data is received, sub-conscious cognitive activity tries to "make sense" by making inferences, thereby turning data into information. The relationship between sensory data and the schemata that contextualise it is always dynamic and contingent; the schemata is testing and refining sensory data even as the data is testing the adequacy of the schemata. So each new input is measured according to whether it constitutes a part of something. This interaction creates, "a perceiver's recognition of global patterns characteristic of that data. 'Meaning' is said to exist when pattern is achieved" (Branigan, 1992, p.14). Kant called this process of "making sense" the "productive imagination" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.68). In dealing with narrative we do the same thing but in this case narrative itself constitutes "the whole" of which everything else is a part. Isolated individual events are brought together and recognised as part of a story. The process requires the synthesis of any number of narrative schemata. Ricoeur suggests an analogy between this "grasping together" of events by recognising them as part of a story, with what Kant has to say about "the operation of judging" which "places an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept" (ibid, p.66). The productive imagination connects understanding and intuition by "engendering syntheses that are intellectual and intuitive at the same time" (ibid.). By integrating an intellectual understanding of what we call the theme or "point" of a story with an intuitive recognition and selection of

circumstances, characters, episodes and so on, the productive imagination engenders "a schematism of the narrative function" (ibid).

Bordwell points out that all this is a problem-solving, goal-oriented process:

> Perception tends to be anticipatory, framing more or less likely expectations about what is out there.... the organism interrogates the environment for information which is then checked against the perceptual hypothesis.
>
> Bordwell, 1988 p.31

Involuntary cognitive processes are designed to "make sense" but to do that they need some idea of what it is they are making sense of. As James pointed out, different "worlds" have different requirements so they trigger different sets of assumptions about what will "make sense". According to Iser this is why literary texts are designed so that they "... cannot be fully identified either with the objects of the external world or with the experiences of the reader" (Iser, 1989, p.7). This produces "a degree of indeterminacy" leaving gaps in the reader's conception of the world of the text. It is the job of the reader to then fill these "gaps of indeterminacy" by reference to either "the external world of objects" or "the reader's own world of experience". We can see how this relates to the relationship I described previously between the *sjuzet* and the *fabula*: The *sjuzet* leaves "gaps of indeterminacy" in the narrative which the audience needs to fill with story material, *fabula*, in order for the narrative to make sense. In fact, since it is impossible for a narrative to describe everything, it is inevitable that much of the difference between a narrative world and the "real" one will be a question of what is missing. This isn't a weakness or failure. On the contrary, it can be constitutional of a narrative's power. Virginia Woolf remarked that part of the quality of Jane Austen's novels was in the way that: "She stimulates us to supply what is not there" (cited in Iser, 1989, p.33).

Iser offers an example of a literary form that shows how his notion of "indeterminacy" is related to the teleological aspect of narrative. It is the "serial story" that Dickens wrote for weekly magazines, the episodes later collected and published as novels. Each episode usually ends "where a certain tension that has been built up demands to be resolved" (Iser, 1989, p.11), a situation more commonly referred to as a cliff-hanger:

> The dramatic interruption or prolongation of suspense is the vital factor that determines the cutting, and the effect is to make the reader try to imagine the continuation of the action. How is it going to go on? In asking this question we automatically raise the degree of our own participation in the further progress of the action.
>
> Iser, 1989, p.11

Mamet makes a similar point in the advice he gives to playwrights to exploit the fact that "the only thing we, as audience, care about in the theatre is WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?" (Mamet, 1988, p.76, capitalised in the original). This creation of suspense is a technique used by any skilled narrative practitioner to involve her audience as deeply as possible in the action of a story, but it is a particularly important device for a dramatist whose purpose is to engage the sustained attention of an audience for up to three hours, during which they must be made to feel "only too happy" to continue to create for themselves a mimetic illusion.

The importance of the temporality of the narrative and the relation of past and future in the generation of schemata can hardly be overstated. According to Branigan, "the essence of narrative is a presentation of systematic change through a cause and effect teleology" (1992, p.19). Hypotheses about "what will come next" based on current information are a vital part of the process of engagement with the narrative. Bordwell tells of evidence that "goal orientation is a salient aspect of the schema of causality" (Bordwell, 1988, p.35). A story "cues" expectations, hypotheses and predictions as to possible futures, based on an understanding of the world of the characters of the story as well as all the myriad conventions associated

with the context of its telling: genre, style, internal narrative logic and the model of narrative structure according to which we anticipate the directions it might take us (Bordwell and Thompson, 1986, p.24). Todorov essentialised narrative into a causal structure which transforms a given situation through five stages:

1) equilibrium
2) disruption
3) recognition of the disruption
4) attempt to repair the disruption
5) reinstatement of initial equilibrium

(Todorov, 1971, p.39)

We don't need to be consciously aware of these structural models of narrative since our experience of stories is enough for us to anticipate and predict the direction of events. Nor, strangely enough, do we need to be right. As I mentioned earlier this process (essentially the reception process) reflects, to a certain extent, the relationship of an audience and a culture, in that it is "organised around the dialectic of expectation-supporting norms and possibility-evoking transgressions" (Bruner, 2002, p.16). An audience wants both comforting familiarity and, as Wordsworth put it, "the charm of novelty". The play of expectations between the desire for verisimilitude and "the unpredictability of creation" was described by Jauss as meeting on the "horizon of expectations" of the world of text and audience:

> a literary work... evokes what has already been read, gets the reader into one or another emotional disposition and, from the outset, creates a certain expectation of what "will follow" and of "the ending", an expectation which can, as one's reading advances, be maintained, modulated, reorientated.... It is a guided reception, unfolding in a way that conforms to a well-determined indicative schema.... the new text evokes for the reader (or listener) the expectation horizon.
>
> Jauss, 1970, p.175 (cited in Pavis, 1982, p.74}

This schematism arises out of a tradition constituted by "the interplay of innovation and sedimentation" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.68). "Sedimentation" is established by the paradigms of form, genre and type. A paradigm is established not only by a tradition of genres, but also individual works, each of which, to a lesser or greater extent, is innovative, and all of which, in the context of tradition, are “marked as particular types”, and in this sense are of themselves typical and paradigmatic. As each new work deviates from the established paradigms, it contributes to the gradual evolution of new forms.

It might be useful to recall here the distinction made by States between the two orders of causal determination in which the play of expectations operates: the first, that of the design and composition process; the second we might call the diegetic order, in which the audience shares the play of expectations with the hero(es). The difference between these two orders of causal determination might be described as the difference between the view from outside the story world and the point of view of the principal character(s) "inside" the story. We can see that these two orders of causal determination have different kinds of schemata and different sets of contextual frames. The "expectation horizon" within the story world (States’ second order of causal determination) is concerned with the hero's pursuit of the goal. The expectation horizon of the first order of causal determination is concerned with the play of narrative variations. It shouldn't be too surprising, given what we now know about the human capacity for multiple-order intentionality, that the audience is quite capable of maintaining both points of view at the same time (which is why Aristotle said that they experience both pity *and* fear, but more on that later). Actually, the capacity to deal with two perspectives at once isn't limited to humans.

Watching monkeys interacting with each other at the zoo, Bateson observed that they would not only fight, but also *play* at fighting. He recognised that fighting and play-fighting are two completely different modes of behaviour requiring two kinds of mental processes. When the monkeys play at

fighting, both of these two kinds of mental process are operating at once. Bateson refers to them (with a passing salute to Freud) as "primary" and "secondary" (Bateson, 1972, p.141). What is characteristic of "primary-process" thinking is that it is unable to discriminate between "some" and "all", between denotative action and that which is denoted, between "play" and "non-play" (ibid. p.179). A "higher" cognitive level of processing is required for such discriminations to be made. It is only at the higher level, at the level of "secondary-process" thinking, that the message "this is play" is received and gives a context to the action. This "secondary-process" recognises the difference between an expression of emotion which is playful and one that signifies an authentic emotional condition. A "playful" display of emotion is a negotiation of two signals at the same time; "this is real" and "just kidding". The two signals are received in a particular configuration. "This is real" is "framed" by "just kidding". The frame establishes the conventions by which behaviour is organised and understood. Thus, within the "frame" of a cinema screen or a theatre, actors become characters in a story, not because they *resemble* those characters, but because we as an audience and they as performers agree to the convention that they *depict* those characters, much as a snarling kitten attacking a ball of wool depicts the lion attacking a wildebeest. The ball of wool has no resemblance to the wildebeest. This difference between resemblance and depiction is useful to keep in mind. Resemblance is a symmetrical, reflexive relation; if I resemble my cousin, then he will resemble me and so if I am young and handsome, he must also be young and handsome, *ipso facto* (Sartre, 1940, p.ix). On the other hand, if I was an ugly old actor I could still *depict* a handsome young man so long as the audience is prepared to make the metaphoric substitution. This is why the ageing and famously "unprepossessing" 19th century actor, Edmund Booth, was able to say, "When I play Romeo, I am the handsomest man in Europe!" For that matter, it is also the reason that we are able to concern ourselves with whether or not Daffy Duck will avoid being shot by Elma Fudd, instead of worrying about whether or how (among other things) a duck can speak.

Thus, an audience's acceptance of "the truth of the fiction" depends not on the drama's success in "faithfully representing human social life" but in the set of conventions they have agreed to. Drama establishes and utilises these conventions ("agreed pretences") to manipulate the combination of primary and secondary mental processes at work in the minds of its audience, "cueing" them with enough knowledge and understanding as to a character's situation to imaginatively simulate their interior experience of acting within the fictional world, a condition I have referred to as a mimetic illusion. Goffman extrapolates on Bateson's notion of the play-frame. He suggests that play-fighting uses real fighting as "a model, a detailed pattern to follow" which he calls "keying":

> ... a set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying. A rough musical analogy is intended.
>
> Goffman, 1975, p.44

So we might say that within the frame of a narrative, the productive imagination organises data into schemata in a particular key. Drama, according to Aristotle, is the representation of action. In the "key" of action, sensory data isn't just organised into its usual relation with the world but also into its relation with time and volition. The process of creating it he called *mimesis*.

4) *Mimesis*

According to Aristotle, as translated by Ricoeur, it is the pairing of *mimesis* with *muthos*, "the organising of events" (which Ricoeur calls "emplotment") which constitutes the "what" of "what drama does". While Aristotle's *Poetics* is principally concerned with the writing of dramatic tragedy, he also uses the word *poetics* to mean "the art of composing plots" and therefore "puts

the mark of production, construction, dynamism on... the two terms *muthos* and *mimesis*, which have to be taken as operations, not as structures" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.33). So in Aristotle's *mimesis* there is no sense of Plato's notion of *mimesis* as an imitation of existing reality but rather the depiction of a metaphor of "universal" reality in the representation of action as an organised series of events. It represents, "such things as might be... the universal... the kind of things a certain type of person will probably or necessarily say or do in a given situation" (Aristotle, 1981, p.44,). So the story world is both fictional and universal, and while it is not an imitation of the world, nor is it entirely separate from it. Ricoeur refers to *mimesis* as making "a break that opens the space for fiction" but he suggests that this break should be conceived not as a separation but as a set of connections:

> ... that praxis belongs at the same time to the real domain, covered by ethics and the imaginary one, covered by poetics, suggests that mimesis functions not just as a break but also as a connection...
>
> Ricoeur, 1983, p.46

Ricoeur proposes *mimesis* as a three-part process which begins and ends with the audience; "the three moments of mimesis", beginning with an audience's "pre-understanding of the world of action", followed by the central, pivotal configuration of the action and events which Ricoeur calls "emplotment", and it is then completed by the "re-configuration" of the action as it is finally understood by the audience. In this way emplotment, "draws its intelligibility from its faculty of mediation, which is to conduct us from the one side of the text to the other, transfiguring the one side into the other through its power of configuration" (ibid. p.53). From "one side to the other" also means “from before to after” and it is this temporal aspect of action that makes the whole notion tricky to grasp. Time, as I've already discussed, is an aporia, which is the reason for Ricoeur's examination of narrative in the first place since the aporia of time is one "to which only narrative activity can respond" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.6).

Ricoeur suggests that narrative composition is grounded in three aspects of our "pre-understanding of the world of action; its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, and its temporal character" (ibid. p,53). He points out, however, that this listing of the three categories of "the world of action" is not a closed one. Later I will suggest that another aspect of our experience of the practical "prefigured" world, that of the emotions, might be added to the above list of competences and pre-understandings which the plot-maker has at his disposal. For now, let me clarify Ricoeur's three aspects of our "pre-understanding of the world of action".

To begin with, action is distinguished from mere physical movement because it cannot be separated from the goals, motives and methods of the agents who commit actions and who can be held responsible for them. An action always presupposes an intended outcome. So the meaning of any action can be explained and understood in terms of "what", "why," "who", "how", "with whom", and so on. To understand the interconnections of these terms is to have "that competence we can call practical understanding" (ibid. p.55). This "practical understanding" also requires comprehension of some of the rules of narrative structure; those syntactic features that are aspects of cultural tradition analyzed by the Russian formalists and their successors (Propp, Todorov, Greimas) to identify different kinds of plots.

As narratives become more pervasive and audiences become more sophisticated in their narrative comprehension dramatists have become more adventurous in the way that they structure their narratives. Dramas may, for example, challenge an audiences' temporal expectations by telling the story backwards (Harold Pinter's *Betrayal*) or, indeed, backwards and forwards (Christopher Nolan's *Memento*). In the early scenes of *Taking Liberty* I rely on an audiences' comprehension that the narratives of the three central characters are being woven together, so that, for example, in the following sequence two sets of dialogue are occurring at the same time, otherwise it would be a meaningless sequence of lines that seem to have nothing to do with each other:

ALAN – Have you got a boat that fast?
HARDY – Are you John Bertrand?
BEN – Nope.
JOHN – I am.
BEN – I've got a real pretty picture though. (*He shows Alan his design*)
ALAN – Will it beat /Rolly Tasker?
HARDY -- /Rolly Tasker tells me you're a good sailor on a fast boat.
BEN – She'll beat anything with sails.
JOHN – You're Gentleman Jim Hardy.
ALAN – How much will it cost?
HARDY – Frank Packer wants to take another crack at the cup in 1970.
BEN – A hundred grand, give or take.
JOHN – Which cup?
HARDY – There's only one, lad.
ALAN – Better be bloody fast then.
BEN – She will be.
JOHN – Got a boat?

p.11

Narrative is only possible because our actions are "always already symbolically mediated" and another aspect of the "practical understanding" of human action necessary for narrative composition and comprehension is an awareness of "the symbolic resources of the practical field" (ibid. p.57). In other words, there needs to be an understanding, shared by the composer and his audience, of how actions are "already articulated by signs, rules and norms" (ibid.). Here, Ricoeur refers to the work of Geertz and Cassirer, for whom "symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience" (ibid.). We are talking here about the symbols which incorporate meaning into action and thus make action decipherable within the symbolic social system. It is by these symbolic systems that social reality is constructed (see Searle, 1996) and by which "culture understands itself" and confers "an initial *readability* on action" (ibid. p.58). Any given action or gesture (as distinct from mere physical movement) takes place within the entire system of "conventions, beliefs and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture" (ibid.). It is important to be clear that these are symbols "...that underlie action and that constitute its first signification, before autonomous symbolic wholes dependent upon speaking or writing

become detached from the practical level" (ibid.). So, for example, at the level of this "first signification", a cigar, even in the analyst's office, is only ever something to be smoked.

This symbolic mediation leads to the establishment of social norms which immediately acquire value, thus rules of description become prescriptive; for example, the spontaneous wave of an arm in greeting can acquire meanings that evolve through cultural reiteration into the compulsory salute. The values of the action then attach themselves to the agent:

> As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences. They thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action is more valuable than that one. These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be extended to the agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or worse.
>
> Ibid. 1983, p.58

It can be seen from this how an examination of symbolic mediations of culture leads us from social description to social convention through to moral judgement and questions of what constitutes ethical behaviour. This raises the question as to whether it is possible for a character or even a particular action to be ethically neutral. It is a question which Ricoeur answers with a resounding "neither possible nor desirable": Undesirable because "the actual order of action does not just offer the artist conventions and convictions to dissolve, but also ambiguities and perplexities to resolve in a hypothetical mode" (ibid. p.59). Ethics are established by social convention and one of the functions of art is to explore and challenge the borders of convention. Among other things, narrative constitutes "an ethical laboratory" where a writer can experiment with ethics and values. The history of literature is a dialectic encompassing the struggle of institutionalised moral structures resisting the challenges of innovative alternatives presented to it by the radical in art and literature.

The "third anchorage" that composition finds in our "pre-understanding" of the world of action is in its temporal character. Notions of narrative temporality that are useful for a dramatist to be familiar with - to which I have already referred - are those identified by Genette of order and duration. For example, if the *szujet* misrepresents the order of the events of the *fabula* (as it usually does), the audience will reorganise them in their imagination into their "original" order so as to make sense of them. Similarly, if the timeframe of the *fabula* is, say, 10 years from beginning to end, by the end of the show an audience will have re-imagined the two hours they spent watching it so that the beginning of the story will seem like it was 10 years ago.

I should reiterate that what I have been dealing with is a description of a pre-understanding and competence to utilise the meaningful structures, symbolic resources and temporal character (though the list is not closed) of the domain of action and that these pre-understandings are necessary to begin the exercise of narrative configuration that Ricoeur calls emplotment. Emplotment is the pivotal operation that makes "the break that opens the space for fiction", a space in which the audience engages with the drama which Ricoeur calls "the kingdom of the *as if*". As I said, this break should not be conceived as a separation but as a mediation "between what precedes the fiction and what follows it" (ibid. p.65). The interconnectedness of a dramatic narrative, drawing each of its elements into an intelligible whole is one of its essential characteristics. The dramatist's job is to turn a diversity of events into a single story, so that an audience is able to "draw a configuration out of a simple succession" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.65). This is what gives the story its "followability". We speak of being able to "follow" a story because we understand why each episode is a consequence of those we have already seen and we have confidence that it will lead us to a conclusion which, although unpredictable, will in retrospect "make sense" one way or another of everything that came before. This retrospective comprehension of the way that each part of the narrative relates to the whole requires the synthesis of any number of narrative schemata and is a function of the

"productive imagination" which integrates an intellectual understanding of the plot and the theme or "point" of a story with an intuitive recognition and selection of circumstances, characters, episodes and so on. As I pointed out earlier, Ricoeur sees an analogy between this configurational act of "grasping together" events by recognising them as part of a story, with "what Kant has to say about the operation of judging" which "places an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept" (ibid. p.66).

Ricoeur identifies three particular aspects to this "mediating process" by which emplotment holds its action(s) together. Firstly, there is the way it turns a diversity of events into a single story, so that an event comes to be defined by "its contribution to the development of the plot." The plot, therefore, mediates between "events and a narrated story" by organising the events into "an intelligible whole". By galvanising together each of the events with its narrative connections, emplotment "draws a configuration out of a simple succession" (ibid. p.65). As Dawson makes clear in the following passage this process of reconfiguration is not just an intellectual exercise:

> All works of art are fully grasped through the perception of the interrelatedness of their parts, and in drama the relation between parts is characteristically one of tension.... it is useful to remember, as I. A. Richards reminds us in *The Principles of Literary Criticism* that this tension is in us, but we can only discuss it in terms of the work of art itself. There are many different kinds of tension in drama... but the underlying, continuous tension is that between the situation at any given moment and the complete action.... the most simple and striking example of this tension is suspense.
>
> Dawson, 1970, p.30

A second aspect to the mediating process of emplotment is the way that those components of narrative action that are "capable of figuring in the paradigmatic tableau established by the semantics of action" (p.66) such as agents, motives, circumstances, interactions, goals, unexpected results and so on, pass from the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic, that is, they are

selected from the "tableau" of the paradigms of action to be "integrated" into the story. We recognise here the writer selecting from "the paradigms" of the first order of causal determination to be arranged along the syntactic order of the story – the second order of causal determination. Thirdly, emplotment mediates by way of its temporal characteristics. One of the ways it does this is by the expectation of an endpoint which "furnishes the point of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole" (ibid. p.67). The plot imposes "the sense of an ending" (Kermode, 2000) so that all events are related and equally relevant in that they are steps towards an end. This is particularly important when the story as such is already known. If you already know the ending then following the story

> is not so much to enclose its surprises or discoveries within our recognition of the meaning attached to the story, as to apprehend the episodes which are themselves well known as leading to this end. A new quality of time emerges from this understanding.
>
> Ricoeur, 1983, p.67

Thus, not only does an audience get satisfaction from finding out "what happens next" but also from the quality of the connectedness of each event. This is perhaps indicative of a relation between the way an audience comprehends and appreciates drama (and other narratives) with its comprehension and appreciation of music. Ricoeur observes a parallel here between the "Augustinian paradox" of time and the way that emplotment deals with time, in that they both combine a pair of temporal dimensions. As we have seen, emplotment draws together a chronological, episodic, linear representation of time by means of the configurational, in that a story is a single configuration of multiple events. So we might say that the episodic dimension equates with Augustine's "eternal" time (an infinite succession of "nows"), while the configurational equates with what he calls "human time" illustrated by the recitation of the Psalm in which past and future are always connected to the ongoing present. It is from this correlation between the two pairings of temporal concepts in Augustine and emplotment that Ricoeur extrapolates what is perhaps the central thesis of his work: "By

mediating between the two poles of event and story, emplotment brings to the [Augustinian] paradox a solution that is the poetic act itself" (ibid). In other words, narrative draws the events together in a connective pattern; it brings the consolation of a "discordant concordance" to the jarring havoc of the condition that Augustine calls the *distentio animi* - the distension of the soul. Perhaps, as I suggested earlier, this explains the success and popularity of storytellers of all styles and types.

While noting that the importance Ricoeur places on recognising the extended series of multiple events as a single story validates the approach to composing the work I talked about in the first chapter (the two orders of causal determination and the "organising principles" within each of them; Egri's premise in the first order and the heroes pursuit of the goal in the second), I'm not suggesting that the object of the exercise for an audience should be to identify the premise, although the premise is likely to influence an audience's notion of "what the story was about". I also think that the "followability" of the story is the payoff for the dramatist's struggle to discipline the narrative into the "single knot of relevance" that disallows any elements unrelated to the premise or what the hero wants.

The mimetic activity is completed where the world of the text meets the world of the reader or audience. Ricoeur characterises the process as a transition from "configuration to refiguration" that reaches its fulfilment in the mind of the audience. Just as, in the reading of a sentence, each word on its own refers to nothing but itself until it can be gathered up into the mind of the reader where its purpose as part of the meaning of a single concept is completed, so narrative keeps us waiting for the meaning of an action until it is completed and its true cause is revealed.

This analogy raises a couple of questions that need to be dealt with: First the thorny problem of reference. Thorny because linguistics and semiotics as disciplines reject intentions oriented toward the "extra-linguistic." Ricoeur argues for a different approach;

> ...if (following Benveniste rather than de Saussure) we take the sentence as the unit of discourse, then the intended of discourse ceases to be confused with the signified correlative to each signifier within the imminence of a system of signs. With the sentence, language is oriented beyond itself.
>
> Ibid. 1983, p.78

The event of discourse is not confined to the speaker. Language does not constitute a world of itself, it refers to the world of our experience. It has a dialogical function whereby the speaker intends to "bring a new *experience* to language and share it with someone else" (ibid.). What needs to be found is a way to cross the gap between the horizons of speaker and listener, text and reader. Ricoeur finds it by means of "metaphorical reference". The act of metaphor is the extension of meaning. Meaning for Ricoeur emerges at the level of the sentence: "words alone cannot be metaphoric. They are metaphoric only in the context of the sentence" (Ricoeur, 1991, p.77). Rather than a mere substitution of one word by a simile, a metaphor creates meaning by a "semantic discrepancy", a violation of the rules which determine appropriate predicates. By communicating in this way it engenders a "new pertinence that the metaphorical utterance establishes at the level of sense, on the ruins of the literal sense abolished by its impertinence" (ibid. p.80). It is in this activity of "metaphorical reference", covering all non-descriptive uses of language in a narrative, by which the worlds of text and reader are brought together. A narrative text is "the proposing of a world" (ibid. p.81). The world of the text and the world of the reader are "fused" in the act of reading/watching/listening. This "fusion of horizons" leads to the "dialectic of sedimentation and innovation. The shock of the possible, ... is amplified by the internal interplay, ... between the received paradigms and the proliferation of divergences. ... Thus narrative ... is a model of practical actuality by its deviations as much as by its paradigms" (p.80). In this way fiction expands our horizon of existence, "augmenting it with meanings that themselves depend upon the virtues of abbreviation, saturation, and culmination, so strikingly illustrated by emplotment" (p.80).

Until now Ricoeur's approach has been structured around Aristotle's *Poetics* for which tragic drama is the case model and, thus, well suited for my own theorising of a methodology for the composition of dramatic narrative. But in his reflections on the end point of emplotment, he acknowledges that Aristotle is more concerned with the composition of the text *per se* than with the traversal from text to audience. Perhaps it is as a result of this that Ricoeur's references and terminology with regard to the reception of narrative become more suggestive of the act of reading than that of watching and comprehending a drama. In discussions like this we must be careful not to blur the distinction between reading and watching drama too easily: are there any significant differences between the comprehension of a text by an act of reading and that of an audience attending a performance that would invalidate my application of his description to the experience of an audience engaged with a drama? Let me identify some of the more obvious differences. When an audience watches a performance of drama there are, as Lodge points out, extra dimensions of feeling and suggestion being communicated simultaneously "on several different channels" (Lodge, 1996, p.217) which Ricoeur, by conflating a reader and an audience, might be inclined to overlook. As Pugliatti pointed out, the dramatic text shouldn't be seen as a "linguistic text *translatable* into stage practice" but rather as "a linguistic transcription of a stage potentiality" (cited in Elam, 1980, p.209). Elam suggests the following differences between a text to be read and a text to be performed:

> ... it is the performance, or at least a possible or 'model' performance, that constrains the dramatic text in its very articulation... the constant pointing within the dialogue to an undescribed context suggests that the dramatic text is radically conditioned by its performability... and indicates throughout its allegiance to the physical conditions of performance, above all to the actor's body and its ability to materialise discourse.
>
> Elam, 1980, p. 209

Ricoeur, however, once again takes his cue from Aristotle who appears to see no significant difference between watching a play performed and the act of reading it. This is because he uses the term "narrative" in a generic sense, only contextualising differences between the diegetic and the dramatic modes when necessary. It is justified on grounds that he has chosen a mimesis of *action* as his dominant category: "The result of this choice is that the distinction between the diegetic mode and the dramatic mode moves to the background" (Ricoeur, 1985, p.153). I was making a similar distinction at the very beginning of this discussion, when I pointed out that, for all their many differences, what theatre and film have in common is the drama of human action. I think it is a strong enough argument to validate Ricoeur's concept of *mimesis* as a description of the dramatic narrative in terms of its composition and reception.

I hope it has become clear from even this minimal summary of it that the mimetic process, regardless of whether it is being undertaken by a reader or a member of an audience, is a deeply complex and dynamic network of activity which requires a great deal of psychic effort, which Shakespeare refers to as "imaginary puissance". A performance of *Taking Liberty,* for example, requires six actors to run up and down a narrow wooden platform and pretend to pull on a few ropes, but somehow, the imagination of the audience translates these actions into a 10 year campaign (of real sailing on real oceans) to win an international yacht race: to the extent that, when the final victory Canon is fired, on many nights during the run of the play, they quite literally leapt to their feet and cheered the actors as if they really had just won the America's Cup.

The question is: what motivates the mental effort required for all this work of reception of the narrative. Interaction with story is so common and universal that it tends to be taken for granted that reception and emotional involvement will happen automatically. Theoretical explanations and descriptions of the receptive processes of an audience watching a dramatic narrative appear to make this assumption: that the activity of reception is a

foregone conclusion. But I don't see that it would necessarily happen at all without an initial emotional response to the material to trigger the process. Isn't it the emotions that fuel the dynamic connections of each single action to the episode it belongs to, as well connecting that episode to the entire story, thus drawing the audience into the reception process? Bordwell, while acknowledging the relevance of emotion, suggests that the affective aspect of the narrative experience doesn't need to be dealt with by the constructivist theorists because cognitive comprehension processes can be separated from the emotions:

> As a perceptual cognitive account, this theory does not address affective features of film viewing. This is not because I think that emotion is irrelevant to our experience of cinematic storytelling - far from it - but because I am concerned with the aspects of viewing that lead to constructing the story and its world. I'm assuming that a spectator's comprehension of the film's narrative is theoretically separable from his or her emotional responses.
>
> Bordwell, 1988, p.30

This assumption that our comprehension of narrative can be separated from our emotional responses is highly contentious. If, as Bordwell suggests, all of our thinking is a goal-oriented process, then we must assume that it is with a view to satisfying some sort of desire, otherwise achieving the goal has no payoff. As Frijda points out: "Emotional valence - the pleasantness or unpleasantness of emotional reactions to things, events or situations... is the origin of all goals" (Frijda,1994, p.17). In anticipation of this argument Bordwell offers the rather limited notion of an "emotional kick" that we experience when an expectation initiated by the narrative is interrupted or delayed and then fulfilled. We experience this "emotional kick" because; "the organism enjoys creating unity" (Bordwell, 1988, p.39). This takes us back to the difference between aesthetic and cathartic pleasure. Bordwell's "emotional kick" is an aesthetic response, it does nothing to explain the spectrum of emotions that an audience feels ebbing and flowing with the travails of the hero of the narrative. Can there really be any doubt that

emotional responses constitute an element of the action of the dramatic narrative? The reason I cry with joy for George Bailey when he is returned to his family and saves everybody's Christmas is because (in spite of my own personal distaste for Christmas and everything associated with it) I have been sharing his suicidal distress for the previous ninety minutes. It may well be that the reluctance to deal with emotion in theories of reception is due to the objections to catharsis I discussed earlier (by Nietzsche, Brecht, Althusser and their fellow sceptics all the way back to Plato). Another reason for this reluctance might be the paradoxical nature of the question that catharsis inevitably raises; why should we care about something that doesn't exist? To deal with these objections, a different kind of explanation of *mimesis* is required to the one that my discussion of reception theory has offered so far.

Chapter 3

The Emotional Audience

> Emotion is evolution's way of giving meaning to our lives.
>
> Bower, 1992, p.4

1) *"He's behind you!" - Fiction and Empathy*

Our capacity to experience an emotional response to fiction raises questions about the nature of belief, emotion and verisimilitude, reminding us again of William James's question: "under what circumstances do we believe a situation to be real?"

We are inclined to think that an emotional response is indicative of a "real" event because we trust our emotions to be authentic, spontaneous, biological responses to danger or opportunity. After all, while we can *pretend* that we are sympathetic or frightened, and we might even feel guilty for not feeling as sorry as we believe we ought to feel, we will not experience feelings of pity or fear or joy if we don't care about a situation, because to care we must surely believe it to be the case. For the same reason we are not likely to experience pity for someone if we believe that their apparent suffering is an act. Nor do we feel pity for someone or something that doesn't exist. This is why an emotional response to fiction strikes us as paradoxical. I know that George Bailey doesn't exist, he is just an actor reciting lines from a script recorded on film and broadcast on to my

television screen, nonetheless, when George returns to the bosom of his nonexistent family I weep with joy. My tears would seem to be evidence that I must, in some way, to some extent, believe in the existence of George Bailey. Hence, the equation appears to boil down to; I feel therefore I believe. But here's the paradox: if, while watching *Psycho*, I am genuinely and sincerely *afraid* that Marion Crane is about to be stabbed in the shower by a psychotic murderer, and therefore *believe* it to be the case; why don't I call the police? Thus the authenticity of the emotional response to fiction is challenged by its failure to motivate action: "What is pity or anger which is never to be acted on? ...Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all" (Walton, 1990, p.196).

The problem is known as "the fiction paradox" and regularly resurfaces among Anglo-American academics concerned with theories of narrative and culture. Its history is debated; Neill refers to it as "ancient questions... in recent years resurfaced..." (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.175) and Nussbaum frames her description of the issue with references to Aristotle's *Poetics* (Nussbaum, 2001, p.238-248) while Yanal, on the other hand, insists that it is "*not* one of the perennial problems of philosophy" (Yanal, 1999, p.13, his italics) because neither Plato nor Aristotle "incorporates recognition of fictionality in their theories of mimetic art" (ibid). The paradox can be presented as a set of three propositions which I have paraphrased from Levinson (in Hjort and Laver, 1997, p. 22-3) and Yanal (1999, p.11):

1) we experience emotions in response to fiction;
2) we only feel emotions in response to things in which we believe;
3) we don't believe in the existence of things we know to be fictional.

Rationalist resolutions to the paradox are explained as denials, contradictions or challenges to one or more of these three propositions, usually based on their failure to fit strict definitions of what constitutes authentic emotion or belief. For example, the most common explanation for the phenomenon that I receive from students in scriptwriting tutorials when I ask why it is that we care for fictional characters is the "suspension

of disbelief" theory. This involves a challenge to proposition 3, which, if allowed, leads to a contradiction of proposition 2. Walton challenges proposition 1 by suggesting that the emotions we feel in response to fiction are "quasi-emotions" evoked by our imagining ourselves involved in the fiction. He doesn't consider the emotions to be "real" because the situation that generates them isn't real, which we must be aware of because we are not motivated to act (Walton, 1990). This raises questions about what constitutes "authentic" emotions, that is, what are the minimal requirements necessary for us to be able to say that an emotion exists;

> When we view or conceive an object as having such and such properties, whether or not we strictly believe that it does, we must, on pain of incoherence, be taking said object to exist or be regarding it as existent.
>
> Levinson (in Hjort and Laver,1997, p.24)

Rationalist arguments tend to assume that mental states such as emotions and beliefs are total and can be strictly defined, but, as Curry points out, agreement about the "type-identification" of mental states depends on presumptions with regard to common meanings and psychological conditions which may not necessarily be universal (Hjort and Laver, 1997, p.70). Curry, paraphrasing Moran, points out that fiction isn't the only situation in which we have feelings about things that don't exist or are "non-actual": "Isn't it also problematic that I should be upset at the thought of an event that I know didn't happen to my child, or that did happen to me long ago..." (ibid, p.71). Similarly, Nussbaum suggests that we are inclined to be profligate with our beliefs and emotions. She points out that we can react to a character emotionally and, simultaneously, share the emotions of a character by identification. We can also react emotionally towards the "implied author" (as conceived by Booth, 1961) which she defines as "the sense of life embodied in the text as a whole". A fictional work can also evoke emotions with regard to "one's own possibilities" which are "multiple and operate at multiple levels of specificity and generality" (Nussbaum, 2001, p.242). A simultaneous experience of all these attitudes is possible because we are capable of experiencing more than one emotional response

at a time. Nussbaum points out that we can, for example, feel sympathy for Marion Crane and rage at her killer at the same time as feeling sympathy for all women who are raped or assaulted and anger at all their attackers, while simultaneously feeling acutely aware of our own sadistic and persecutory aggression which leads us to *want* to see her slashed. This is a reminder of our capacity for multiple-order intentionality by virtue of which we are able to adopt a number of subject positions and, it would seem, emotional attitudes simultaneously.

As I have already pointed out, an audience is not simply a passive observer of the activity that takes place in the drama; cognition is a dynamic process in our relations with both the "real world" and any given fictional one. A story is not just projected onto our minds as we read or listen or watch - producing the *fabula* from the *szujet* requires the selecting and sorting of the paradigms of action into a syntagmatic linear narrative. This process of filling in the gaps and making sense of the *szujet* is not entered into from a point of view of objective curiosity. We, the audience, are drawn into it because we have adopted a subjective perspective of the events; we have taken a personal interest. As Nussbaum points out, emotional responses arise as a result of the formal structures of the work (ibid). This is what Ricoeur called "the subjective alchemy…constructed *in* the work *by* the mimetic activity," which "conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling..." to transform "the pain inherent in these emotions [pity and fear] into pleasure" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.50). I mentioned earlier that literary Darwinists have theorised that our capacity as human beings to enter into the perspective of one or more other people is an adaptation that has evolved as "a precondition of our collective life in culture" (Tomasello, cited in Bruner, 2002, p.16). Bruner, as I said, suggests that storytelling is an adaptation by which we have found a way of converting "individual experience into collective coin which can be circulated, as it were, on a base wider than the merely interpersonal one" (ibid, p.16). This would seem to suggest that the act of adopting the personal perspectives of the characters in fiction or drama is modelled on the common storytelling interactions we have with

each other as individual members of a community. Both activities require empathy and a theory of mind.

For humans and philosophers the problem of other minds is the question of how we recognise and comprehend that others have the same kind of internal consciousness as we do ourselves. Blackburn discusses the three principal "suggestions" that modern philosophy makes about "understanding the sayings and doings of others" under the title "Theory, Observation and Drama" (Blackburn, 1995, p. 274). Of these three approaches, the observational approach assumes that other people's meanings are "manifest in their utterances" (ibid), while the "theory theory" suggests that we make "tacit use of a 'folk theory' or rough sets of principles that take us from observed behaviour, thought of as evidence, to one particular attribution of belief and meaning" (ibid). The third approach is that we attribute meaning to others by "a process of re-enactment: a dramatic projection or entering into the position of another" (ibid). Blackburn discusses the compatibility of the three suggestions I have just outlined and argues convincingly that there are necessary aspects to our understanding of other people that only the dramatic option is able to fulfil. This is now more commonly referred to as "simulation theory" and has become one of the most prominent of the philosophical theories that deal with the way we understand each other (Blackburn, Oatley, Goldie). One of its early proponents was R.G. Collingwood. According to Blackburn's reading of Collingwood, a particularly useful aspect of the concept is the view that understanding others is not merely to place them in some kind of "lawlike causal network" but also to understand their self-interested motivations, which includes, among other things, their personal history and aspirations and their own self-understanding, that is "the understanding and rational control of what one is doing" (Blackburn, 1995, p.277). Again, this is not simply a matter of "finding individual elements of the person... connected by scientific law with other elements", it is "an essentially holistic enterprise that needs to draw on indefinitely wide knowledge of the person's human context" (ibid). This corresponds with Goldie's description of empathy as "a

process or procedure by which a person centrally imagines the narrative (the thoughts, feelings, and emotions) of another person" (Goldie, 2000, p.195). The simulation model is sometimes accused of giving "improper privilege to the first person, even involving a Cartesian transparency of the mind to itself". According to Blackburn, however, Collingwood "had no patience with Cartesian transparency". He considered that the understanding of the self was as "historical" as the understanding of others: "the child's discovery of itself as a person is also its discovery of itself as a member of a world of persons...; in my thinking I am both speaker and hearer" (Blackburn, 1995, p. 278).

This notion of "empathy as simulation" establishes a correspondence between quotidian social interaction and the way that we comprehend drama. Oatley has even suggested that they are more or less the same thing, proposing that "simulation" is a fair translation of Aristotle's *mimesis* (Hjort and Laver, 1997, p.265). Oatley hypothesises that "by engaging with the art of the theatre... we are induced to run on ourselves narrative simulations of actions, with their consequences and emotional effects" (ibid p.267). Elsewhere, Oatley has suggested that it was Shakespeare who first conceived of the theatre as a simulation of the world run on the minds of its audience, the point of which was to observe and better understand the "deep structure" of selfhood and social interaction (Oatley, 2001). Neill makes a similar point: that empathy gives us access to feelings that would otherwise be foreign to us, mirroring "the feelings and responses of others whose outlooks and experiences may be very different from our own" (Bordwell and Carroll, p.180). But as Goldie points out, it is not sufficient simply to be able to say of someone that "he is afraid" or "he feels fear": "You have also at least to be able to say what it is he is afraid of. To do this and also to explain why the person has the feelings that he does towards this object of his emotion, it will be necessary to piece together or fill in the emotion's narrative" (Goldie, 2000, p.181). This is because, as Nico Frijda's first "law" of emotion establishes; emotions "...arise in response to the meaning structures of given situations" (Frijda, 1988, p.271). To

understand what I am feeling you need to try on my shoes. Collingwood (reiterated by Blackburn) said that what we do to understand others is to "re-centre" ourselves, to change the "egocentric map" so that we can think and feel about the world from the other's point of view, and since, as we have seen, our own point of view is as both speaker and hearer, then in empathising with others we continue to be aware of them, just as we are aware of ourselves, as "a member of a world of persons". This act of understanding self and other by hypothesising the other as oneself requires no conscious effort, it is instinctive and involuntary and a natural part of our emotional lives.

It may well be that the recently discovered mirror neuron helps to facilitate this kind of empathy. Mirror neurons fire in the brain when we watch someone else performing an action, and the pattern of firing mimics the pattern that we would use if we were performing that action ourselves. Stern has described their activity as follows, "the visual information received when watching another act gets mapped onto the equivalent motor representation in our own brain by the activity of these mirror neurons." (Stern, 2007, p.37). Some scientists have suggested that mirror neurons provide a neurophysiological foundation for empathy, love and human interaction (see, for example, Preston and de Waal, 2002, p.1–72: Decety and Jackson, 2004, p. 71-100: or Gallese and Goldman, 1998, p.493-501). However, I have some qualms about the usefulness of mirror neurons as an explanatory device for reasons I will discuss later.

Empathy isn't merely a simultaneous emotional response. To be empathetic with you, my feelings must be *related* to your feelings - I must feel as I do *because* you feel as you do. Neill references Susan Feagin's theory that in empathetic responses the connection between my mental state and yours is made by way of *belief.* Empathy is in this sense a cognitive state: "a matter of my holding second-order beliefs about your beliefs" (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.182). However, merely forming second-order beliefs about another's beliefs is not sufficient. My beliefs about what you believe could

easily leave me entirely unmoved. Empathising with another is, at least in part, "a matter of *understanding how things are with her*" (ibid, p.183). So while second-order beliefs are a precondition for empathy, it also involves, as I have said, taking another's perspective on things, imaginatively representing to oneself the thoughts, beliefs, desires and so on of another as though they were one's own. To do this you have to know, or at least have some beliefs about, what the other's thoughts, beliefs, desires and emotions *are*. A certain amount of knowledge is necessary. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that "the better we know them, the greater the empathy". Empathy is motivated by a desire to understand the other person and under normal conditions requires a great deal of guesswork, but in the case of some novels, with their descriptions of the character's internal psychology, we sometimes receive too much information, to the extent that we feel we don't need to exercise empathy in order to understand them (ibid, p.188). In this regard, drama bears closer resemblance to our everyday experience than prose fiction. What a drama provides (ideally) is enough knowledge and understanding as to a character's situation, as well as an external view of their response to it, so that we are able and motivated to imaginatively simulate their interior experience. This imagining of the inner life of a character in a drama involves, just as it does in everyday life, a complex ongoing process of inferencing their cognitions and emotions, based on the assumption that their cognitive and emotional life is more or less the same as our own.

Aristotle indicated that the cathartic experience of an audience specifically involves feelings of both pity and fear for a character in a drama. Pity and fear denote the two different perspectives I have been talking about; pity is felt by the audience in response to the character's suffering while fear is the emotional experience of the character involved in the action that is shared by the audience. Neill extrapolates:

> Since the very beginnings of the debate, the pity and the fear that works of fiction may evoke from us have been lumped together. But

> our emotional responses - whether to fictional or to actual persons and events - are not all of a kind. For example, we can distinguish (at least roughly) between emotional responses in which the focus of concern is oneself (as, for example, in fear for oneself), and those in which the focus of concern is another. And among "other-focused" emotional responses, we may distinguish between sympathetic responses (such as those in which I fear for you), and empathetic responses (for I may also feel fear with you).
>
> Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.175

The difference between sympathy and empathy, "feeling for" and "feeling with", is also the difference between an external social perspective of others and an adopted subjectivity of others, commonly referred to as "identification" (although Carroll, Smith and Bordwell warn that the concept of identification covers such a wide variety of cases that it is too vague and equivocal to be particularly useful: Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.17). In the case of *Taking Liberty*, the audience, in spite of already knowing perfectly well that "our heroes" would win the race (because that's what happened in the historical event of 1983), nonetheless behaved, when the winning moment was represented, as if it had just taken place in front of them, cheering and whistling and, on a number of occasions giving the actors/sailors a raucous standing ovation.

So the point I'm at pains to make is that when an audience empathises with a character in a drama they feel both as if they were *in* the character's predicament, as well as feeling *for* the character, which includes judging that character's actions and responses as appropriate or not (according to social norms and conventions), and they are feeling and cogitating on these things all at the same time, without making any conscious decision to do so. It is by this instinctive, involuntary tendency towards the multi-perspective that the audience is seduced into engaging emotionally with situations invented by the dramatist. Its effectiveness is best demonstrated by situations of dramatic irony, in which the audience knows and understands the situation better than the character on stage. One of the most effective situations of

this kind is the representation of a hero in jeopardy but unaware of it. In pantomime the standard version of this situation is a hero who, while thinking he is in hot pursuit of the villain, is unaware that the villain is creeping up behind him: "Where is he?" asks the hero. "He's behind you!!" scream the children. And they do scream. There is a particular kind of intensity for them about the situation. Not only do they feel sympathy (pity) for the character in danger, and empathy (fear) with his condition, but there is also an additional sense of frustration that comes from not quite being able to grasp why it is that the hero doesn't recognise the danger as clearly as they do. The response can't be dismissed as a symptom of childhood. This kind of dramatic situation is a requisite component for any standard thriller or horror film.

Drama is designed to exploit an audience's empathetic inclinations in this way to recruit their complicity in sustaining the reception process. But drama also uses catharsis as a rhetorical device. Aristotle and Cicero were among the earliest philosophers to recognise the importance of understanding how emotion operates in everyday life in order to use it for rhetorical purposes. An audience shouldn't need more than an "everyday understanding" of emotions (commonly referred to by emotion theorists as "folk psychology": see, for example, Griffiths, 1998 , p.1) for the purposes of recognising the emotional responses of the characters in a drama and entering into an empathetic or "cathartic" engagement with them. However, for the dramatist (or anyone else) who wants to exploit the emotional responses of an audience for rhetorical purposes, a deeper and clearer understanding of the nature and operation of the emotions would be beneficial.

2) *Emotion as the feeling of a readiness to act*

Our emotions are designed to direct attention towards the object or situation that has triggered them and so it is against their nature to make themselves readily available for a cognitive examination of what they are and what they do. De Sousa admits that it is easier to explain what emotions are not, than what they are (De Sousa, 1987, p.19). Griffiths, on the other hand, doubts whether "emotion" is a useful term at all since the "putative kinds of psychological state" it seeks to describe are impossible to categorise (Griffiths, 1997, p.1). This "covert" aspect of emotion raises a number of philosophical questions concerned with issues of volition and free will: If my attention and awareness can be hijacked by my emotions, how much control can I be said to have over my thinking? A perceived opposition between "thinking" and "feeling" has a history going back to Plato who said that our emotions and appetites are like wild horses that need to be reigned in by reason (Goldie, 2000, p.113). In the field of contemporary emotion theory these ancient philosophical concerns find expression in an ongoing debate between two theoretical approaches. One theorist goes so far as to say that "there are two kinds of emotional theorists in the world", the cognitive and the non-cognitive (Prinz in Hatzimoysis, 2001, p.69). The "non-cognitive" theory of emotions is concerned with immediate physiological responses to stimuli, while "cognitive" theory concerns itself with longer term emotional responses. Both are vital to an understanding of the way that drama operates on an audience.

I have already mentioned that William James is acknowledged as introducing the modern conception of non-cognitive emotion theory. In a paper written in 1884 he described emotion as an embodied response to a stimulus that is only subsequently followed by conscious awareness (LeDoux, 1998, p.43; Goldie, 2000, p.52). On first consideration the idea seems counterintuitive and provoked considerable resistance (Griffiths, 1997, p.80), as, it seems, James anticipated it would:

> Common sense says: we lose a fortune, are sorry, and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run... the hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect,... that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry.
>
> William James (quoted in Campbell, 1997, p.26)

In other words, "it is physiological change that puts the emotionality into emotion" (Robinson in Solomon, 2004, p.30).

Contemporary research in neuroscience has provided evidence which appears to support James's theory. It suggests that, responding to a given situation, the body undergoes characteristic patterns of physiological change, the nature of which determines the nature of the emotion. These changes can occur prior to any cognitive awareness of an emotional response (Damasio, 1999, 2003). Physiology finesses cognition in a variety of highly complex processes (LeDoux, 1999; Damasio, 2000; Ellis, 2005) but perhaps the most telling difference between a "conscious cognitive appraisal" and pre-conscious "affective response" is that the latter triggers the activation of the amygdala, a small region of the forebrain which deals with urgent situations such as threat. If I see a rabbit in the wild, for example, signals are transmitted from my eyes to my visual cortex which transmits the sensory representation of the rabbit to different parts of the brain including the amygdala, the working memory and long-term memories. Since the rabbit poses no threat, the response of the amygdala is benign and the "working memory system" has time to integrate long-term memories with sensory representation, and as a result I become aware that the object I am now looking at is a rabbit. If, on the other hand, I see a bull with horns heading in my direction, the amygdala has already arranged for me to turn around and start running in the opposite direction before cognition has recognised it; before I am even aware enough of what I'm looking at to remember its name; before, literally, I can say "bull". This is because the amygdala doesn't recognise the bull as such, it simply registers

what Goldie calls the "emotion-invoking determinable property" (Goldie, 2000, p.38), in this instance perhaps, horns approaching at speed, signalling "threat!" My conscious awareness of the specific nature of the threat only arises some milliseconds later (LeDoux, 1998). Emotional responses requiring a pre-cognitive pathway through the mammalian brain developed well before human beings developed consciousness, and for obvious reasons; "if the rabbit is to escape, the action must be undertaken long before the completion of even a simple cognitive process" (Zajonk, 1994, p.294). In the following passage Ekman describes the "inherited central mechanism that directs emotional behaviour" which he calls (adopting a phrase proposed by Tomkins, 1962) an "affect program":

> A cascade of changes occurs in split seconds, without our choice or immediate awareness, in: the emotional signals in the face and voice; preset actions; learned actions; the autonomic nervous system activity that regulates our body; the regulatory patterns that continuously modify our behaviour; the retrieval of relevant memories and expectations; and how we interpret what is happening within us and in the world.
>
> Ekman, 2003, p.65

Ekman believes that what he calls the "basic emotions" - surprise, anger, fear, disgust, sadness and joy - each have their own affect program, each with a unique set of recognisable patterns or sequence of responses. This sequence of responses, he believes, is common to all humans regardless of culture or race (although he is at pains to point out that "affect program" is a metaphor to indicate the complex of activity we normally describe as an emotion - ibid, p.66).

Frijda, another theorist of the Jamesian tradition, proposes that "emotions arise in response to the meaning structures of given situations; different emotions arise in response to different meaning structures" (Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p. 271). On the face of it this would seem to be obvious; different kinds of emotion are elicited by particular types of event: "grief is

elicited by personal loss, anger by insults or frustrations, and so forth." The point though, is that it is "meanings and the subject's appraisals that count - that is, the relationship between events and the subject's concerns, and not events as such". Frijda calls this "the law of situational meaning" (ibid). Pacherie condenses Frijda's description of an emotion stimulus to a three-step process:
1) relevance to concerns;
2) appraisal of what can be done;
3) urgency, difficulty and seriousness of the situation.
Once evaluation has happened "action readiness changes are generated" (Pacherie, 2002, p.75). The way a situation is evaluated may well change, however, as the meaning of the situation changes: "frustration or offense can be seen as caused by someone powerful *who may have further offences in store*, and fear then is likely to supplant anger as the emotional response" (Frijda, 2002, p.273).

Action readiness is the bodily impulse to act in accordance with emotional inclination: "...impulses to approach or avoid, desires to shout and sing or move, and the urge to retaliate; or, on occasion... an absence of desire to do anything, or a lack of interest, or feelings of loss of control" (ibid, p.274). Frijda suggests that "meaning structures of emotion are lawfully connected to forms of action readiness"(ibid). So it is by the particular quality of feeling of the "action readiness" response to a given situation that we identify the particular emotion we're experiencing. This notion draws together and helps to clarify the relation between two differing notions of drama, the first, that drama is an emotional experience, the second, stemming from Aristotle, that the principal element of drama is action.

In light of the idea that the origin of emotion is the feeling of a readiness to act, a play or a film can be seen as the designing of an emotional experience by the construction of the dramatic action. My enquiry into this idea will be the main subject of the rest of the chapter, beginning with the nature, and particularly the physiology, of human action. This will lead, on a brief

tangent, to a possible resolution of the fiction paradox, which will, I hope, help to explain why, when watching a Warner Brothers cartoon, we aren't disturbed by the unlikelihood of a talking duck, and why, if we think Marion Crane is going to be attacked in the shower, we don't call the police.

3) *Desire, intention, and the as-if-body-loop*

If a brief event can be said to constitute a single action it seems fair to ask how this kind of single action relates to Aristotle's notion of an entire drama as a "single action". The answer is that some actions can be *part* of other actions: if the Aristotelian single action of *Hamlet* is constituted by Hamlet's revenge for the murder of his father, we can say that *Hamlet* consists of a sequence of "sub-actions" taken by the Prince (opposed and assisted by the actions of others) to complete the action of bringing about the death of his father's murderer. Thus the causes of action are reduced to what is usually referred to by action theorists as "the belief/desire causal theory of action". Pacherie identifies this theory by the three ways it distinguishes actions from other kinds of happenings or behaviours;
i) being part of a particular kind of causal sequence of events;
ii) key elements of this causal sequence being intentional states;
iii) explanation of action being causal explanation (Pacherie, 2002, p.55).
According to the "belief/desire" theory, the death of Claudius at the end of *Hamlet* should be explained by Hamlet's *desire* to kill Claudius and his *belief* that a sword through the heart should do the trick. Thus the action "Hamlet kills Claudius" is explained by Hamlet's belief and desire. What the theory overlooks, however, are the four acts of the play that separate Hamlet's initial promise to his father's ghost to kill Claudius, from the killing itself. The problem with the belief/desire causal theory of action is that it assumes that the complex of desires to act and beliefs about how to do it completes the explanation. It makes the same mistake I make when I wonder why an audience doesn't take action as a result of their emotional response to the dramatic situation in a performance. It fails to take into account the

intermediary steps of intention and commitment that are necessary if the desire to take action of a particular kind is going to result in any kind of real action (let alone the "right" one). There are three kinds of problem that Pacherie identifies that the belief/desire causal theory of action fails to explain;

i) the problem of automatic or impulsive actions - many actions, in particular automatic or habitual ones, do not seem to be preceded by any particular belief or desire to perform them;

ii) the problem of causal inertness - one might have beliefs and desires that would seem to rationalise acting in a certain way but still not act (*Hamlet* in a nutshell);

iii) the problem of failed actions - the truth of the beliefs figuring in the belief/desire complex does not guarantee that the bodily movement made by the agent is appropriate. i.e.; in a game of tennis my *orienting belief* that my opponent is on the other side of the court and my *instrumental belief* that hitting a cross-court forehand would constitute a winning point may be true, but I may still fail (ibid, p.57).

Pacherie notes Bratman's point that desires are merely "*potential influences* of action" whereas intentions are "conduct-*controlling*" (Bratman, 1987, p.16; cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.59). Thus it is important to recognise intentions as separate states from beliefs and desires. Borrowing her terminology from Bach, Pacherie suggests a "dual model" of intention (as action explanation) which splits intention into "prior intentions versus executive representations" (Bach, 1978; cited in Pacherie, 2002. p.61). According to this dual model, all actions, whether preceded or not by prior intentions, require executive representations for their initiation and execution. She points out that executive (or "motor") representations, "are typically conceived of as outside the realm of the mental and as falling within the sole province of physiology" (ibid p.63). But this seems to suggest that cognition isn't concerned with movement, that there is "a gap between the motivating cognitions and the act they cause" (Israel, Perry and Tutiya, 1993, p.529; cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.62). According to Pacherie

this misconception probably arises because "the phenomenology of perception has a salience that the phenomenology of action usually lacks" (ibid p.62). Be that as it may, executive representations fill the "gap" between the cognition and the act: "actions have a phenomenology of their own that does not reduce to some species of perceptual phenomenology and executive representations are needed to account for the awareness we have of what we are doing"(ibid).

The concept of executive representations has been further clarified by neurophysiological research which suggests that "actions are driven by *an internal representation of a goal* rather than directly by the external world" (Jeannerod, cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.67, my italics). Previously, theorists have been inclined to "artificially separate" movement representations, assumed to pertain to a physiological approach, and action representations, assumed to pertain to a psychological approach. Jeannerod suggests that "there is no such dichotomy but rather a continuum" (ibid). This research reveals highly complex processes of interaction involving two aspects of executive representations; (i) representations of "the body as a generator of acting forces...dictated by kinematic rules and biomechanical constraints" and (ii) representations of the goal of the action, which include representations of "both the external object toward which it is directed, and the final state of the organism when that object has been reached" (ibid, p.68).

In her interpretation of this research Pacherie emphasises the importance of the dynamic character of executive representations; "neither states of the body *per se* nor states of the environment *per se*, but rather dynamic relations between body and goal" involving "an interplay of anticipations and adjustments in response to sensory feedback" (ibid, p.69). What this seems to suggest is that the pattern of action which we call narrative that connects the subject to the goal can be found operating at all levels of human activity.

So Pacherie establishes "two levels" of intentional states: prior intentions and executive representations. Prior intentions are able to govern the executive representations directing the behaviour of the agent by determining what aspects of the situation are attended to and then deciding "which among the available action schemata will be selected and in what order" (ibid, 71). This can be quite specific, as when the prior intention is to act according to a definite plan, but it can also be indirect such as when driving a car along a familiar route:

> Many sub-actions will have to be performed; accelerating, changing gears, making turns, applying brakes... and so on. These sub-actions don't need to be represented at the level of the prior intention, what the prior intention does here is simply to raise the level of activation of the schemata concerned with driving and to make more salient the aspects of the situation that are relevant to driving.
>
> Pacherie, 2002, p.71

There are also some "routine or automatic actions" which don't depend on the presence of prior intentions at all, such as absent-mindedly sipping a mug of coffee while writing: "the conjunction of the visual perception of the mug combined with a state of thirst, even if not consciously registered" (ibid, p.72) triggers relevant action schema, as well as activating related schemata and inhibiting rival schemata. The sipping of the coffee may not interrupt attention to the writing at all, unless preconscious expectations are suddenly subverted, such as the coffee having gone cold or discovering a dead fly floating on the surface. Suddenly emotions of disgust and perhaps anger interrupt the concentration previously focused on the writing so that action can be taken to deal with the new situation. We can see from these two examples that the connection between prior intentions and executive representations can be decoupled at a variety of points along the continuum. This casts a little more light on the mystery of the "fiction paradox", that is, why an audience doesn't act in response to a dramatic representation which they seem, at the time, to believe. For a better understanding though, it

would be useful to reconsider executive representations from different perspective.

Damasio suggests that the location of the mental activity I have been calling executive representations is in a region of the brain which receives signals from various parts of the body and thus maps and monitors "the ongoing state of the organism" (Damasio, 2003, p.96). These "body maps" register all the different organic systems; neurological, limbic, etc. Damasio suggests they are designed as part of the ongoing maintenance of the body's homeostasis. An aspect of these areas of the brain is that they are also capable of simulating or creating "false" maps of what's happening in the body; "certain brain regions, such as the prefrontal/premotor cortices, directly signal the body-sensing brain regions" thus bypassing the body itself to create what Damasio calls an "as-if-body-loop";

> ... the body-sensing areas constitute a sort of theater where not only the "actual" body states can be "performed," but varied assortments of "false" body states can be enacted as well...
>
> Damasio, 2003, p.117

An example of the "simulated body state" which Damasio calls the "as-if-body-loop", is one I have already referred to; the executive representations that guide action between "the external object toward which it is directed, and the final state of the organism when that object has been reached". By reproducing the action tendencies that would occur in response to the "as if" situation, the "as-if-body-loop" or "simulated body state" informs us how it would *feel* to be in the situation it is simulating, that is, what the emotional response would be, including its valence and intensity, *if* the action were to be taken. Is this not the situation of the member of an audience watching a dramatic performance? So when an audience watches the performance of drama, the play-frame could be said to be operating as an unconscious disconnect between intentions and executive representations, particularly if we take these representations as conceptually analogous to Damasio's body maps. If every audience member's multiple intentions, such as "save Marion

from the approaching attack" and "run away, run away", are directed by the frame "this is just a film" towards the dynamic body maps of the "as if" body loop, the audience will be able to enjoy all the appropriate action tendencies, each with its own emotional valence and intensity, without having to leave their seats.

At this point I should, perhaps, deal with the relatively recent discovery of mirror neurons. According to Stern,

> Mirror neurons sit adjacent to motor neurons. They fire in an observer who is doing nothing but watching another person to pay (e.g., reaching for a glass). And the pattern of firing in the observer mimics the pattern that the observer would use if he were reaching for that glass, himself. In brief, the visual information received when watching another act gets mapped onto the equivalent motor representation in our own brain by the activity of these mirror neurons. It permits us to directly participate in another's actions, without having to imitate them.
>
> Stern, 2007, p.37

Some scientists have suggested that mirror neurons provide a neurophysiological foundation for empathy, love and human interaction. This may well be the case, however, I have two reasons for leaving mirror neurons out of my exploration of mimesis and emotion. First of all, research by neurophysiologists at Harvard University and elsewhere has cast some doubt on initial assumptions about the function of mirror neurons (Hickok, 2009). Secondly, this is not a thesis in the field of biology or neurophysiology. While I have certainly ventured into explanations of emotions and of the "fiction paradox" by means of some aspects of neurophysiology, I have tried to do so in a way that offers a model by which to understand the event. For example, Damasio's description of the body-sensing areas of the brain constituting "a sort of theater…". Here, the neurophysiologist is not so much providing a scientific *explanation* of our experience but, rather, an aid to a useful, if rough, understanding of the way the process might work. The notion that mirror neurons provide an explanation of mimesis may well be true in the scientific/biological sense,

but it contributes little to our understanding of why some dramatic texts succeed in sustaining the experience of a mimetic illusion while others fail. As Churchland has pointed out, our understanding of others' intentions happens at a more complex level of neural activity than that of individual neurons: "A neuron, though computationally complex, is just a neuron. It is not an intelligent homunculus. If a neural network represents something complex, such as an intention [to insult], it must have the right input and be in the right place in the neural circuitry to do that" (Churchland, 2011, p.142).

One further point might help to clarify how it is possible for us to "believe" a fiction even when it is patently absurd, such as the representation of a talking duck. De Sousa suggests that there is a significant difference between a belief and an emotion. It has to do with our ability to hypothesise. To hypothesise is to *entertain* a possible belief so that it is "as if we believed something to be true" even if it isn't. The "as if" here places the frame of "this is a hypothesis" around the belief. Unlike beliefs, however, emotions cannot be hypothesised. Either we feel them or we don't (De Sousa, 1987, p.157). Hence, in any subjunctive or metaphorical activity, such as hypothesising or depiction or play, the *pretense* is always with the cognition and never with the feeling. Empathy is a kind of hypothesis. As I discussed earlier, when we see a character or characters in action, fiction or not, we automatically want to know why - what is it that motivates them (because there might be something in it for us)? To understand their motivation we must enter into their perspective and see how things feel from their point of view. This is why empathy demands simulation. To understand their motivation we have to become emotionally involved with what they care about and the inability to hypothesise emotions means that once we have adopted their perspective, their emotions become ours. This helps to explain why drama relies on emotion for verisimilitude; because, as I said, in emotional experience feeling finesses cognition. As soon as we enter into an empathetic understanding of another person, fictional or not, our empathetic awareness of their feelings pre-empts our judgement of

them as people. We are, therefore, predisposed to overlook Daffy's duckness because we have already begun to share his existential angst.

4) *Gestic music*

According to Frijda's "law of concern… every emotion hides a concern, that is, a more or less enduring disposition to prefer particular states of the world" (Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p.274). Concerns dictate the way we perceive any given situation and decide what is salient about it and give it its emotional meaning; "The evaluation of the rationality of an emotional action will concern how performing this action relates to the antecedent goals of the agent" (Pacherie, 2002, p.75). So the appraisal of a given situation depends on what concerns are in the foreground at the time of evaluation: "my discovering that the computer won't work will generate anger if my intention was to start writing now". However, it might also produce malicious joy if the goal "was to test whether the virus I have been programming has the devastating effects I was hoping for" (ibid). It is important to reiterate that rationality in this instance is not related to the goal but to the efficacy of the action in achieving it. With regard to drama, so long as it has been made clear to the audience how important it is to the protagonists to achieve their goal, any action taken to achieve this end will seem to be rational and appropriate, no matter how ridiculous we might consider the goal itself to be. The nature of the goal in this context is irrelevant; a McGuffin. It is the context of the character's concerns and the situation that renders their actions plausible (or not), sustains verisimilitude and holds the empathetic involvement of an audience because, by virtue of recognising the situational meaning they share the paradigmatic action tendencies of the characters and so, quite literally *feel* the plausibility of the action. This is a why Aristotle preferred plausible impossibilities to implausible possibilities (Aristotle, 1981, p.68). This brings us back to the question of the difference between the emotions of "real-life situations" and the vicarious emotions felt at the cathartic

moments of drama; the difference, for example, between the joy we might feel when proposing marriage and being accepted, and the joy we share with, say, Beatrice and Benedict when they finally acknowledge their love at the end of *Much Ado about Nothing.* What is important about emotion felt by the audience towards and about a given dramatic situation is not so much whether it feels the same as the "real-life" version but whether it makes the dramatic cause and effect feel plausible.

It is hardly surprising that we are so susceptible to being engaged by drama, because our attention will always be directed by an emotional response to a situation that has apparent urgency or might be relevant to our concerns. Frijda describes the influence of events on our embodied emotions by comparing it with a piano player's fingers on the keys of the piano:

> Meaning structures are lawfully connected to forms of action readiness. Events appraised in terms of their meanings are the emotional piano player's finger strokes; available modes of action readiness are the keys that are tapped; changes in action readiness are the tones brought forth.
>
> The keys, the available modes of action readiness, correspond to the behaviour systems and general response modes with which humans are endowed…. And last, the response modes include the action control changes that are manifest in behavioural interference and that we experience as preoccupation and urgency; sometimes, these are the only aspect of our change in action readiness that we feel or show.
>
> Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p. 271.

The analogy of the appraisal of emotional meaning with the keys on a piano is alluring to a dramatist with aspirations to composing the emotional experience of his characters and his audience. It is no coincidence that Brecht likened the work of the dramatist to the composition of what he called Gestic music. His idea of "gestus" being a language of attitude and gesture: "A gestus characterises the relations among people." (quoted in Pavis 1982, p.41). If events trigger the "emotional piano player's finger strokes" then the performance of a script, which is the dramatist's

composition of the events, is analogous to written music being read and performed on Frijda's piano.

The recognition of a character's concerns and desired outcome, evokes the empathy of the audience and locks them into an involvement with the process of reaching or achieving it. They come to feel the different modes of action readiness of the character, calibrating the dynamics of the relationships between the character's intentions and goals. Modes of action readiness include (but are not restricted to) action tendencies, which Frijda defines as "states of readiness to execute a given kind of action" where "kind of action" is defined by "the end result aimed at or achieved" (Frijda, in Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p.274). For instance, the action tendency associated with anger is defined as "the removal of obstruction". So potential action paradigms such as attacking, spitting, insulting, turning one's back or slandering might be considered to be actions of a similar kind insofar as they are aimed at "removal of obstruction". Elster makes the point that action tendencies "typically go together with *desires* - that is, desires to act" (in Solomon, 2004, p.153). Here again is his list of emotions with their paradigmatic action tendencies:

Emotion:	Action Tendency:
Anger	cause object of anger to suffer (revenge)
Hatred	cause object of hatred to cease to exist
Contempt	ostracism, avoidance
Shame	"sink through the floor"; run away; suicide
Guilt	confess; make repairs; hurt oneself
Envy	destroy the envied object or its possessor
Fear	flight; fight
Love	approach, touch, help, please the loved one

(ibid, p.152)

Goldie suggests that each episode of an emotional response leading to action can be described in terms of a "script" with a set of "paradigmatic steps so that for each sort of emotion, there will be a *paradigmatic narrative*

structure of elements of emotional experience" (Goldie, 2000, p.92, my italics). Here is Goldie's five-step description of an anger episode:

step 1: paradigmatic recognitional element involved in anger;
step 2: paradigmatic facial expression for anger;
step 3: paradigmatic bodily changes and feeling of those changes;
step 4: paradigmatic motivational response involved in anger;
step 5: paradigmatic action out of anger.

(Goldie, 2000, p.94)

The paradigmatic feature or features of each step will be different depending on the "situational meaning" (which we might also call "the story of the situation"). The situational meaning will be identified by the subject according to their emotional experience and the range of possible interpretations and behavioural responses available to them as a member of a given culture.

Elster points out that, as well as their vicarious involvement with the emotions of the characters in drama, an audience experiences "aesthetic emotions induced by the formal organisation of the work of art. They include wonder, awe, surprise, humour, relief, and release" (Elster 1999, p.245). In the case of dramatic art we can say that these emotions are felt in response to the operations at the level of the first order of causal determination, in response, that is, to the quality of the design. Understandably, the dramatist wants to evoke these feelings about his work. However, it is important that these aesthetic responses don't overwhelm the cathartic involvement with the causal determinations of the second order; the story. The aesthetics of catharsis are best appreciated after the event.

It would be a mistake to try to draw too direct an analogy between music and drama. However, what it usefully reminds us of is that the composition of drama requires more than the writing of dialogue between characters. It is also concerned with the creation of rhythmic patterns of tensions and resolutions with virtually unlimited variation. An aesthetics of catharsis

might appreciate the quality and beauty of the complexity, valence and intensity of the patterns of tension and resolution to be found in the cathartic operations of drama.

5) *Three kinds of emotional action*

The notion of emotion as action tendency raises the question whether there are actions that are not motivated by emotion. Whether or not there are, they are of little concern in the composition of drama. What is of concern is the intensity of the emotion arising from the action tendency and the influence of that intensity on the resulting action. As we have seen, a desire to act and a belief in the likelihood of the anticipated outcome is not necessarily a direct road to action. It is important to recognise intentions as separate states from beliefs and desires, and to recognise the difference between "prior intentions" and "executive representations". Sometimes though, under the influence of an intense emotion, these stages between the emotion and the act are virtually indiscernible. Different situational meanings produce different intensities of motivation to act. Pacherie identifies three categories of action each with a different level of intensity and, consequently, different relation/connection between the emotion and subsequent action; i) impulsive actions, ii) semi-deliberate actions, iii) fully deliberate actions.

i) *impulsive actions*

As I mentioned earlier, there are two "levels" of intentional states: prior intentions and executive representations. Prior intentions are able to govern the executive representations, directing the behaviour of the agent by determining what aspects of a given situation are attended to and then deciding "which among the available action schemata will be selected and in what order" (Pacherie, 2002, p.71). In some circumstances though, such as with routine actions like driving a car or drinking a beverage, action schema can be activated without any cognition of prior intentions. This is also true

of impulsive actions, which Goldie calls "actions out of emotion" (Goldie, 2000), in which emotional reaction is in direct control of the executive representations, "without the benefit of a second level of control by prior intentions" (Pacherie, 2002, p.76). As a result, "the first object or feature of the environment affording an action that fits the kind of action defined by the action tendency of the emotion is the one acted upon" (ibid). Some obvious examples of impulsive actions include hitting someone in anger, jumping for joy or running in fright. Pacherie points out that, whereas routine actions demand little attention and only take control when prior intentions and plans are "not attended to with sufficient force", impulsive action tendencies "clamour for attention and for execution, they have the feature of *control precedence*" (ibid, my italics). This "control precedence" of impulsive action has important consequences for the dramatist that I will discuss in a moment, but first it would be useful to identify the cause of it.

In the absence of cognition, "relational properties" between the agent and object of the action are inclined to collapse into one or the other, that is, they are taken to be an aspect of either the action or the object. So, for example, properties of oppressiveness or horribleness attributed to a given situation (its situational meaning) are also "injunctions to act": danger requires escape, offence demands reprisal; "means and goal are not coded separately". So the transition from recognition of situational meaning to executive representation of an action is direct: "no need for the conscious formulation of a plan for dealing with the situation; panicky flight is directed not toward a place of safety; but away from the place of danger" (Frijda, 1986, p.81: cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.78). Relational properties can also "collapse" into properties of the object, becoming "a mode of appearance of the situation". This means that the emotional response to an object or situation is projected directly back onto it. Thus we experience perception of "horrible objects, insupportable people, oppressive events" etc. They contain the relation implicitly: "the 'to me' or 'for me' dissolves into the property" (Frijda, 1986, p.188: cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.77).

The absence of cognitive prior intentions in impulsive actions has to be taken into account by the dramatist in his practice. Action and emotion in a single work of long-form drama usually covers a broad scale of intensity and consequence, from the subtle action of quiet moments like sipping a cup of tea, to the high risk, "high octane" action of the dramatic climax. Every one of them, from the subtle to the most intense, requires plausible motivation; an audience must be able to recognise the "emotional logic" of a character's behaviour. If there is inconsistency between action and motivation, if a given action seems unjustified or implausible, the verisimilitude shatters and the audience suddenly becomes more aware of the "play frame" than they are of what's going on inside it. Actions that are highly consequential and risky within the context of a story have a higher risk of breaking verisimilitude because "normal people under normal circumstances" aren't normally prepared to take such risks. Such actions are unlikely to be motivated by indifferent feelings. To believe in the impulsive action we need to have a clear understanding of the relationship between the hero's concerns and his or her understanding of the situational meaning. If the nature of the situation has been made clear such that a passionate response and impulsive action is plausible, it will be easy for an audience to understand and empathise with the hero's action without any explanation necessary beyond the situation itself. So it could be said that this kind of drama is designed and constructed specifically to explain and demonstrate why, at the dramatic climax, the hero is prepared to risk "everything" by undertaking the penultimate action to reach his or her goal. In *Taking Liberty*, by the time Warren Jones discovers that Alan Bond has gambled his entire corporation on the winning of the 1983 America's Cup (p.53), the audience understands Bond's reckless ambition well enough to consider his action quite plausible, although it would seem implausible if it was taken by almost anyone else.

Impulsive actions do allow for minimal forms of reasoning, for instance "when I'm desperately trying to flee that bear, I may see a crack between two rocks and reason that the bear is too big to follow me through the crack"

(Pacherie, 2002, p.78). But this kind of reasoning is always short-sighted and can therefore lead to trouble. This has proved quite useful for innumerable hero/villain chase sequences. Whoever is being chased will, more often than not, run unthinkingly to a place they can't escape from, thus creating the impression that the final dramatic confrontation between them is inevitable and therefore plausible.

ii) *semi-deliberate actions*

With semi-deliberate emotional actions, action tendency is experienced in the mode of self-awareness. In other words I am aware that my emotional response to an object or situation is not only a property of the object or situation, but also that my feelings are the result of my own cognitive understanding of the object or situation. Semi-deliberate emotional action tendencies usually arise because the situation "does not immediately afford ways of satisfying the action tendency generated by the emotion" (ibid, p.80). As a result "the action tendency gets converted into a conscious intention to pursue a certain goal. This involves a change in representational format" (ibid). Unlike impulsive emotional action in which the recognition/response is directed straight to executive representation and the choice of action is limited to whatever the situation immediately affords, semi-deliberate emotional actions "presuppose a capacity for a partial detachment from the present situation" (ibid, p.81). The question of whether such a thing as "partial detachment" is possible (surely one is either attached or not) is not something that Pacherie goes into. Be that as it may, according to Pacherie, both the emotion and the "action tendencies" of semi-deliberate actions are determined by the response to present situation, but the action itself must wait until a situation in which it is conceivable that the goal is achievable. In such a situation we are aware of the need to organise an alternative situation in which the action tendency is able to be activated, that is, to "exploit my stock of instrumental beliefs in order to form a plan of action" (ibid). Drama is usually framed within the gap between the initiating event that provokes an action tendency in the hero, and the final completion of the action.

Semi-deliberate emotional actions can be decided upon by (seemingly) rational deliberation but it is important to note that the end or goal to which this deliberation is put is defined by, and under the control of, the emotion. Hamlet's deliberations and plans are focused on a goal determined by his emotional response to the murder of his father. So the planning and deliberation of semi-deliberate emotional actions are "short-sighted in the sense that their cognitive integration is only partial" (ibid, p.82). Thus, since we can only see things from a current perspective under the potentially prejudicial shadow of an emotional response, we can never be completely sure that we are seeing them objectively. The susceptibility of our perception of apparent reality to the distorting influence of emotion ("we believe easily what we hope and what we fear," goes the Swedish proverb) will be a topic of section six.

iii) *fully deliberate actions*

It is debatable whether we can describe fully deliberate actions as emotional at all. (Goldie probably wouldn't call them emotional; see Goldie, 2000, p.38.) Pacherie points out however that they "exploit the motivational potential of emotions" (Pacherie, 2002, p.83). What she is referring to is "cases where my becoming aware of an emotion and the action tendency it generates gives me some control over it and allows me to exploit and possibly redirect its action potential" (ibid). Pacherie's example is the fear of delivering a speech in front of a large audience. The impulsive action in response to the fear would be to run away or perhaps phone the facilitator and offer excuses. However, a fully deliberate emotional action would be to use the fear as motivation to work very hard on the speech. This is what Jon Elster calls "technologies of emotional planning" (Elster, 1999; cited in Pacherie 2002, p.83). Other strategies of the same kind might include mustering "the courage to go confront one's boss" by "remembering all the wrongs one has suffered in order to feel anger" (ibid). One might also "whistle a happy tune". De Sousa refers to this kind of practice as "emotional boot-strapping" (De Sousa, 1987, p.235-241). These strategies "presuppose

the capacity for truly reflexive emotional awareness, awareness by the subject of himself as feeling an emotion" (Pacherie 2002, p.83). In these cases we are able to make "instrumental use of emotions", to use emotions for the purpose of achieving a desired end. To do this one must be disengaged from the emotion and able to "encode situations as situations eliciting in oneself an emotion of a given kind" (Pacherie, p.84). However any sense of confidence in an objective view of the goal, that is, of perception or intention entirely independent of emotional distortion, must be treated with some scepticism, as it is in the social comedies of, among others, Shakespeare, Moliere and Brecht.

6) *The urgent versus the important*

Previously I referred to a perceived divide between theorists of the "noncognitive" emotion experience and those who conceive of emotion as a "propositional attitude". Goldie describes it as a debate between the "analytic-philosophical theorists and the genetic-psychological theorists; the former try to describe cultural explanations for mature human emotional experience while the latter examine the biological origins of the development of capability for the emotions" (Goldie, 2000, p. 84). In my previous sections I was mainly discussing the "noncognitive" approach, which presents emotion as if it is,

> ... more or less over and done with in 120 milliseconds, the rest being mere aftermath and cerebral embellishment (LeDoux 1996, Panksepp 1992, Damasio 1999). Emotion, so understood, is a brief, preconscious, precognitive, more or less automatic excitation of an affect program.
>
> Solomon, 2004, p.78

A dramatist might try to evoke this kind of emotional experience to establish or to reignite the engagement of an audience with events and characters in the drama. As I indicated previously, short-form narratives such as

television advertisements exploit to great commercial advantage the possibility of manipulating our attention by finessing it with brief narratives of the primary emotions; desire in concert with pleasure or pain; a housewife's desire for pure cleanliness is satisfied and redeemed by a "white tornado"; ageing is prevented by lotions with scientifically proven efficacy; all your frustrated desires are suddenly satisfied by a winning lottery ticket or a friendly bank, and so it goes. But as I said, such brief narratives tend not to be satisfying enough to watch for their own sake; the sort of engagement required for an audience to sit uncomplaining for an hour to 90 minutes demands a more complex emotional experience. Solomon follows the passage quoted above with reasons for his own interest in emotion:

> I am interested, not in those brief "irruptive" reactions or responses but in the long-term narratives of Othello, Iago... I am interested in the meanings of life, not short-term neurological arousal.
>
> Ibid

What is interesting about the debate between the schools of noncognitive and cognitive emotion is not whether or which side is right but what else it reveals about emotions: how we conceive of them and what we conceive them to be.

Spinoza, in his *Ethics*, suggests that, based on the evidence, "we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and... like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate" (p.172). He goes on to point out, however, that "human bondage" isn't inevitable. Our values do not have to be entirely self-oriented; our desire for pleasure (and to avoid pain and danger) can be trumped by our desire for "the good", should we so choose. Contemporary emotion theorists of the "propositional attitude" school are particularly concerned with this struggle between feeling and judgement. Nussbaum, for example, calls emotions "intelligent responses to the perception of value" and considers them to be an important aspect of ethical reasoning. She refers to her approach as

"neo-stoicism", identifying its origins in the ideas of the Greek Stoics for whom,

> ... emotions are forms of evaluative judgement that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing. Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency.
>
> Nussbaum, 2001, p.22

How is the physiological visceral feeling of an emotion related to the cognitive, propositional, judgemental aspect of the experience? The question immediately raises further questions about the universality of emotional experience. How much is learnt and how much is pan-cultural? Is judgement an innate part of the emotional experience or culturally mediated, seeming intrinsic only because of its having been learnt so young? Is an emotion a brief and discreet episode which begins and ends with a biological response to a situation, or is it part of a longer narrative of the individual as a member of a culture and society?

All emotions have a positive or negative valence and therefore make a judgement. They are generated according to our interpretation and evaluation of a given object or situation as it relates to us: "when we appraise something as good for us, we like it, when we appraise something as bad for us, we dislike it" (Arnold, 1960, p.194). My pleasant emotions tell me something is desirable and likewise the unpleasant emotions warn me against it:

> ... those internal states - which occur naturally along a range whose poles are pain and pleasure, and are caused by either internal or external objects and events - become unwitting non-verbal signifiers of the goodness or badness of situations relative to the organism's inherent set of values.
>
> Damasio, 1999, p.30

What is often at issue is the value of pleasure in light of normative cultural values. Parkinson et al. suggest that typical emotion sequences (which they

refer to as "emotion scripts") involve value judgements about the emotion itself:

> At minimum, some antecedent event and some response to that event are specified. Commonly, the representation also includes the subsequent regulation of the response to the event or an evaluation of its appropriateness"
>
> Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead, 2005, p.39

This question of "appropriateness" brings the concept of emotion as a biological experience into the sphere of culture and society. Unlike other animals, humans "elaborate explicit theories of the world... providing a framework of understanding within which causal and temporal thinking will operate" (Nussbaum, 2001, p.147). This framework is constituted in part by the question, "what is worth caring about?" The answer is dictated as much by cultural norms as by a physical desires or dangers. Whether or not cognition ought to be considered to be part of emotion *per se* isn't my concern here. What interests me is how the interaction of physiological and cultural aspects of emotion informs and affects the emotional experience of an audience watching drama or, to put it another way, how the short-form narratives of "affect programmes" operate as a function of the "long-form narrative" of our emotional life.

LeDoux suggests that "emotion and cognition should be thought of as interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain functions" (in Solomon, 2004, p.36). Robinson describes how this interaction develops into a complex sequence of processes unfolding as the emotional experience runs its course, and arousal and appraisal become alchemically reconstituted into a single emotional experience:

> ... there is continuous feedback of various sorts from one event in the process to another. For example, physiological changes may help to fix our attention on whatever it is that is important in the situation. Autonomic arousal may prompt us to action. Subjective feelings may also reinforce attention and in addition can serve as a source of information about what I am reacting to and how important

> it is to me. Cognitive appraisals and reappraisals modify action tendencies, physiological changes, and subjective feelings alike.
>
> Robinson (in Solomon, 2004, p.38)

Robinson concludes that cognitive judgement theorists' explanations of human emotions in folk psychological terms (desires and beliefs) aren't concerned with "a scientific account of the sequence of events in an emotion process," as much as an after-the-fact summary:

> What the judgement theorist is doing in "explaining" the nature of "jealousy" or "shame" is summarising in terms that the culture understands what kind of situation has occurred, what beliefs about it the person had, and which of his or her wants, goals, interests and values were at stake.
>
> Ibid

In the light of such a description it is hardly surprising to find propositional attitude theorists also using narrative as a means of understanding the emotional life;

> The understanding of any single emotion is incomplete unless its narrative history is grasped and studied for the light it sheds on the present response.
>
> Nussbaum, 2001, p.236

So, while narrative is useful to the noncognitive emotion theorist as a step-by-step structural analogy for an affect programme, to philosophers, like Nussbaum, from the "propositional attitude" school, narrative provides a way of conveying subjective emotional experience as a recognition and response to change over time.

Rorty shows in the following passage how Frijda's insistence that the experience of an emotion arises from the relation between "the event and the subject's concerns" is best captured by narrative explanation:

> ... a set of psychological attitudes - love, joy, perhaps some sort of desire - that are individuated by the character of the subject, the character of the object, and the

> relation between them.... these psychological attitudes are identified by the detail of the narrative of the interactions between the subject and the object, interactions that also individuate the persons involved.
>
> Rorty, 1988, p.121

As Goldie points out, "everyday explanation of what we think, feel, and do is narrative in form, presenting what happened from a possible multiplicity of perspectives" (Goldie in Hatzimoysis, 2003, p.202). I have already established how easy it is to be recruited into another's perspective by an almost involuntary empathy and that each new perspective involves its own evaluative thoughts, hence Goldie is correct to say that "each perspective involved in the narration of a story potentially involves an emotional response to value" (ibid p. 211). All these aspects of subjective emotional experience seem to be innate and intrinsic to our experience of the world and thus a "natural" part of who and what we are. However, it is important to remember that there is such a thing as an emotional education and narrative is an essential part of that as well.

As I mentioned in the introduction, according to de Sousa we learn about emotions, both automatic responses and retroactive understanding, by means of structured memories or *paradigm scenarios* "drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art and culture" (de Sousa, 1987, p.182). Goldie describes what we might call the basic structural unit of the paradigm scenario which he refers to as the "recognition-response tie":

> We can be taught to recognise and to respond emotionally, as part of the same education. For example, we can be taught to recognise things as dangerous and to respond, appropriately and proportionately, with fear.
>
> Goldie, 2000, p.27

There is a difference between an emotion *per se* and the motivating aspect of the object of that emotion. Goldie calls this the "emotion-invoking determinable feature". The emotion-invoking determinable feature of the

bull I referred to earlier (which motivates us to turn and run before we are even aware it is a bull) we might call "dangerousness". It is a property "whose recognition *merits* a certain sort of response" and what is merited is not just recognition or judgement (such as "avoidance would be appropriate"), but *fear*; "with all that this emotional experience involves, including thought, feeling, and action" (ibid). Having been taught that things which are dangerous merit fear, we also learn when we *ought* to experience this response. Thus, even an emotion as apparently "natural" as fear has a normative element to it:

> Recognition and response will feature as part of the narrative structure of the person's emotional experience, and when he acts out of the emotion, they will serve to explain the action, so that it can be understood as intelligible, and appropriate and proportionate from the agent's perspective.
>
> Ibid, p.31

This kind of emotional education is not limited to training us for the highly salient "hair-raising" situations of physical danger. Dangerousness is not unique to bulls. Many things invoke a fear response, although they may not necessarily be similar *kinds* of things at all; Goldie reminds us that the class of dangerous things has no unifying feature definable by "scientific description" because "dangerous things are picked out relative to our particular human, or, more locally, cultural interests" (Goldie 2000, p.30). Thus the concept of "dangerousness" groups together all sorts of things depending on the background of the individual; stoves, lions, peanuts, Byron, clifftops, or a little learning. Dangerousness is, thus, an evaluative property, and the dangerousness of the things I just listed demonstrate de Sousa's notion of the way we learn from the paradigm scenarios. They might have been learnt from experience, such as burning my hand on a hot plate, or from a text, such as a government health warning or a biography of Shelley. These experiences are integrated into the memory and become automatic, establishing "somatic markers" influencing the decision-making process at a preconscious level. Paradigm scenarios are formed and

categorised according to "their significance in terms of our personal narrative" in readiness to respond to the relevant category of a situation. These "conceptual categories" are then connected to "the brain apparatus used for the triggering of emotions" (ibid). So when a situation arises that fits a particular category "we rapidly and automatically deploy the appropriate emotions" (ibid, p.147). Thus we grasp the meaning of a situation by its associated feeling before it has been processed cognitively. On the other hand, cognition, as I said, can provide us with a retroactive understanding of why we feel a particular way about a situation (see Elster, 1999). An emotional education leaves us with a strong sense of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of emotions, which can in turn cause us to alter our feelings, producing meta-emotions. As Miller points out, it is rare for us to experience an emotion unaccompanied by others:

> Emotions flood in upon us as we respond emotionally to our own emotional states. We are guilty about our anger, embarrassed by our grief, disgusted by our fear.
>
> Miller, 1997, p.25

In drama the situation of a single character "struggling" between his initial emotional responses and the regulatory normative value judgements that produce further consequent emotions, can be identified operating in most of Hamlet's soliloquies. In the "… rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy, for example, he is disgusted by his perceived failure to feel the appropriate level of grief about his father's death.

6) *Mechanisms of self-deception*

In my discussion of impulsive action, I referred to the process whereby the emotional response to an object or situation is projected directly back onto it so that relational properties "collapse" into properties of the object, becoming "a mode of appearance of the situation": for example, my anger in response to the frustration of my desire to get to my destination in a hurry

will turn any obstruction into a malevolent agent; a "horrible" set of traffic lights or a "conspiracy" of Sunday drivers. This collapsing of the relational properties of action and object into one or the other is called (by Elster, 1999) a mechanism. Its operations have to do with the potential for the distortion of apparent reality by the subject/agent under the influence of emotion, and its implications can be demonstrated by the narrative of the fox and the grapes. The fox is "famished" and so, under the influence of his desperate hunger, wishful thinking leads him to believe in a world in which the grapes hanging above him are sweet and within his reach. His perception of the geophysical relationship between himself and the goal of his desire (his orienting belief that the grapes are above him and his instrumental belief that he can reach them), is distorted by the subjunctive "as if body loop" to which his awareness (of his body maps) has been redirected by his desire. However, as soon as his action tendencies have resulted in the impulsive act of reaching for the grapes he recognises a change in the world; as he discovers that he can't reach the grapes there comes the corresponding realisation that they must be sour.

This is a particular instance of Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance" which Elster summarises as "whenever a tension among the elements of a person's mental set generates psychic discomfort, 'something has to give'" (Elster, 1999, p.20). In the case of the sour grapes "tension is generated by the presence of a desire that X be the case and a belief or suspicion that X is not the case" (ibid). Both "sour grapes" and wishful thinking are escape mechanisms governed by the pleasure principle operating at an unconscious level. Much drama, including my own play, depends, to an extent, on wishful thinking. To take action one must believe in the possibility of achieving the intended outcome and the harder it appears to be to achieve the outcome, the greater the dramatic tension, so dramatists construct situations designed to make the goal seem almost impossible, which makes the hero all the braver (or crazier) for pursuing it. Their belief in the possibility of achieving it appears to be deluded. Until, of course, they

do. The potential for self-deception with regard to the goal (under the influence of their deep desire for it) is a danger that every hero must risk.

Our understanding of the meaning of a situation gives it an apparent reality that leads to the instrumental and orienting beliefs by which we calibrate our next action (were we to take it) and measure what we risk by taking it (should we do so); the more urgent and/or important the antecedent goal, the greater the risk worth taking to achieve it. Hence Hollywood's preoccupation with situations in which the entire world is threatened with extinction. Such danger has apparent relevance to us all so the consequent urgency expressed by the characters is easy for an audience to empathise with. The stakes, however, don't need to be so enormous to make us care about the outcome of events. As I've said, the relation of the situation and the subject's concerns are the most important influence on the emotional response, and our concerns are not always entirely with the pursuit of satisfying physical pleasure or avoiding the threat of physical danger. Self-image and self-esteem are equally important to us. This can be demonstrated by comparing the relative value of the stakes in situations that evoke social emotions (such as shame, guilt or envy) with situations in which the basic emotions such as anger and fear find expression. Consider, for example, the hero of a Jane Austen novel trying to make a good impression on the aristocratic relations of her chosen future husband, compared with the story of a soldier in the midst of modern warfare; we might find, relatively speaking, the dropping of a spoon equally if not more emotionally disturbing than the dropping of a bomb.

The intensity of the "psychic discomfort" of dropping a spoon can be explained as follows:

> The desire of esteem is as real a want of nature as hunger; and the neglect and contempt of the world as severe a pain as gout and stone.
>
> John Adams (cited in Elster, 1999, p.143)

Self-image depends to a great extent on the opinion of others and so produces the emotions of social life such as guilt, envy, shame and "the cluster of emotions related to the pursuit and defence of honour" (Elster, 1999, p.139). Some of these social emotions are implicated in the operation of social norms. These are the so-called "moral emotions" influenced by the norms prevailing over any given social situation which influence the agent's concerns (ibid, 140). For example, envy is triggered by the belief that someone has something that I want. Envy is an emotion that, as a general rule, incurs social disapproval, so not only do I feel bad because I don't have the desired object, I also feel the pain of shame and guilt for even feeling this way. On the other hand, I may not feel the social disapproval if I don't *realise* that I am envious (even if it is obvious to others). However, if and when I do realise that I am envious my sense of shame and guilt "induce a rewriting of the script" (ibid, p.98). For example, I can tell myself that "the person who has what I want got it (the coveted item) immorally, illegally and probably at my expense". Thus my envy and its concomitant shame are transmuted into the pleasurable emotion of righteous indignation (Aristotle suggested that indignation is caused by the sight of someone enjoying *undeserved* fortune). Thanks to this psychic mechanism I can now put into place a plan to deprive the person who has it of the coveted item while maintaining smug confidence in the integrity of my actions. All of this self-deceptive psychic activity takes place below the radar of consciousness, influenced by the two conflicting desires: for the pleasure of the goal itself and to maintain self-esteem. In my first chapter I discussed how this double desire plays out with regard to Alan Bond's pursuit of the America's Cup. These complex mechanisms of self-deception provide some of the most interesting material by which dramatic narrative produces "gestic music" from the "emotional piano player's finger strokes" on Frijda's piano.

The transmutation of envy into self-righteousness is a recognisable pattern of behaviour that can produce highly unpredictable outcomes in specific instances of dramatic narrative. As I mentioned in chapter 1, the combination of recognisable but unpredictable outcomes is cause for

considerable depth of satisfaction experienced by the audience of a drama. To recognise, for example, the plausibility of Iago's motivation for hating Othello, we need to understand the cathartic mechanisms of envy and shame that are played out through the play. I choose *Othello* because it is often accused of not providing Iago with plausible motivation for his actions (Coleridge in Shakespeare, 1963, p.205; Bernard Shaw cited in Wurmser, 2008, p.34). However, his actions are *felt* to be plausible when witnessed by an audience. A brief examination of the aesthetics of catharsis in the play should reveal how Shakespeare's design of the emotional elements leads us to believe Iago's behaviour is plausible.

The objection appears to be that the cold calculation and ultra lucidity with which Iago analyses and manipulates the emotional life of the other major characters, as well as being so lucid about his own hatred and contempt for Othello, would suggest that he should also be able to identify to himself and to us the *source* of his hatred. But this is precisely where his blind spot lies. Iago is prepared to express his anger at being overlooked for promotion behind Othello and Cassio: "I am worth no worse a place". He is even prepared to admit his jealousy:

> ... I do suspect the lusty Moor
> Hath leapt into my seat, the thought whereof
> Doth, like poisonous mineral, gnaw my innards

What he cannot bear to acknowledge is his humiliation. As Lansky points out, Iago's envy arises from "... the sense of diminishment (shame, conscious or unconscious) he feels at the flourishing... of those at whom his envy is directed" (cited in Wurmser, 2008, p.34). But he is incapable of admitting it to himself, let alone us. Instead, the action demonstrates it. The audience feels his humiliation as the primary motivation among his many other emotional motivations for the very reason that it is the unspoken emotion; they are not told of it, but they are allowed to feel it for themselves. (This

may well also raise questions about Shakespeare's inherent racism but here I am concerned with his dramaturgical methodology.)

Jane Austen demonstrates similar technique in her dealings with envy. All of her heroines (except for Emma) are poor compared to their relatives but none of them either acknowledge or reveal what contemporary writers might call "status anxiety". By resisting this temptation themselves they leave us, the reader (or in the case of those watching one of the innumerable adaptations, the viewer), to feel it in their stead. In this way, storytellers like Austen and Shakespeare use catharsis to reveal what must, for the sake of verisimilitude, remain unspoken. Thus an aesthetics of catharsis might offer an appreciation of the artfulness by which an audience is given an opportunity to recognise the authenticity of a character's motivation by feeling it on their behalf, even in its apparent absence.

The recognition, understanding and sharing of motive and intention are the principal constituents of the empathy that connects an audience to dramatic characters, rather than some general quality of the characters themselves: action, that is, rather than "characterisation". When catharsis is operating at its best, this motivation will be recognised and understood by an audience as shared emotion. In this instance, catharsis is not simply a pleasurable byproduct of the drama but essential to a complete understanding of the elements of the story. This is potentially true of all drama, as should be clear from the enormous difference between the two examples of motivational envy I presented above; it drives both the sociopathic villainy of Iago and the ironic virtue of Elizabeth Bennett. We find this kind of catharsis operating in a similar manner in many of the great narrative dramatists, for example; the frustration of Arnolphe in Moliere's *School for Wives* is never stated but, when effectively performed, felt by every sensate member of an audience. Similarly, the prevailing disappointment with life suffered but going unacknowledged by so many of the characters of Chekhov's plays, and the gradual but implacable growth of the deep but silent feeling of injustice that finally drives Nora from *The Doll's House.*

With regard to my own play, the unspoken pursuit, particularly for Bertrand and Lexcen, is for self-esteem. Perhaps the closest it comes to being stated outright is towards the beginning when all three characters, although each is in his own separate theatrical space, each try to answer the same question:

> ALAN -- I'm not saying I shouldn't be here. If they see fit to put me in jail for losing shareholders' money so be it.
> BEN – I don't think I had a choice.
> ALAN -- That's not what I'm pissed off about. I'm talking about my medal!
> JOHN -- When something like that happens,…
> ALAN -- My Order of Australia. For winning the America's Cup.
> JOHN --... You can't help wondering...
> BEN – It's what I was born to do.
> ALAN -- They took it back!
> JOHN --... Was it *worth* it?
> BEN – It nearly killed me.
> ALAN -- As if it never happened.
> JOHN – But it was.
> ALAN - But it did.
> JOHN -- I know it was worth it.
> ALAN -- I won it!
> JOHN -- But how to explain …
> ALAN -- I had what it takes.
> JOHN -- The will...
> ALAN -- The will.
> BEN -- How do I start?
> JOHN -- The drive....
> ALAN - The drive.
> JOHN --... where it comes from...
> ALAN -- You have to believe in yourself.
> JOHN -- ... the need…
> ALAN -- I always had that.

once this has been established nothing else needs to be said specifically about Bertrand and Lexcen's reasons for wanting to win until the "St Crispin's day" speech before the final race:

> *Lights up on John below deck talking to the crew.*
> JOHN -- Apparently, gentlemen, we've been keeping half the population of Australia awake these last few nights. Well, tonight, they'll all be awake. They will be speaking our names in every household in the nation. And for the rest of their lives they will remember the night they watched us win the America's Cup. Today we sail into history, gentlemen, but we also sail together for the very last time. So make this one the best, for yourself and for your shipmates. (p. 85)

Holding back on statements about why winning is important adds deeper significance to this speech when it finally comes and further raises the stakes for the "final battle".

Conclusion

At the beginning of the Introduction I mentioned some of the questions I wanted my dissertation to answer with regard to the mechanics of the seductive capacity of narrative drama: How is it that, as an audience, we are susceptible to the illusion that the dramatic events are somehow "real" enough that we should care? How does the dramatic narrative create and sustain the engaged absorption from which the illusion of reality emerges and keeps us sitting so still for so long?

The terms engagement and absorption are both often used to describe an audience's experience of narrative drama (and narrative generally). Both words are appropriate for different reasons. Engagement suggests a capturing of an audience's attention, while absorption suggests a quality of that attention. Through the course of this essay I have discussed three aspects of the way I believe engagement and absorption are brought about. In Chapter 1 I discussed from a practical, dramaturgical perspective the way the dramatist approaches the construction of two hours of sustained engaged absorption. In Chapter 2 I discussed the reception side of the process, suggesting that engaged absorption is a dynamic process and that the structure of effective drama is designed to seduce the audience into an engagement with the act of creating a mimetic illusion. I suggested, by way of "literary Darwinism" possible evolutionary causes for human susceptibility to narrative and then went on discuss various structuralist and poststructuralist descriptions of the interactive processes involved in the reception of dramatic narrative. I came to the conclusion that there is little to be found in reception theory that deals with the emotional involvement that drives these processes. Consequently, in my third chapter

I discussed the condition of an audience's engaged absorption with a dramatic narrative in light of relatively recent research into the philosophy of emotion, which is sometimes referred to as "emotion studies".

What *seems* to be the cause of our emotional involvement with drama is that we somehow believe in the reality of the dramatic situation enough to feel the concerns of the characters involved. However, in the light of research into the field of "emotion studies", we find, counterintuitive though it seems, that it is our feelings that lead us into a cognitive involvement with the action. We don't feel afraid of the Daleks because we believe in their existence, we believe in them because we are afraid. Narrative reception by an audience is initiated when recognition of the situational meaning of the dilemma of the hero is triggered by an empathetic non-cognitive emotion response consisting of action tendencies and subjective feelings. These physiological changes affect enough of a cognitive bias for the audience to accept the apparent reality of the dramatic situation. We hope for a positive outcome and we dread the negative, enough to continue to make the psychic effort necessary to decode the signs and conventions of the form and genre in order to assess what might happen next. Ongoing cognitive appraisals modify these initial reactions and a continuous feedback is established as the performance and its audience jointly sustain the mimetic illusion.

The involvement of the emotions in the creation of the mimetic illusion doesn't end with its role in initiating the illusion. Ricoeur points out that our understanding of time and, indeed, the quality of our temporal existence, depends on our narrative comprehension of it. On the other hand, we understand narrative as a temporal string of actions and events with followability, that is, the belief that the future holds the key to a retrospective cohesion that will tie the entire string into a knot of relevance that can be conceived and remembered as a single action. Catharsis is the emotional, intuitive "grasping together" of events and actions by recognising them as parts of a single story. It is, as Ricoeur describes it, "the integrating part of the metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and

feeling." As the drama continues, expectations are raised and satisfied or subverted, creating ongoing shifts of perspective triggering shifts in our emotional responses to the value of the hero's short-term and long-term goals: wishing and/or dread deepens with a better understanding of the importance and significance of potential consequences. These changes in the valence and intensity of the emotional experience are designed by the dramatist and constructed in the text to encourage the audience to continue to "make imaginary puissance" until they reach an outcome that constitutes a satisfactory conclusion to the whole.

I have not tried to suggest that the attention of the audience is dependent on an absorption in the world of the story to the exclusion of all else. Drama is quite capable of emotionally involving us in the 'co-creation' of an apparent reality by the encoding/decoding of dramatic conventions while even at the same time technically breaking the illusion, subverting those conventions with such techniques as, for example, direct address to the audience. The kind of drama that maintains for the duration of the play the conceit that the presence of the audience is entirely unknown to the players ("the fourth wall") is a relatively recent development. The convention of Ancient Greek, Roman and Elizabethan drama was for a chorus of one kind or another to acknowledge and address the audience. In this the chorus reveals its origins in the role of priests and storytellers. Brecht's plays successfully engage the audience by the telling of stories without letting them forget the presence of the mechanisms of the theatrical process. There is no doubt that an audience is capable of being emotionally involved with the travails of a hero while also being well aware of the act of storytelling taking place. Nor is this capacity limited to people: Bateson's otters are capable of being emotionally committed to a fight "to the death" but still conscious of the playful context in which the contest takes place. This requires an understanding (and trust) that one's opponent is also aware of the "play frame". People, on the other hand, are capable of "multiple-order intentionality", that is, the capacity to understand what someone is thinking and feeling about someone else thinking and feeling about someone else and so on; and feelings, as De Sousa

points out, cannot be hypothesised. We feel our way into understanding someone else's situation by deluding ourselves, for the moment, that we share it. Catharsis is the emotional aspect of "multiple-order intentionality"; the intuitive "grasping together" of the attitudes that connect and draw together the characters, actions and events by, as Ricoeur describes Kant's concept of judgement, placing "an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept" (cited in Ricoeur, 1983, p.66). Moral judgements unavoidably constitute part of this integrating of cognition, imagination, and feeling into a single story because drama involves the symbolic mediation of culture, and as I pointed out in my second chapter, this leads us, inevitably, from social description to social convention through to moral judgement and to questions of what constitutes ethical behaviour.

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